2009 — June 26, Tractor-trailer hits multiple cars, I-44, near Miami, OK — 10

–10  AP. “Death toll in Oklahoma turnpike crash rises to 10.” Del Rio News-Herald, TX. 6-29-09, 10.

–10  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.  FARS 1975-2010 Fatality Analysis.

–10  NTSB. HAR. Truck-Tractor…Collision Into Passenger Vehicles on I-44 Near Miami, OK.

–10  Truckinginfo. “NTSB…Driver Fatigue…Root of Fatal [OK] Truck Wreck.” 9-29-2010.

—  9  Associated Press. “9 killed in Okla. Wreck.” Hays Daily News, KS. 6-28-2009, p. 5.

—  9  Lawrence Journal World, KS. “Oklahoma. 9 killed in turnpike traffic wreck.” 6-27-2009, 2

 

Narrative Information

 

June 27, Lawrence Journal World: “Nine people died Friday when a tractor-trailer slammed into a line of cars stopped by an earlier accident on a northeast Oklahoma turnpike, leaving twisted metal and debris strewn on the highway and stranding miles of traffic in scorching heat.

 

“The final victim was found hours after the crash when tow trucks were finally able to dislodge the rig from a car it had crushed.

 

“Oklahoma Highway Patrol Lt. George Brown said eastbound traffic was stopped about 1 p.m. on the Will Rogers Turnpike northeast of Miami because of an earlier crash when the big rig slammed into at least three cars, which then crashed into more vehicles.  “It looks like a war zone,” he said. “There’s mangled metal everywhere. There’s debris, fluids, dead bodies.”

 

“The turnpike’s eastbound lanes were closed for hours after the accident, which occurred near the border with Missouri and Kansas.” (Lawrence Journal World, KS. “Oklahoma. 9 killed in turnpike traffic wreck.” 6-27-2009, 2.)

 

June 28, AP: “Miami, Okla. (AP)….Eight adults and one child died Friday in the accident that left twisted metal and debris strewn across the highway and stranded miles of traffic in scorching heat for hours.”  (AP. “9 killed in Okla. Wreck.” Hays Daily News, KS. 6-28-2009, p. 5.)

 

June 29, AP: “Oklahoma City (AP) – The death toll from a chain-reaction collision in northeast Oklahoma, which began when a tractor-trailer slammed into cars stopped for a previous accident, climbed to 10 on Sunday.  Shelby Hayes, 35, of Frisco, Texas, died about 7 a.m. at Freeman Hospital in Joplin, Mo., the Oklahoma Highway Patrol said.  “There were family members with her this morning,” said Tina Freeman, a spokeswoman for Freeman Health Systems.

 

“Hayes had been pinned in the wreckage of her vehicle for about two hours after the accident on Interstate 44 on Friday before she was freed by emergency crews.  She was taken to the hospital in critical condition with head, internal and external injuries.  Hayes’ husband of 16 years, Randall Hayes, 38, and their son, Ethan Hayes, 7, were pinned in the vehicle for between eight and nine hours and were pronounced dead at the scene.  Cynthia Olson, 55, of Crossroads, Texas, who also was in the vehicle, died as well.  Olson was Shelby Hayes’ mother, Wanda Hayes said. “They were on their way to Sarcoxie, Mo., for Shelby’s great-grandfather’s funeral,” Wanda Hayes, Randall Hayes’ mother, said Sunday from Garland, Texas.  “I heard about this about 1:30 a.m. from Garland police.  They tracked me down and I immediately went to Joplin to be with Shelby and make arrangements to get my boys home.”

 

“Barbara Mueth of Children’s Mercy Hospital in Kansas City, Mo., said Sunday that the condition of 12-year-old Andrea Reyes, of Phoenix, Ariz., was upgraded from critical to serious. Her parents, Ricardo Reyes, 39, and her mother, Ernestina Reyes, were killed.

 

“The other victims were Oral Hooks, 69, Earlene Hooks, 63, Antonio Hooks, 42, and Dione Hooks, 41, all of Oklahoma City.

 

“The Hooks family, two parents and two sons, were headed to Missouri to visit Ronnie Hooks for what was supposed to be a celebration on Sunday.  “They were on their way to see me in St. Louis,” Hooks said.  “I was to be ordained as an elder in the Church of God and Christ.”  Instead, Hooks and his surviving brothers are arranging to bury their loved ones.  Hooks said his father, Oral, was semi-retired and his mother, Earlene, was a housewife.  His brother Dione worked as a laborer and Antonio Hooks was a veteran who was disabled, Ronnie Hooks said.

 

“The driver of the tractor-trailer, identified as 76-year-old Donald Creed of Willard, Mo., was admitted to a Missouri hospital in good condition with head and other injuries.”  (AP. “Death toll in Oklahoma turnpike crash rises to 10.” Del Rio News-Herald, TX.6-29-09, p. 10.)

 

NTSB: “Executive Summary

 

“On June 26, 2009, a multivehicle accident occurred on Interstate 44 (I-44) near Miami, Oklahoma, shortly after a minor accident in the same vicinity occurred. The minor accident took place about 1:13 p.m., when a 2001 Ford Focus traveling eastbound at milepost 321.7 on I-44 drifted into a truck-tractor semitrailer parked on the right shoulder.  After the Focus sideswiped the semitrailer, the car’s driver overcorrected to the left, lost control, and struck the concrete center median barrier.  The Focus came to rest in the roadway, blocking the left eastbound lane. As the trailing traffic began to slow and stop, it formed a queue.  Several motorists exited their vehicles and began to push the disabled Focus to the right shoulder. The queue of stopped vehicles and approaching but slowing vehicles extended back from the accident site approximately 1,500 feet to about milepost 321.5.

 

“Meanwhile, about 1:19 p.m., a 76-year-old truck driver operating a 2008 Volvo truck-tractor in combination with an empty 2009 Great Dane refrigerated semitrailer was traveling eastbound in the outside (right) lane of I-44 at approximately 69 mph. (The posted speed limit was 75 mph.) The truck driver did not react to the queue of slowing and stopped vehicles and collided with the rear of a 2003 Land Rover sport utility vehicle (SUV). As both vehicles moved forward, the Land Rover struck a 2003 Hyundai Sonata and then departed the right lane and shoulder, coming to rest off the roadway.  The Volvo continued forward, struck and overrode the Hyundai Sonata, struck and overrode a 2004 Kia Spectra, and then struck the rear of a 2000 Ford Windstar minivan.  The Volvo overrode a portion of the Windstar while pushing it into the rear of a livestock trailer being towed by a 2004 Ford F350 pickup truck.  The pickup truck was pushed forward and struck a 2008 Chevrolet Tahoe SUV.  The Volvo combination unit came to rest approximately 270 feet past the point where it initially struck the Land Rover.  As a result of the Volvo combination unit’s striking the slowed and stopped vehicle queue on I-44, 10 passenger vehicle occupants died, 5 received minor-to-serious injuries, and the driver of the Volvo combination unit was seriously injured.

 

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the Volvo truck driver’s fatigue, caused by the combined effects of acute sleep loss, circadian disruption associated with his shift work schedule, and mild sleep apnea, which resulted in the driver’s failure to react to slowing and stopped traffic ahead by applying the brakes or performing any evasive maneuver to avoid colliding with the traffic queue. Contributing to the severity of the accident were the Volvo truck-tractor combination unit’s high impact speed and its structural incompatibility with the passenger vehicles.

 

“The following safety issues are identified in this report:

 

  • The accident truck driver’s fatigue,
  • The need for updated and comprehensive fatigue education materials and fatigue management programs,
  • The significance of heavy vehicle aggressivity in collisions between dissimilar vehicles,
  • The lack of Federal requirements for heavy commercial vehicle event data recorders and video event recorders, and
  • The lack of Federal requirements for forward collision warning systems.”  (pp. ix-x.)

 

“At the times of both accidents, the pavement was dry, and the nearest weather station reported conditions of clear, dry weather with 10 miles of visibility and a temperature of approximately 101° F and 43 percent humidity. When the accidents occurred, the sun was almost directly overhead.” (p. 3.)

 

“Second Accident (With Fatalities)

 

“As vehicles approached the traffic queue, they decelerated from the posted speed limit of 75 mph. The 2008 Volvo truck-tractor with an empty 2009 Great Dane refrigerated semitrailer, traveling eastbound at approximately 69 mph, struck the last vehicle in the right lane of the queue without significant slowing. The entire combination vehicle weighed approximately 40,400 pounds….”  (p. 4.)

 

“Survival Factors….

 

“Postaccident examinations of those killed in the accident showed that their injuries included blunt force trauma to the head and torso, fractures of the extremities, and multiple severe abrasions and lacerations. Three occupants of the passenger vehicles sustained chemical contact injuries from the fuel that leaked from the damaged saddle fuel tank of the Volvo truck-tractor when it came to rest on top of their vehicles….

 

“The driver of the Volvo truck-tractor semitrailer was not wearing his 3-point restraint, and he sustained injuries including a non-displaced fracture of the jaw, a brain contusion, and facial swelling and lacerations.”  (p. 9.)

 

“Emergency Response

 

“The Miami Police Department dispatcher was notified of the fatal accident through the 911 system at 1:20 p.m.  An OHP trooper, who was working a vehicle incident a short distance west of the accident, was notified of the accident by a passerby and was en route to the scene when dispatch notified him at 1:22 p.m.  Upon his arrival on scene at 1:24 p.m., the trooper assumed Incident Command for law enforcement and immediately requested OHP dispatch to send all available ambulances, three medical helicopters, and a heavy-duty wrecker, stating that there were injuries and people pinned in their vehicles.  The trooper also requested that the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority (OTA) close the eastbound tollgate in Miami and start rerouting traffic.  By 1:33 p.m., eastbound traffic on the I-44 turnpike was closed, and traffic was redirected off at the Miami tollbooth. Westbound traffic was reduced to one lane.

 

“The first call from dispatch went out to the Downstream Fire Department at 1:22 p.m., and its first unit arrived on scene at 1:31 p.m.  The Miami Fire Department was notified of the accident at 1:23 p.m., and its first unit arrived on scene at 1:33 p.m.  The arriving shift captain for the Downstream Fire Department assumed Incident Command for the rescue, recovery, extrication, and transport of the injured.  Between 1:33 and 1:38 p.m., three medical helicopters were put on standby; they were subsequently dispatched to the scene, sequentially. Each helicopter transported one seriously injured passenger vehicle occupant to hospitals in Joplin, Missouri.  The Volvo driver and the seriously injured Tahoe passenger were transported to a hospital by ground ambulance at 2:29 p.m.

 

“A heavy-duty wrecker arrived approximately 40 minutes after the first call from dispatch. According to the wrecker owner/driver, he took the most direct route to the accident scene, a distance of about 15 miles. Because of the backed-up traffic, he had to drive his wrecker along the shoulder and, at times, into the drainage ditch to get to the scene.  The Volvo combination unit had come to rest on top of three passenger vehicles; consequently, the Volvo truck-tractor and its semitrailer had to be lifted off the Kia and the Hyundai before the occupants could be extricated.  In total, 7 fire departments, with 7 rescue and engine units, and 12 public and private emergency medical services ambulances responded to the scene, as well as 3 medical helicopters.” (p. 10.)

 

“Highway Information  General

 

“The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) recommends an 820-foot stopping sight distance for a speed of 75 mph. Field measurements showed that when the accident site was viewed from a truck driver’s perspective (average seated eye height of approximately 96 inches from the ground), a 2.0-foot-tall (height of a passenger car taillight) object could be seen from the beginning of the hill crest 1,260 feet away.”  (p. 11.)

 

“Accident records from the OTA showed that for a 5-year period prior to the accident (2004–2008), there were 70 accidents along the 6-mile segment between mileposts 318.5 and 324.5. Comprising the 70 events were 31 injury accidents, 2 fatal accidents (1 of which involved a commercial vehicle), and 37 property damage accidents. The annual average daily traffic count for 2004–2008 was 20,642 vehicles per day for I-44. The OTA indicated that commercial vehicles accounted for approximately 35 percent of this total.” (p. 12.)

 

“The initial accident that caused the traffic queue to develop occurred at approximately 1:13 p.m.; the fatal accident occurred at 1:19 p.m., and the first responding OHP trooper arrived on scene at 1:24 p.m.”  (p. 13.)

 

“Volvo Truck-Tractor Semitrailer

 

“The vehicle that rear-ended the passenger cars in the fatal accident was a 2008 Volvo truck-tractor with an empty 2009 Great Dane refrigerated semitrailer. The unloaded Volvo combination unit weighed 40,400 pounds. Both the truck-tractor and the semitrailer were owned by Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. (AWG).” (p. 13.) ….

 

“Following the accident, the truck-tractor’s cruise control was found in the “on” position…” (14)

 

“The available ECM [electronic control module] data also indicated that the tractor’s cruise control was active and that the driver did not attempt to brake the Volvo before striking the passenger vehicles or at any time during the accident sequence….” (p. 15.)

 

“Driver

 

“The 76-year-old Volvo truck driver had been employed by AWG since 1992,23 and he possessed a valid Missouri Class “A” commercial driver’s license… Missouri requires that a CDL be renewed every 3 years after a commercial driver turns 70; for drivers under 70, the renewal period is 6 years. The driver also held passenger transportation and doubles/triples trailer endorsements. His license indicated that he was not subject to any restrictions, and he had a current medical certificate, valid for 1 year, with an expiration of December 2009.25 The NTSB obtained a copy of the driver’s Missouri driving history, and it indicated no violations, convictions, or traffic accidents.

 

“When he arrived on scene, the first responding OHP trooper spoke with the accident truck driver, who was still in his vehicle. The trooper subsequently reported that the driver was able to walk and negotiate turns, and he saw no indication of the driver’s having visual problems. The OHP accident investigation report stated that the driver was inattentive at the time of the collision.

 

“The driver was subject to postaccident drug and alcohol screening, per 49 CFR 382.303.27 Urine and blood samples were collected from the driver at the hospital at 5:34 and 7:20 p.m., respectively. The NTSB arranged for a split of the blood specimen collected at 7:20 p.m. under the direction of the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation to be tested at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Civil Aerospace Medical Institute toxicology laboratory; the sample was negative for alcohol and a wide range of prescription, over-the-counter, and illicit drugs.

 

“The accident driver refused to be interviewed by NTSB investigators postaccident.” (pp. 16-17.)

 

“Witnesses’ Reports of Driver’s Preaccident Actions

 

“The NTSB interviewed several witnesses who were driving on I-44 eastbound and observed the driver and his activities just prior to the accident.

 

“Truck Driver Trainer and Trainee. A truck driver trainer and his trainee student, who was driving a Freightliner tractor with a refrigerated semitrailer, were traveling in the right lane heading eastbound on I-44, and they observed the accident.  They saw the Volvo combination vehicle driver pass them in the left lane, traveling approximately 70 mph. They reported that the accident driver changed lanes about a half-truck-length in front of them, without signaling.

 

“The trainer stated that he could observe that traffic ahead on I-44 was stopped, and he told his student to “back down.” He recalled that as their vehicle slowed, the Volvo combination unit traveled another 4–5 truck lengths ahead of them; then, the trainer observed debris flying into the air and a vehicle going off the road to the right.  The trainer reported not observing brake lights on the accident truck or smoke from the vehicle’s tires.  After the student driver brought their vehicle to a stop, the two witnesses exited their vehicle and approached the accident truck which was on top of the passenger vehicles.

 

“The student truck driver reported that while he was driving on I-44, he first noticed the accident truck in his left side mirror, changing from the right into the left lane. He said this occurred about the same time that he began to slow his own vehicle in response to the congestion and brake lights he observed in both lanes ahead of him as he crested the hill. He said he activated his vehicle’s four-way flashers when he observed the stopped traffic. He stated that the accident Volvo truck passed him on the left and changed back to the right lane without slowing or braking. The student driver estimated that it took 6–7 seconds for the accident truck to complete the passing maneuver. Then, the Volvo combination unit crashed into the stopped traffic ahead. This witness estimated that his own truck was traveling about 66 mph when he began to brake it and that he had slowed to about 35–40 mph when the accident occurred about 300–400 feet ahead of him. This witness also observed that another truck passed him after the accident Volvo did, and that truck stopped without hitting the traffic queue ahead. This student driver believed that he was able to bring his vehicle to a stop approximately at the location where the Volvo truck had struck the westernmost vehicle in the queue, the Land Rover SUV….” (pp. 17-18)

 

“Witness 1 From Traffic Queue.  A witness who had been stopped in the traffic queue that resulted from the first accident (involving the Ford Focus) said that he observed in his rearview mirror that a vehicle had been struck from behind and had gone off the road. He then saw a truck strike and run over several more vehicles. He called 911 to report the accident and request ambulances. He exited his vehicle, ran to the accident truck driver, and saw him climb up from the floor of the Volvo cab on the passenger side and sit back into the driver seat.

Witness 2 From Traffic Queue. NTSB investigators interviewed another driver from the traffic queue who did not observe the accident but did interact with the accident driver immediately thereafter. He noticed that both windows of the Volvo truck-tractor were down and that the driver appeared to be disoriented and seemed to have no idea of what had happened.” (p. 19.)

 

“Driver’s Work Shift and Preaccident 72-Hour History

 

“According to AWG, the driver was regularly scheduled to work on Mondays, Thursdays, Fridays, and Saturdays. The driver engaged in shift work; he generally came on duty between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. and went off duty before 3:00 p.m.” (p. 19)

 

“When he was scheduled to work, the driver normally began his shift at AWG’s Springfield, Missouri, terminal, made deliveries to a number of stores (or other destinations), and returned to the Springfield terminal after completing his final delivery. On the day of the accident, the driver’s start time was scheduled for 3:00 a.m., and he left the AWG terminal in Springfield at 3:15 a.m. He traveled to the following destinations (all in Oklahoma): Chouteau, Muskogee, Vian, back to Muskogee, onto Wagoner, and back to Chouteau. The driver departed Chouteau and was headed to the AWG terminal in Springfield when, at 12:46 p.m., while driving on I-44, he began a 22-minute cellular telephone call to a friend.  The OHP interviewed the person with whom the accident driver was speaking during this 22-minute telephone call, and that individual stated that the driver was coherent, spoke in a normal fashion, and did not mention anything about being tired or sleepy.  The driver ended the telephone call at 1:08 p.m. after remarking that he was in traffic. The accident occurred east of Miami, Oklahoma, about 1:19 p.m., at milepost 321.5….

 

“There is no indication that the driver was engaged in non-driving tasks, such as sending a text message or talking on a citizens band radio or cellular telephone at the time of the accident. Postaccident examination of the roadway and the accident vehicle showed no evidence of braking or evasive steering input by the Volvo truck driver prior to his truck’s striking the first passenger vehicle in the traffic queue….”  (p. 22.)

 

“At the time of the accident, the driver weighed 240 pounds, was 5 foot 11 inches tall, and had a body mass index (BMI) of 34.4.[1]

 

“Postaccident Medical Examinations. After the accident, the driver was admitted to a local hospital for injuries sustained in the accident; he was observed for 24 hours and then released. The driver went to another hospital 2 days later due to markedly elevated blood pressure. During this hospitalization, he was evaluated by a neurologist, who noted the following in the driver’s medical record in reference to the accident on June 26,

 

He was amnesic for the event. The last thing he remembers was that he saw the traffic was slowing down and he thought he was slowing down in the traffic. But according to the witness, he was not slowing down. The next thing he remembered was that he was out of his truck and a lady was holding his left side of the face. He did not know the exact time that he was out but it was approximately about 15–20 minutes.”  (pp. 24-25.) ….

 

“Cellular Telephone Use Policy

 

“AWG’s policy regarding personal cellular telephone use appears in its employee handbook.  It states, “The use of cellular telephones can lead to workplace distractions that can cause the user to put themselves or others in dangerous situations.” The handbook further states, under Prohibited Use, that “Employees will not use or carry their cellular telephone in any fashion while performing their jobs.” The NTSB obtained the accident driver’s cellular telephone records. The records for June 22 showed that the driver had used his personal cellular telephone that day when driving the company’s Volvo combination unit.”  (p. 27.)

 

“Analysis

 

“Accident Discussion….

 

“Four of the six passenger vehicles sustained catastrophic damage from being struck by the Volvo combination unit. The first vehicle struck by the Volvo was the Land Rover; the truck-tractor’s front bumper was higher than the Land Rover’s, so the Volvo overrode the smaller vehicle and intruded into its occupant compartment, crushing it inward several feet before pushing the Land Rover off the right side of the roadway. The second vehicle struck was the Hyundai; the Land Rover hit it first in the rear right corner, which rotated the Hyundai slightly counterclockwise. Then, the Volvo truck-tractor hit the Hyundai and pushed it forward into the Kia sedan. The Volvo continued forward and (due to the high impact speed, its taller bumper, and its heavier structure) drove over the Hyundai, which was caught under the truck-tractor’s dual wheels when it came to rest.

 

“The third vehicle struck was the Kia sedan; it was hit first by the Hyundai and then by the Volvo truck-tractor. The Volvo then drove over the Kia. The Kia ended up directly under the truck-tractor’s second axle. The fourth vehicle struck from the rear by the Volvo was the Windstar minivan. The Volvo overrode it and crushed the Windstar occupant compartment structure forward, almost to the front seatbacks. The last two passenger vehicles, the F350 pickup truck (towing a livestock trailer) and the Chevrolet Tahoe, sustained moderate damage but no intrusion into their occupant compartments. The Volvo did not strike these vehicles directly; however, the Windstar was pushed forward into the trailer being pulled by the F350, causing the pickup truck and the trailer to be pushed forward into the Tahoe.” (p. 44.)

 

“Driver….

 

“It cannot be conclusively established that the driver was awake/conscious at the exact time of the accident, but he was certainly awake/conscious when he shifted lanes prior to it, when the queue of slowing and stopped vehicles in both lanes would have been clearly visible to him.

 

“The driver’s failure to initiate any sort of action to avoid the accident suggests a complete lack of awareness of, and/or inability to respond to, the line of vehicles in front of him. No compelling medical explanation for his behavior was identified through comprehensive postaccident medical testing. Although there are conditions—including a complex partial seizure, a transient ischemic attack (mini-stroke), a psychological disorder, or a sudden sustained abnormal heart rhythm—that might explain a sudden loss of awareness or inability to act, no clinical evidence was found that any of those conditions had occurred. Further, there is no evidence that the driver experienced any such event in the months/years preceding or in the weeks following the accident, and the diagnoses of such events are not consistent with the driver’s witnessed behavior immediately before and after the accident. Therefore, the NTSB concludes that based on the medical evidence and witness accounts concerning the accident truck driver’s behavior and condition, it is unlikely that he experienced a medical event that might have caused or contributed to the accident.” (pp. 44-45.)

 

“Fatigue….

 

“The day of the accident, June 26, was the first time in 3 weeks that the driver had worked a long shift, which required an earlier shift start time of 3:00 a.m.  Had the driver gone to sleep at 8:00 p.m. and awoken at 1:00 a.m., he would have had the opportunity to obtain a maximum of 5 hours of sleep, which was 3-4 hours less than his typical sleep requirement.  Such acute sleep deprivation has been found to increase the risk of an injury crash, with a 2-hour sleep loss resulting in noticeable decrements in divided attention and vigilance.  Additionally, drivers who reported getting 5 hours sleep or less in the previous 24 hours had an almost threefold increase in risk for an injury crash.

 

“In the 3 weeks prior to the accident, the Miami accident driver had worked only once and had probably reverted to a typical diurnal sleep–wake schedule similar to the one he described as having since the accident (that is, going to bed about 10:00 p.m. and rising about 7:00 a.m.). Consequently, at the time of the accident, it is very likely that the driver’s circadian rhythms mirrored those of an individual keeping a typical daytime schedule. Therefore, on the night before the accident, the driver would have been trying to fall asleep 2 hours earlier than usual. This significant phase advance is beyond the range of entrainment for the circadian clock and would have resulted in significant sleep latency and shortened total sleep time. Given the self-reported circadian phase advance of the driver’s bedtime, it is possible that he may have obtained as little as 3 hours of quality sleep prior to the accident, resulting in a total of 5 hours of  acute sleep loss prior to the crash. Furthermore, the driver would have begun driving during the window of a circadian low, making him more prone to fatigue and decrements in attention and performance. Finally, the accident occurred in the early afternoon, about the time when individuals on a standard daytime schedule would begin to experience a mid-afternoon dip in performance. It is highly probable that the combined effects of acute sleep loss, his shift work schedule, and a mid-afternoon decline in performance resulted in the accident driver being fatigued at the time of the accident.  (pp. 46-47.) ….

 

“In 2009, 3,380 people died in crashes that involved a large truck.”[2] …. (p. 68.)

 

“Conclusions….

 

  1. The cellular telephone activity in which the truck driver engaged while on duty failed to comply with Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., written policy.

 

  1. Based on the available electronic control module data and analysis, the truck driver failed to apply the brakes at any time prior to, during, or after striking the slowed and stopped vehicles in the traffic queue and was operating the accident truck with the cruise control engaged at a speed of about 69 mph.

 

  1. Based on the medical evidence and witness accounts concerning the accident truck driver’s behavior and condition, it is unlikely that he experienced a medical event that might have caused or contributed to the accident.

 

  1. The accident truck driver was impaired by fatigue at the time of the crash as a result of the effects of acute sleep loss, circadian disruption associated with his shift work schedule, and mild obstructive sleep apnea.

 

  1. The truck driver’s impairment from fatigue led to his failure to react to the slowing and stopped traffic ahead by applying brakes or performing any evasive maneuver to avoid colliding with the traffic queue.

 

  1. The provision of new and updated information on sleep, fatigue, and alertness by the

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, based on contemporary scientific research, is essential to ensuring that commercial drivers have the necessary guidance to enable them to be alert and well rested when operating their vehicles.

 

  1. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., did not have a meaningful fatigue management

program in place at the time of the accident.

 

  1. The use of fatigue management programs by motor carriers has the potential to reduce

accidents caused by fatigued commercial drivers.

 

  1. The combination of the high impact speed of the Volvo truck-tractor semitrailer and the

structural incompatibility between the Volvo and the passenger vehicles resulted in extensive intrusion deformation and crush damage to the passenger compartments of the Land Rover, Hyundai, Kia, and Ford Windstar; a loss of survivable space in those vehicles; and the deaths of 10 passenger vehicle occupants.

 

  1. Even though heavy truck incompatibility is a major cause of death for occupants of

passenger cars, light trucks, and vans involved in crashes with heavy trucks, to date, the U.S. Department of Transportation and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration have not made this issue a priority and have not allocated sufficient resources to study and address it.

 

  1. The heavy truck in the Miami accident lacked a dedicated event data recorder designed

for accident reconstruction and to provide accelerometer-based crash pulse data, which

are critical to the evaluation of vehicle performance and could have been used in vehicle

incompatibility research; therefore, these data are again unavailable to investigators and researchers.

 

  1. Due to the lack of government standards and requirements for the design and use of highway vehicle event data recorders, valuable high-fidelity crash data continue to go unrecorded and, thus, are unavailable for analysis.

 

  1. Video event recorders have the potential to increase safe behavior among commercial drivers through structured safety performance monitoring, which may lead to decreases in accidents and injuries.

 

  1. Had the accident truck been equipped with a video event recorder, a more definitive assessment of the driver’s precrash condition and behavior would have been possible.

 

  1. A forward collision warning system with adaptive cruise control and active braking would have provided the driver with the best opportunity to prevent, or reduce the severity of, the truck-tractor semitrailer’s impact with the passenger vehicles in the traffic queue.” (pp. 80-81.) ….

 

“New Recommendations

 

“As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following safety recommendations:

 

“To the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration:

 

Create educational materials that provide current information on fatigue and fatigue countermeasures and make the materials available in different formats, including updating and redistributing your truck-driver-focused driver fatigue video; make the video available electronically for quicker dissemination; and implement a plan to regularly update the educational materials and the video with the latest scientific information and to regularly redistribute them. (H-10-8)

 

Require all motor carriers to adopt a fatigue management program based on the North American Fatigue Management Program guidelines for the management of fatigue in a motor carrier operating environment. (H-10-9)

 

Require all heavy commercial vehicles to be equipped with video event recorders that capture data in connection with the driver and the outside environment and roadway in the event of a crash or sudden deceleration event. The device should create recordings that are easily accessible for review when conducting efficiency testing and system-wide performance-monitoring programs. (H-10-10)

 

Require motor carriers to review and use video event recorder information in conjunction with other performance data to verify that driver actions are in accordance with company and regulatory rules and procedures essential to safety. (H-10-11)

 

“To the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:

 

To improve highway vehicle crash compatibility, develop performance standards for front under-ride protection systems for trucks with gross vehicle weight ratings over 10,000 pounds. (H-10-12) (This recommendation supersedes Safety Recommendation H-06-16 and is classified “Open—Unacceptable Response.”)

 

After establishing performance standards for front under-ride protection systems for trucks with gross vehicle weight ratings over 10,000 pounds, require that all such newly manufactured trucks be equipped with front under-ride protection systems meeting the performance standards. (H-10-13)

 

Develop and implement minimum performance standards for event data recorders for trucks with gross vehicle weight ratings over 10,000 pounds that address, at a minimum, the following elements: data parameters to be recorded; data sampling rates; duration of recorded event; standardized or universal data imaging interface; data storage format; and device and data survivability for crush, impact, fluid exposure and immersion, and thermal exposure. The standards should also require that the event data recorder be capable of capturing and preserving data in the case of a power interruption or loss, and of accommodating future requirements and technological advances, such as flashable and/or reprogrammable operating system software and/or firmware updates. (H-10-14)

 

After establishing performance standards for event data recorders for trucks with gross vehicle weight ratings over 10,000 pounds, require that all such vehicles be equipped with event data recorders meeting the standards. (H-10-15)

 

“To Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc.:

 

Create and implement a comprehensive fatigue management program using existing sources of information, and develop a systematic process to update the program as more guidance becomes available. (H-10-16)

 

“Previously Issued Recommendations Reiterated and Reclassified in This Report

 

“As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board reiterates and reclassifies the following safety recommendations:

 

“To the U.S. Department of Energy:

 

Report to the National Transportation Safety Board the 21st Century Truck Partnership’s plans and timetable for prioritizing research, testing, and design enhancements that address heavy truck aggressivity. (H-06-15)  Safety Recommendation H-06-15 is reclassified “Open—Unacceptable Response” in the “Vehicle Occupant Survival, Heavy Vehicle Aggressivity” Analysis section of this report.

 

“To the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:

 

Complete rulemaking on adaptive cruise control and collision warning system performance standards for new commercial vehicles. At a minimum, these standards should address obstacle detection distance, timing of alerts, and human factors guidelines, such as the mode and type of warning. (H-01-6)  Safety Recommendation H-01-6 is reclassified “Open—Unacceptable Response” in the “Forward Collision Warning Systems” Analysis section of this report.

 

After promulgating performance standards for collision warning systems for commercial vehicles, require that all new commercial vehicles be equipped with a collision warning system. (H-01-7)  Safety Recommendation H-01-7 is reclassified “Open—Unacceptable Response” in the “Forward Collision Warning Systems” Analysis section of this report.

 

“Previously Issued Recommendations Reiterated in This Report

 

“As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board reiterates the following safety recommendations:

 

“To the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration:

 

Develop and implement a plan to deploy technologies in commercial vehicles to reduce the occurrence of fatigue-related accidents. (H-08-13)

 

Develop and use a methodology that will continually assess the effectiveness of the fatigue management plans implemented by motor carriers, including their ability to improve sleep and alertness, mitigate performance errors, and prevent incidents and accidents. (H-08-14)

 

“To the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:

 

Determine whether equipping commercial vehicles with collision warning systems with active braking and electronic stability control systems will reduce commercial vehicle accidents. If these technologies are determined to be effective in reducing accidents, require their use on commercial vehicles. (H-08-15)

 

“Previously Issued Recommendation Reclassified in This Report

 

“As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board reclassifies the following safety recommendation:

 

“To the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:

 

Include heavy vehicles in your research, testing, and eventual rulemaking on highway vehicle incompatibility, especially as that incompatibility affects the severity of accidents. (H-06-16)  Safety Recommendation H-06-16 is reclassified “Closed—Unacceptable Action/Superseded” (superseded by Safety Recommendation H-10-12) in the “Vehicle Occupant Survival, Heavy Vehicle Aggressivity” Analysis section of this report.”  (pp. 83-85.)

 

(NTSB. Highway Accident Report Truck-Tractor Semitrailer Rear-End Collision Into Passenger Vehicles on Interstate 44 Near Miami, Oklahoma, June 26, 2009 (NTSB/HAR-10/02; PB2010-916202). Adopted 9-28-2010.)

 

Truckinginfo: “Creed [the AWG Truck driver], who was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the crash, has pleaded guilty to 10 counts of negligent homicide and was sentenced last month to 30 days in jail and 10 years’ probation.  He is barred from possessing a CDL as part of a plea agreement with prosecutors.  He retired from the Kansas City-based Associated Wholesale Grocers shortly after the accident.”  (Truckinginfo. “NTSB Says Driver Fatigue at the Root of Fatal Oklahoma Truck Wreck.” 9-29-2010.)

 

Sources

 

Associated Press. “9 killed in Okla. Wreck.” Hays Daily News, KS. 6-28-2009, p. 5. Accessed at:  http://newspaperarchive.com/hays-daily-news/2009-06-28/page-5/

 

Associated Press. “Death toll in Oklahoma turnpike crash rises to 10.” Del Rio News-Herald, TX. 6-29-09, 10. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/del-rio-news-herald/2009-06-29/page-10/

 

Lawrence Journal World, KS. “Oklahoma. 9 killed in turnpike traffic wreck.” 6-27-2009, 2. Accessed at:  http://newspaperarchive.com/lawrence-journal-world/2009-06-27/page-2/

 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Partial Data Dump of Crashes Involving 10 or More Fatalities, by Year, Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 1975-2009 Final and 2010 ARF. Washington, DC: NHTSA, pdf file provided to Wayne Blanchard, 1-26-2012.

 

National Transportation Safety Board. Highway Accident Report. Truck-Tractor Semitrailer Rear-End Collision Into Passenger Vehicles on Interstate 44 Near Miami, Oklahoma, June 26, 2009 (NTSB/HAR-10/02; PB2010-916202). Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted 9-28-2010. At: http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2010/HAR1002.pdf

 

Truckinginfo. “NTSB Says Driver Fatigue at the Root of Fatal Oklahoma Truck Wreck.” 9-29-2010. Accessed 2-3-2012: http://www.truckinginfo.com/news/news-detail.asp?news_id=71776

 

 

 

[1] NTSB footnote 36:  The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define a BMI of 30 or above as constituting obesity.

[2] NTSB footnote 179:  See <http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs811363.pdf>