1986 — June 18, Grand Canyon Air and Helitech helicopter collide, Grand Canyon, AZ–25
— 25 NTSB. AAR. Grand Canyon Airlines…and Helitech…Midair Collision… 1987, p. v.
— 25 NTSB. SIR. Safety of the Air Tour Industry in the United States (NTSB/SIR-95/01).
— 25 Planecrashinfo.com. “1986. Accident Details. Grand Canyon Airlines/Helitech, June 18.”
Narrative Information
NTSB AAR Executive Summary: “On June 18, 1986, at 0855 mountain standard time, a Grand Canyon Airlines DHC-6, N76GC (Twin Otter), call sign Canyon 6, took off from runway 21 of the Grand Canyon Airport. The flight, a scheduled air tour over Grand Canyon National Park, was to be about 50 minutes in duration. Shortly thereafter, at 0913, a Helitech Bell 2068 (Jet Ranger), NGTC, call sign Tech 2, began its approximate 30-minute, on-demand air tour of the Grand Canyon. It took off from its base at a heliport adjacent to State route 64 in Tusayan, Arizona, located about 5 miles south of the main entrance to the south rim of the National Park. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The two aircraft collided at an altitude of 6,500 feet msl in the area of the Tonto Plateau.
“There were 18 passengers and 2 flightcrew members on the DHC-6 and 4 passengers and 1 flightcrew member on the Bell 206B. All 25 passengers and crewmembers on both aircraft were killed as a result of the collision.
“Because of the lack of cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders in both aircraft, as well as the lack of radar data, no assessment of the flight path of either aircraft could be made. As a result, the reason for the failure of the pilots of each aircraft to “see and avoid” each other cannot be determined. Consequently, the issues highlighted in this report concern primarily the oversight of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on Grand Canyon-based scenic air tours or sightseeing flights and the actions of the National Park Service to influence these operations.
“Because of an exemption to 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135, local scenic air tours were conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. This investigation revealed that there was no FAA oversight on the routes and altitudes of Grand Canyon-based scenic air tour operators. This was contrary to the intent of Safety Recommendation A-84-52.
“Further, the National Park Service, through its authority under a 1975 law, was conducting a study to determine the effects of aircraft noise on the Grand Canyon and, at the same time, influencing the selection of air tour routes. The routes of the rotary-wing operators were moved as a noise conservation measure to where they converged with those of Grand Canyon Airlines at the location of the accident.
“Other safety issues concern the lack of regulations to limit flight and duty times of pilots conducting scenic air tour flights, and the lack of a requirement for the pilots of such flights to use intercoms or public address systems when narrating during the flights.
“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrews of both aircraft to “see and avoid” each other for undetermined reasons. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration to exercise its oversight responsibility over flight operations in the Grand Canyon airspace and the actions of the National Park Service to influence the selection of routes by Grand Canyon scenic air tour operators. Also contributing to the accident was the modification and configuration of the routes of the rotary-wing operators resulting in their intersecting with the routes of Grand Canyon Airlines near Crystal Rapids.
“As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board issued recommendations to the FAA to apply 14 CFR Part 135 flight and duty time limitations on scenic air tour operations; require air tour pilots to use a public address system, intercom, or similar system while narrating air tour flights; and require all scenic air tour flights to operate under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 135 and not 14 CFR Part 91.” (p. v.)
NTSB SIR: “On June 18, 1986, a DHC-6 Twin Otter airplane and a Bell 206B Jet Ranger helicopter collided over the Grand Canyon, killing all 25 passengers and crewmembers aboard both aircraft. As a result of the investigation and public hearing in connection with this accident, the Safety Board concluded that one of the contributing factors to the accident was ‘the failure of the FAA to exercise its oversight responsibility over flight operations in the Grand Canyon airspace…’
“Three of the Safety Board’s 15 conclusions from its investigation were: (1) “The similarity of routes and limited number of scenic points overflown by scenic air tour operators increased the risk of a midair collision”; (2) “The FAA did not modify the regulations necessary to allow [it] to properly oversee Grand Canyon scenic air tour flight operations”; and (3) “The rule changes that the FAA has proposed should correct many of the deficiencies in current FAA authority to perform surveillance over Grand Canyon scenic air tours. However, the workload of the personnel in the Las Vegas FSDO may preclude their effective implementation.”
Also a result of this investigation, the Safety Board made three recommendations to the FAA. The following two are pertinent to this special investigation:
Apply to revenue air tour flights the same flight and duty time limitations that apply to operations conducted under 14 CFR 135.265. (A-87-91)
Require all revenue air tour flights, regardless of the distance flown, to be subject to the regulatory provisions of 14 CFR Part 135. (A-87-93)
On June 5, 1987, the FAA issued Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 50-1, which provided rules to enhance safety of overflight operations in the vicinity of the Grand Canyon National Park. After receiving comments from the Department of the Interior concerning the protection of resources in the Grand Canyon from adverse impacts associated with air traffic above the canyon, the FAA issued SFAR 50-2 on May 27, 1988.” (NTSB/SIR-95/01, p. 1)
On January 17, 1992 the FAA issued Bulletin 92-01, Air Tour/Sightseeing Operations:
“Bulletin 92-01 cites background information about the June 18, 1986, accident over the Grand Canyon. It further states, “Aviation accidents within and around the Grand Canyon and other prominent attractions have heightened public interest in safety of sightseeing and air tour operations.” It also refers to congressional concerns over aircraft noise and air safety, which resulted in Public Law 100-91 dated August 18, 1987. That law imposed flight restrictions at National Parks in the Grand Canyon, Yosemite, and Haleakala, Hawaii.
“Bulletin 92-01 contains specific guidance regarding mandatory actions for FAA principal operations inspectors (POIs) to take in their oversight of the Grand Canyon operators and it contains recommended actions for POIs to take for air tour operations outside of the Grand Canyon area. Bulletin 92-01 also holds each FAA Regional Flight Standards Division and District Office responsible for identifying scenic areas that may attract air tours in their respective geographic areas. It states that POIs should “encourage” air tour operators in areas other than the Grand Canyon “…to cooperate in complying with procedures established for each scenic flight area. Information regarding special routes should be extensively distributed to avoid conflict with other airspace users.”
“The bulletin places responsibilities on POIs for the following areas:
Identifying scenic areas subject to air tour operations.
Identifying active and potential air tour operators.
Coordinating with air traffic control and airspace users to establish recommended routes, entry/exit points, altitudes, direction of flight, and necessary reporting points.
Encouraging participation of “non-certificated” air tour operators.
The bulletin requires Grand Canyon air tour operators to hold special operations specification’ authorizations. It also states that routes and altitudes outlined in an operator’s operations specifications “…should enhance collision avoidance procedures and aircraft noise abatement.”
“POIs for air tour operators in areas other than the Grand Canyon are required by Bulletin 92-01 to “recommend” that operators have a chapter in their operations manual containing an outline of air tour operations procedures covering clear depiction of air tour areas, entry/exit points, common radio frequencies, description of routes/altitudes/reporting points, weather, and pilot narration duties.” (NTSB/SIR-95/01, p. 3)
Planecrashinfo: “Summary: Midair collision. Inadequate visual lookout on the part of both aircraft. Twenty killed on the de Havilland and five on the Helitech. The failure of the flightcrew of both aircraft to see and avoid each other for undetermined reasons.” (Planecrashinfo.com.)
Sources
National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Grand Canyon Airlines Inc., and Helitech, Inc., Midair Collision over Grand Canyon National Park, June 18, 1986 (NTSB/AAR-87/03). Washington, DC: NTSB, 7-24-1987, 65 pages. Accessed 12-31-2016 at: http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR87-03.pdf
National Transportation Safety Board. Special Investigation Report. Safety of the Air Tour Industry in the United States (NTSB/SIR-95/01). Washington, DC: NTSB, 1995, 60 pp. At: http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/special-investigation-reports/SIR95-01.pdf
Planecrashinfo.com. “1986. Accident Details. Grand Canyon Airlines/Helitech, June 18, 1986.” Accessed at: http://www.planecrashinfo.com/1986/1986-30.htm