1977 — Dec 27, Dust Explosion, Farmers Export Grain Elevator, Galveston, TX — 18

— 18 High Plains Journal, Dodge City, KS. “USDA honors victims of grain…” 1-1-2003.
— 18 National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, p. 139.
— 18 US GAO. Report to Congress. Grain Dust Explosions — an Unsolved Problem. 1979, p. 4.
— 16 (13 bodies recovered and three missing.) NYT. “Weather Cited…” 12-29-1977, p. 16.
–>16 Washington Post. “Grain Elevator Managers Criticized on ‘Animosity.’” 12-31-1977.
— 15 NMAB. International Symposium on Grain Elevator Explosions, Vol. I. July 1978, p. 3.

Narrative Information

High Plains Journal: “Des Moines, IA (DTN) — This month marks the 25th anniversary of two of the deadliest grain elevator explosions in U.S. history. The U.S. Department of Agriculture commemorated the deaths of 13 employees of the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration who were among the victims of the 1977 explosions. USDA Deputy Secretary Jim Moseley dedicated a memorial plaque on Wednesday, which will be located on the grounds of USDA’s Jamie L. Whitten Building in Washington, DC.

“Seven USDA employees died on Dec. 22, 1977, when a grain elevator near New Orleans, LA, exploded in what was the worst accident of its kind in the nation’s history, according to a USDA press release. Overall, 36 people died in the explosion and millions of dollars in property were destroyed.

“Just five days later, on Dec. 27, 1977, a grain elevator in Galveston, TX, exploded and killed 18 people, including six USDA employees. The total damage caused by the two explosions is estimated at $50 million….

“According to the U.S. Department of Labor, there were five elevator explosions in the U.S. in 1977, which resulted in 59 deaths and 48 injuries. The high number of fatalities that year prompted the federal government to investigate grain elevators and create regulations to help reduce the number of explosions.

“Government officials called on the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) for an objective perspective on the matter, according to the Occupational Health and Safety Administration’s (OSHA) Website. In 1978, NAS formed the “Panel on Causes and Prevention of Grain Elevator Explosions” to analyze, investigate and help to prevent further disasters. The panel completed its work in 1983, resulting in raising awareness in the grain handling industry of the hazards of grain dust as well as providing specific means of reducing those hazards.

“The panel recommended the most cost effective step to control explosions was improved control of grain dust within elevators through concentrated housekeeping programs, such as automatic suction and manual cleaning systems installed to remove dust from within enclosed elevator spaces. According to OSHA safety literature, for a grain dust explosion to occur, the following conditions are needed: Oxygen, ignition source, fuel (grain dust) and contaminant. If any one of these factors is eliminated, the explosion will not occur.

“Following public concern after the 1977 explosions and the panel review, OSHA created a new standard for grain elevator safety, which states that grain dust must not accumulate to levels in excess of one-eighth-inch in priority areas–floor areas within 35 feet of inside bucket elevators, floors of enclosed areas containing grinding equipment and floors of enclosed areas containing grain dryers located inside the facility….” (High Plains Journal, Dodge City, KS. “USDA honors victims of grain elevator explosions.” 1-1-2003.)

National Materials Advisory Board, National Academy of Sciences: “…a very serious explosion occurred at the Farmers Export Company elevator in Galveston, Texas, at 8:30 p.m. on December 27, 1977, when a relative humidity of 100 percent was recorded.” (NMAB. Prevention of Grain Elevator and Mill Explosions. 1982, p. 24.)

US GAO: “Farmers Export Co., Galveston, Tex. 18 [dead] 22 [injured] $25.0 million [estimated cost of damage].” (p. 4.)

“In the explosion at Farmers, an adjoining office building was also destroyed, but it was unoccupied the night the explosion occurred. According to the National Fire Protection Association, a lot of people would have been in the building in the daytime..” (p. 17)

“Six weeks before the accident at Farmers Export Company, the FGIS [Federal Grain Inspection Service, USDA] safety manager inspected the elevator and noted several hazardous conditions – in particular, dust clouds and ignition sources. FGIS officials did not notify OSHA [Occupational Health and Safety Administration] of the hazards. They told the inspectors not to notify OSHA but to rely on the FGIS safety program to correct the problem.

“On December 23, the FGIS area supervisor requested authority to withdraw the FGIS employees from the elevator because of dust and low humidity. Withdrawal of FGIS employees could have resulted in shutting down elevator operations since FGIS must weigh incoming grain and weigh and inspect outgoing grain at export elevators. FGIS headquarters denied the request because there was no written authority to withdraw and low humidity was not known to be a factor in dust explosions. The elevator exploded on December 27.

“In February 198, FGIS issued ‘Alert Guideline Procedures and Policies Upon Encountering ‘Hazardous Conditions’ in Grain Elevators.’ These guidelines are designed to protect FGIS employees from situations posing an immediate threat to life, limb, or property. FGIS has established a policy that gives its supervisors authority to evacuate FGIS employees from an elevator when certain conditions exist. These conditions include:

When the 10-hour moving average relative humidity is below 45 percent and the dust collection system is inoperable, shut down, or nonexistent.

When open flames, such as from matches or lit cigarettes, are observed.

When sparks are observed coming from foreign objects, metal parts, rotating machinery, mills or grinders or from nails in shoes.

When fire or smoke is observed in the headhouse or in grain storage bins.

When excessive fumigant odors exist.

“FGIS personnel are to advise the elevator management and OSHA of the reasons for evacuating.” (pp. 24-25)

“Farmers Export Company

“The export grain elevator owned and operated by Farmers Export Company in Galveston, Texas, had a capacity of about 4.6 million bushels. In a December 1977 accident, 18 people died and about 22 were injured. The cause of the accident is unknown. OSHA citations, which are being contested by the company, were issued for several violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The elevator had not been inspected by OSHA since the start of grain handling operations. A construction inspection was made when the elevator was being built.

“The facility

“The grain elevator, built in 1976, consisted of 60 silos, 2 grain tanks, a railcar unloading facility, a truck unloading facility, a ship loading facility, a barge unloading facility, a headhouse, an office building, and other miscellaneous structures. The elevator had handled between 7.7 and 14.2 million bushels per month.

“The silos were 125 feet high with 7-inch reinforced concrete walls and 5-inch reinforced concrete roofs. The 230-foot-high headhouse was also of reinforced concrete construction. Just south of the headhouse was a one-story office building, and southwest of the office building was a metal railroad car dump shed. Grain was transferred from the dump shed to the headhouse by underground concrete tunnels which ran under the office building.

“The facility was equipped with dust collection equipment, which was being upgraded at the time of the accident. Collected grain dust was reintroduced into the grain.

“The accident

“On the evening of December 27, 1977, about 47 people were on duty at the elevator. Wheat was being unloaded from railcars, and wheat was being loaded aboard the motor vessel Sutjeska.

“At about 8:31 p.m., a violent explosion occurred. On arrival at the elevator, fire and police department personnel began rescue operations and injured personnel were transported to a local hospital. As a result of the accident, 18 people died and 22 were injured.

“The railcar unloading facility was completely destroyed, along with the conveyor tunnel connecting the facility to the headhouse. The headhouse was so damaged that it had to be torn down. One grain tank collapsed, and the contents of the second grain tank caught fire. When the conveyor tunnel between the railcar unloading facility and the headhouse exploded, the explosion destroyed the unoccupied general office building, which would have been occupied during the day.

“The cause

“The cause of the explosions is not known. Based on eyewitness statements and an inspection of the damage, OSHA investigators concluded that an explosion occurred in the railcar unloading facility, followed by explosions in the conveyor tunnel and the headhouse.

“OSHA investigators found several possible ignition sources in the railcar unloading facility. A diesel electric locomotive, which produced coupler sparks, exhaust sparks, generator sparks, and electric motor sparks, was in the facility. Additionally, spark producing tools were used to open railcars, smoking was allowed immediately outside the facility, and electrical equipment was used which was not approved for hazardous dust locations. These and other potential ignition sources found throughout the elevator were cited as violations of OSHA standards.

“Housekeeping in the elevator was not considered to be good by employees and Federal grain inspectors. As noted on page 24, an FGIS official had requested authorization to withdraw his inspectors. OSHA inspectors cited the existence of dust accumulations and unsafe practices in handling grain dust. Another violation was cited because the dust collectors for two sections of the unloading facility were inoperative on the evening of the explosion.” (pp. 54-56)

(United States General Accounting Office. Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General. Grain Dust Explosions — an Unsolved Problem (HRD-79-1). Washington: March 21, 1979.)

Newspapers:

Dec 29, NYT: “Galveston, Tex., Dec. 28 (UPI) Agriculture Department officials said today that unusually dry conditions might have been a key factor in explosions at three Southern grain handling facilities that killed at least 49 persons and injured 47 others in less than a week. Officials of the department arrived here today to study the most recent blast, at 8:35 P.M. yesterday at the Farmers Export Company. It apparently began in loading area near the wharf at the facility, tore through a tunnel to the grain elevator and ripped up the side of the silo. One ship was being loaded at the being unloaded at the time. Thirteen bodies were recovered; three persons were still missing today.

“The Agriculture Department is aiding in the inquiries into the three explosions —the others were in Louisiana and Mississippi—but the main responsibility is with the local authorities and the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration….

“Paul Mabry, public relations director for the Port of Galveston, said that low humidity tended to dry out the grain. ‘The drier the stuff gets, the more tends to pop,’ he said. ‘The low humidity had to play a part in this explosion.’

“Rescue crews here dug into tons of concrete and metal today at the base of the silo looking for the missing persons, said to include Federal grain inspectors. A smoldering fire and the sheer weight of the debris slowed the crews. The explosion last night was heard 70 miles away….

“Mr. Mabry said that experts were baffled by the Farmers Export explosion, even considering the low humidity. The elevator was built 18 months ago at a cost of $26 million and contained the latest technology for ‘total environmental engineering.’

“The humidity in the elevator itself is carefully controlled, but the Galveston explosion apparently started in the open air and then flashed to the interior of the elevator. Elevators such as the one here contain highly flammable grain dust, which can ignite and explode from the smallest spark.

“Ray Elrhart, 46 years old, was working inside a concrete warehouse about a half-mile from the explosion. ‘The force of the blast rattled the steel doors and knocked them off their tracks,’ he said.

Mr. Elrhart said that if the explosion had occurred in the main part of the elevator instead of along the loading chute, it would have caused even more destruction. ‘If that grain elevator went,’ he said, ‘it would be like an atom bomb.’ (New York Times. “Weather Cited as Possible Factor In 3 Southern Grain Plant Blasts.” 12-29-1977, p. 16.)

Dec 31, Washington Post: “The managers of the Galveston grain elevator that exploded Tuesday night, killing at least 16 persons, were criticized openly yesterday by the Agriculture Department for their ‘open animosity’ to federal safety inspectors. Memoranda released yesterday by the Agriculture Department showed that members of the Federal Grain Inspection Service two months ago had asked the Farmer Export Co, to clean up the dust accumulating in its elevator. The Farmers Export Co. ‘angrily’ responded that they felt they were ‘being harassed’ by the federal inspectors. ‘Their attitude seems to be that Congress imposed the Federal Grain inspection Service on them,’ said a Nov. 2 memo written by FGIS inspector James S. Phelps to Deputy Administrator David R. Galliart, ‘and that they may have to have us around, but they don’t have to cooperate.’

“Phelps said he had discussed ‘on numerous occasions’ with Farmers Export the rising dust levels in its elevator, its “unclean” working conditions and its practice of working its men ‘through meal breaks’ to get as much grain moved out of the elevator as it could to ships in Galveston Bay. ‘Space provided by the elevator is weevily, has rats living in the ceiling, and the air conditioner doesn’t work 75 percent of the time,’ Phelps told Galliart. ‘When the air conditioner is not working and windows have to be opened, flies in the laboratory [at the elevator] are unreal. Dust in the lab is so bad now that employees have to wear dust masks.’

“One Agriculture Department official who visited the Galveston elevator said that so much dust had built up inside that it was piled up like snowdrifts against the walls clogging the ducts of the air conditioner so badly they could no longer work. ‘To make things even worse, the dust-collecting machinery in that elevator wasn’t working well,’ said David Mangum deputy assistant administrator. ‘They were in the process of fixing it when the explosion took place.’

“The Galveston explosion was one of three major grain elevator explosions in a week that killed more than 50, including 13 Agriculture Department inspectors. The worst of the three explosions was one that took place a week ago Thursday at a Continental Grain Co. elevator near New Orleans. It killed 35….

“The Agriculture Department, the Occupational Safety and Health Administrator and the Environmental Protection Agency set up and interagency task force yesterday to look into the causes of the explosions and to find possible remedies to head off future explosions. One of the first things the task force did was to order federal grain inspectors to leave their posts if they felt that dust inside the elevators had risen to dangerous levels.

“Inspectors at a grain elevator in Baltimore left their posts yesterday along with workers at the elevator who felt rising dust levels were making working conditions unsafe. The elevator was closed down when the workers left their jobs.

“No one contacted yesterday in the federal government was willing to fix blame for the explosions, except to suggest that the hectic pace of work at many export elevators had created a climate where safety might take a back seat to business. There are 89 export elevators in the United States moving an estimated 3 billion bushels of grain a year out of the country….

“Each of the three major explosions took place when the air inside the elevators dried to where the humidity was below 40 per cent. Mangum said the dry air inside the elevators almost surely created more hospitable conditions for a spark of some kind to trigger the dust explosion.

“One theory discussed by the federal task force yesterday was that dust that had been collected in ‘bag rooms’ outside the elevators had been brought back inside to mix with the grain for shipping. The returned dust could be drier than the dust gathering inside the elevators, and create a more hazardous environment….” (Washington Post (Thomas O’Toole). “Grain Elevator Managers Criticized on ‘Animosity.’” 12-31-1977.)

Sources

High Plains Journal, Dodge City, KS. “USDA honors victims of grain elevator explosions.” 1-1-2003. Accessed 9-28-2021 at: https://m.hpj.com/archives/usda-honors-victims-of-grain-elevator-explosions/article_f35d184b-348d-5181-a0e5-57177c61c163.html

National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.

National Materials Advisory Board (NMAB), National Academy of Sciences. International Symposium on Grain Elevator Explosions, Volume I (NMAB 352-1) Washington: NAS, July 11-12, 1978.

New York Times. “Weather Cited as Possible Factor In 3 Southern Grain Plant Blasts.” 12-29-1977, p. 16. Accessed 9-28-2021 at: https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1977/12/29/75705871.html?pageNumber=16

United States General Accounting Office. Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General. Grain Dust Explosions — an Unsolved Problem (HRD-79-1). Washington: March 21, 1979. Accessed 9-28-2021 at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/hrd-79-1.pdf

Washington Post (Thomas O’Toole). “Grain Elevator Managers Criticized on ‘Animosity.’” 12-31-1977. Accessed 9-28-2021 at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/12/31/grain-elevator-managers-criticized-on-animosity/fe6d855e-1359-4d67-b366-4f9bfb1e449f/