1976 — Oct 20, tanker Frosta hits ferry George Prince (capsizes), MS River, Luling, LA– 77

— 77 Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). 1982, p. 417.
— 77 USCG. Marine Casualty Report. SS Frosta…George Prince; Collision…MS River…1978
–72 Passengers (71 bodies recovered; one missing and presumed dead).
— 5 Crew (all).

Narrative Information

US Coast Guard: “1. Findings of Fact:

“On 20 October 1976, at about 0615 (all times CDT), the Norwegian Tankship SS Frosta and the American Ferry M/V George Prince collided at Mile 120.8 above head of passes (AHP) on the Lower Mississippi River. M/V George Prince was struck on the portside, amidships by the bow of SS Frosta, pushed upriver a short distance and then capsized to starboard throwing her full load of vehicles and passengers into the water.

“Seventy-six persons, including the entire M/V George Prince crew of five perished; their bodies have been recovered and identified. Eighteen persons, all passengers, survived. One passenger is missing and presumed dead. During salvage operations, a partial human remain was recovered and is insufficient for identification purposes.

“Of those persons that died, 18 bodies were removed from the mostly submerged hull of M/V George Prince on the day of the collision. Fifty-seven bodies and the partial remains were recovered during subsequent vehicle salvage operations on 23 through 30 October 1976. One body was recovered and identified on 22 May 1977.

“M/V George Prince was raised the evening of 21 October 1976 and towed to the Louisiana Department of Highways’ Shipyard at Plaquemine, Louisiana where it was subsequently declared beyond economical repair.

“SS Frosta suffered superficial damage to the stern and propeller. She resumed her voyage on 23 October 1976, departing Baton Rouge, Louisiana for Houston Texas….” (p.1.)

“4. Weather Conditions: The weather prevailing on the Mississippi River, near Luling, Louisiana at the time of collision was a clear, crisp, pre-dawn darkness without fog, haze or other local environmental impairment to visibility….

“5. Radar: SS Frosta is equipped with two radar sets. They were last inspected at Houston, Texas on 27 May 1976….Both sets were operating at the time of the collision. Neither radar was utilized by bridge personnel during the time interval between sighting of M/V George Prince and the collision.

“M/V George Prince is equipped with two radar sets….At the time of raising of M/V George Prince, on 21 October 1976, the radar set mounted at the overhead was turned off, the other radar set located on a pedestal to the left of the helm, just aft of the port throttle controls, was turned on.

“The four radar sets involved in this casualty were not of the collision avoidance/automatic target plotting type. There was no requirement for the vessels to be so equipped….” (pp. 12-13.)

“8. Voyage of SS Frosta…. When SS Frosta was about a mile below the Luling-Destrehan Ferry crossing, Pilot [name blacked out] observed a ferry vessel which later proved to be M/V Ollie K. Wilds, made the transit from West Bank to East Bank. Because of the distance involved, no crossing agreement was considered necessary and no communications or whistle exchanges were attempted by either vessel. In between St. Rose Point and the new bridge construction site, two vessels were moored to grain loading piers on the East Bank, M/V Pacific Saga at Bunge Grain Elevator, Mile 119.9 AHP and M/V Polyviking at St. Charles Grain Elevator, Mile 120.6 AHP. As SS Frosta approached a point even with the stern of M/V Polyviking moored to the St. Charles Grain Elevator pier, Pilot…observed a ferry departing the East Bank ferry landing, Mile 120.7 AHP, and because of its general upriver heading, showing only the after range light.

“The St. Charles grain elevator pier projects some 400 feet into the river and, when hosting a vessel the size of M/V Polyviking at 118,440 deadweight tons, effectively screens the ferry landing and vessels maneuvering in the vicinity of that landing until the landing is broad on the bow, about 45⁰ relative to the observer on an upbound ship. For a vessel such as SS Frosta shaping up to pass through the bridge construction and tending towards the West Bank side of the river, the earliest the East Bank landing is visible is when the upbound vessel is one quarter of a mile downriver from the landing.

“Upon sighting the departing ferry, M/V George Prince, Pilot…called twice, ‘Nobra 51 calling Luling Ferry’ using his hand held transceiver on channel 13. He paused about 15 seconds between calls to listen for a response. Receiving no response on channel 13, Pilot…initiated a two whistle signal indicating his desire to pass ahead of the ferry. This signal in a crossing situation is similar to using two blasts in a meeting situation. It is understood between pilots to mean leaving one another starboard to starboard, or in this case, for the ferry to give way and go under SS Frosta’s stern. The two blast signal in this situation has no standing or meaning in the Western River Rules of the Road. At the time Pilot…sounded the whistle signal, the ferry was about one quarter mile away having already made his turn to port and proceeding across the river towards the West Bank landing showing his red sidelight.

“The master, one deck below the bridge, looked out his cabin port in response to the whistle signal and observed the small vessel about one quarter mile away emerging from behind the bow of M/V Polyviking.

“After waiting a short while, Pilot…again repeated his radio calls on channel 13 followed immediately by a second two blast signal. Again, no response was heard from the ferry, either whistles or radio communication. M/V George Prince has an amber whistle light which operates simultaneously with the whistle. No one on the bridge of SS Frosta observed the light in response to any radio all or whistle signal.

“At the second two blast signal, the master again looked out his port and became concerned because of the lack of resolution in the situation. He left his cabin for the bridge at a half walking half running pace.

“Pilot…thought he perceived a slight course change to starboard or upriver on the part of the ferry with an almost immediate return to the original heading. He became concerned after the ferry apparently resumed its original heading across the river and directly into the path of SS Frosta.

“At this point, Pilot…began continuous radio calls to the ferry, sounded the danger signal continuing with repeated blasts of the whistle to gain the ferry pilot’s attention and ordered SS Frosta full astern….

“Up to this point…made no attempt, other than backing full to avoid the inevitable collision, expecting to the last that the ferry would turn and pass under SS Frosta’s stern in response to…two whistles. …felt that a turn to starboard, a maneuver ordinarily dictated by the Rules of the Road, would only bring about a collision when the ferry turned under SS Frost’s stern, a maneuver which never came. Other reasons Pilot…never seriously considered a turn to starboard were because of the bridge construction some 0.85 miles upriver and the blind corner he would find himself between the bridge construction on one hand and the levee and M/V Polyviking on the other.

“Upon his arrival, the master observed the ferry 500 to 600 feet away still on a constant bearing. Shortly after he made this observation, the ferry passed out of sight under the bow. As the bow of SS Frosta contacted M/V George Prince, the personnel on SS Frosta’s bridge felt a slight bump and then the vibrating of the screw….

“SS Frosta had slowed to about eight mph at the time of collision, which occurred at Mile 120.8 AHP and approximately 275 yards from the West Bank. Pilot…warned the watch not to let go the anchor for fear of hitting the ferry. As the ferry appeared on the port side of SS Frosta, the bridge watch observed M/V George Prince in a nearly totally capsized attitude, bow up and the bottom of the ferry toward the ship.” (pp. 17-18.)

“….Throughout the hectic actions after the collision, no persons from M/V George Prince were observed in the water by personnel on SS Frosta.” (p. 19.)

“10. M/V George Prince:

“M/V George Prince was built in 1937 at Slidell, Louisiana, and subsequently rebuilt to its present configuration at Avondale, Louisiana.

“Until 2 July 1969, M/V George Prince was operated by a joint parish agency on behalf of the State of Louisiana under Coast Guard Inspection and certification….

“MV George Prince as currently outfitted for service is a flat decked, single superstructure, catamaran hulled vessel. Each hull is an identical watertight, 10 compartment, flat bottomed, pontoon type structure 16 feet 3 inches wide by 120 feet 5 inches long. Eighteen of the 20 compartments have flush deck screw and strongback type scuttles fitted in the vehicle deck. The two hulls are joined by the over laying vehicle deck and its under deck support structure. The inter-hull water space is 18 feet across. The vehicle deck edge protrudes beyond the hulls four feet on each side and end. The resultant vehicle deck is 128 feet 5 inches long by 58 feet 6 inches wide….” (p. 21.)

“M/V George Prince took a full load of vehicles consisting of 20 cars, 8 trucks, and 6 motorcycles and an unknown number of pedestrians. Of the passengers aboard that morning, there is no accounting for those in vehicles versus pedestrians. Approximately 20 pedestrians were crowded into the passenger waiting room in an attempt to avoid the pre-dawn chill….” (p. 23.)

“M/V George Prince made a short departure from the East Bank landing turning for the West Bank landing after a short run upriver and then proceeding almost directly across the river. M/V George Prince continued silently and without change in curse or speed into collision with SS Frosta.

“SS Frosta struck M/V George Prince on the port side in way of the deck house which placed the center of impact some 38 feet 3 inches forward from the stern. The blow caused SS Frosta to penetrate the port hull, opening the port engine room to free communication with the river. SS Frosta’s bow opened the port hull to a depth of about 3 feet.

“The momentum of SS Frosta carried M/V George Prince upriver for a short distance until it capsized by rolling to starboard. As the ferry capsized, it was driven under by SS Frosta with a second point of contact between the two occurring between an unknow portion of SS Frosta’s hull and the bottom aft portion of M/V George Prince’s starboard hull.

“The deck load of vehicles was thrown clear with the exception of one motorcycle which became entangled in M/V George Prince’s railing and was recovered at the time the ferry was raised. Only one vehicle was observed to remain afloat, passing down the port side of SS Frosta until it filled with water and sank. All other vehicles apparently sank immediately.

“Eighteen passengers and crew were trapped in various compartments of the hull and drowned. An unknown number of passengers were carried to the bottom with their vehicles, of whom four remained in their vehicles until salvage. The survivors and remainder of deceased had made exits of the vessel and vehicles.” (p. 24)

“12. Survivors: A total of 18 persons survived the casualty. Passengers in vehicles with a line of sight downriver became aware of the relative motions of the two vessels about the time that the second set of two whistles, sounded by SS Frosta, went unanswered by M/V George Prince. At this point, most of these individuals focused their attention upon the approaching tanker with varying amounts of concern. However, motion about the deck of the ferry did not begin until later. Realization that collision was imminent spread throughout most of the passengers at about the time the danger signal, sounded by SS Frosta, was beginning. Passengers left their vehicles and, in a general movement away from the point of collision, headed for the life jacket lockers which were mounted at the four corners of the vehicle deck.

“Those who survived were all forward of the pilothouse at the time of the collision with the exception of two men, Vincent Pardo and Charles Chatelain. Mr. Pardo was a foot passenger riding on the port bow near the life jacket locker. When he realized that the vessels were going to collide, he began running aft. He made it as far as the starboard side amidships, alongside the deckhouse, when the collision occurred. Mr. Chatelain, whose 1975 Ford pick-up truck was parked starboard side next to the deckhouse, facing forward. He heard yelling and saw people running prior to the casualty, but decided it would be safer inside his vehicle which is where he stayed. He escaped through either the windshield or rear window of the cab as his vehicle sank….” (p. 25.)

“Allen Fisher, the driver of the Kenworth dump truck facing toward the tanker, began flashing his lights and blowing the air horn in an effort to attract attention. Mr. Fisher had time to sound five to six blasts of the air horn and exit the truck prior to SS Frosta striking the ferry….

“On the left of the dump truck, facing the same direction, was the 1976 GMC pick-up driven by Dan McLendon. Riding with him were Charles Maples and Charles Naquin. The three men were facing downstream and could see the approaching tanker as soon as the ferry cleared M/V Polyviking, moored below the landing. Initially, they casually discussed the situation without concern, as they assumed everything was under control. As the vessels got closer to each other, Mr. Naquin got out and began yelling at the pilothouse. Then, the other two men jumped out….” (p. 26.)

“Although most of the survivors were heading for life jacket lockers at the time of the collision, only one man, Barry Neyrey, had the use of a life jacket prior to reaching the water. Two others, Charles Allen and Dan McLendon, found life jackets while they were in the water, which they used for a short period of time. None had time to properly don the life jackets….” (p. 27.)

“A preliminary examination of the contents of the plywood box [retrieved from the George Prince pilot house] produced a half-pint Seagram’s V.O Whiskey bottle wrapped in a paper bag. The bottle contained approximately one inch of liquid….

“On 27 October 1976, the Forensic Laboratory of the Orleans Parish Coroner’s Office released results of blood alcohol and toxicology examinations conducted in conjunction with the autopsy performed on Eugene Auletta. Pilot Auletta’s blood was found to contain 0.09 percent alcohol. No other drugs were found to be present. Gray’s Attorney’s Textbook of Medicine, (Vol. IV, 1976, Chapter 133) states that:

With. 04 or .05 per cent alcohol in the blood the probability of causing an accident is not different from that with no alcohol…Above this level, the probability of causing an accident rises increasingly more sharply. At .10 per cent alcohol in the blood the probability is six or seven fold.

“It should be noted that although Gray’s Textbook refers specifically to accidents involving motor vehicles, Dr. Frank Minyard, Coroner of Orleans Parish, concluded that at the time of the collision Pilot Auletta had been drinking, was at the end of a full watch [working overnight] and was experiencing some degree of impairment….” (p. 33.)

“Conclusions:

“1. M/V George Prince was under the navigational control of Egidio P. Auletta when she departed the East Bank ferry landing at about 0613 on 20 October 1976. Auletta’s specific actions during that crossing cannot be determined but are deduced from observations of M/V George Prince. Auletta turned almost immediately for the West Bank because the current was slow and the volume of commuter traffic made it attractive to make the crossing as rapidly as possible. M/V George Prince proceeded mute and without significant change of course or speed into collision, at about 0615, with SS Frosta at about Mile 120.8, AHP, Lower Mississippi River, approximately 800 feet from the West Bank.

“2. The departure of M/V George Prince directly into a river crossing in the presence of stream traffic created a situation wherein risk of collision existed and was governed by Rule 25 of the Rules of the Road for Western Rivers. Had Auletta announced his departure with the three blast signal required by Rule 24 (c) and upon encountering SS Frosta signaled his intention to proceed by a one blast signal as provided in Rule 19 (a), the situation would have been a rude but acceptable crossing situation governed by Rule 19. 33 CFR 95.15, a Western River Pilot Rule that prohibits ascending or descending vessels from crossing in front of stream traffic did not apply. Although this pilot rule was intended to govern vessels following the so called points and bends custom, it would have been applicable to M/V George Prince had Auletta followed the normal ferry route and travelled several hundred yards upstream before turning into his cross river course.

“3. Due to complacency, fatigue and/or the effects of alcohol consumption, Auletta failed to detect the approaching SS Frosta until seconds before collision. It is probable that his failure to detect SS Frosta did not persist much beyond the sounding of the danger signal by SS Frosta when a scant 500 to 700 feet separated the two vessels. At this point, collision was inevitable. M/V George Prince’s momentum in combination with a strong starboard quarter wind and a beam current had been taken beyond the point of human remedy, her maneuverability notwithstanding. Auletta still had time to turn his vessel to a glancing blow which would have lessened the impact of collision and enhances survivability of persons aboard M/V George Prince’s engines immediately prior to collision. It is possible that Auletta made some attempt to slow or stop his engines but did not persist and returned them to full ahead. Any such action, if occurring, was transitory and too late to significantly alter the speed of M/V George Prince.

“4. The primary cause of the casualty was the navigation of M/V George Prince along the Luling-Destrehan ferry crossing without regard to, and awareness of, river traffic and the risk of collision therefrom. We cannot imagine a more vivid example to prove that keeping a proper lookout is the first rule of seamanship.” (p. 35.) ….

“10….It is concluded that SS Frosta proceeded into extremis at an imprudent speed and that such action contributed to the cause of the casualty and the severity thereof.” (p. 37.) ….

(United States Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation. Marine Casualty Report. SS Frosta (Norwegian), M/V George Prince; Collision in the Mississippi River on 20 October 1976 with Loss of Life. Washington, DC: Commandant, USCG, April 18, 1978.)

Sources

Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982.

United States Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation. Marine Casualty Report. SS Frosta (Norwegian), M/V George Prince; Collision in the Mississippi River on 20 October 1976 with Loss of Life (Report No. USCG 16732/73429). Washington, DC: Commandant, USCG, April 18, 1978, 57 pages. At: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/docs/boards/frosta.pdf