1971 — June 7, Allegheny Air 485 instrument approach crash in fog, New Haven, CT– 28

–28 Aviation Safety Network. Allegheny Airlines Flight 485, New Haven, CT, 7 Jun 1971.
–28 Kimura. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Ed., 1946-1993, V.1. 4-11-1994, p. 3-18.
–28 NFPA. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1971,” Fire Journal, Vol. 66, No. 3, May 1972, p. 63.
–28 NTSB. AAR. Allegheny Airlines, New Haven, CT, June 7, 1971, NTSB-AAR-72-20.

Narrative Information

NTSB: “Synopsis On June 7, 1971, Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Flight 485, crashed at approximately 0949 e.d.t., while attempting an instrument approach to Runway 2 at the Tweed-New Haven Airport, New Haven, Connecticut. There were 26 adult passengers, two infants, two pilots, and a stewardess aboard the flight. Twenty-eight persons perished. Two passengers and the first officer survived.

“The airplane struck three beach cottages located on the northern shore of Long Island Sound, at a height approximately 25 feet above mean sea level, (m.s.1.), 4,890 feet from the displaced threshold of Runway 2 and approximately 510 feet to the right of the extended centerline of the runway.

“An intense fire ensued immediately upon initial impact and continued to burn to the point of near total destruction of the upper portion of the fuselage and cabin area of the airplane.

“A special weather observation for the Tweed-New Haven Airport made at 0950 showed partial obscuration, visibility 1 3/4 miles, fog, wind 2000 at 5 knots, altimeter setting 29.96 inches.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain’s intentional descent below the prescribed minimum descent altitude under adverse weather conditions without adequate forward visibility or the crew’s sighting of the runway environment. The captain disregarded advisories from his first officer that minimum descent altitude had been reached and that the airplane was continuing to descend at a normal
descent rate and airspeed. The Board was unable to determine what motivated the captain to disregard prescribed operating procedures and altitude restrictions, and finds it difficult to reconcile the actions he exhibited during the conduct of this flight.

“The Board recommended to the Federal Aviation Administration that it incorporate in its Airworthiness Requirements provisions for fuel system fire safety devices which will be effective in the prevention and control of both in-flight and postcrash fuel system fires and explosions, and that the rulemaking action in this matter be applied to present and future transport category airplanes.

“The Board also recommends to the Federal Aviation Administration nine specific items intended to improve flight attendants’ functions, protection of flight attendants, airplane cabin furnishings and survivability characteristics.

“The Board further recommended that labor organizations and air carriers review and delete from their wage agreements any clauses which would compensate flightcrews for operating flights ahead of scheduled flight times, and that government and industry efforts be applied toward application and use of technological advances in the field of all weather flight, navigation, and approach/landing systems.” (NTSB. Allegheny Air, New Haven, CT. 1972, 1-2.)

“History of the Flight On June 7, 1971, Allegheny Airlines Flight 485, (AL 485) an Allison Prop Jet Convair 340/440, N5832, was operating in regularly scheduled passenger operations between Washington, D. C., and Newport News, Virginia, with scheduled en route stops at Groton Trumbull Airport, New London, New Haven, Connecticut, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

“Due to the below minima weather conditions existing in the Groton and New Haven areas, Flight 485’s dispatch release had been amended to allow the flight to proceed Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) from Washington to Philadelphia via Groton and New Haven with Wilmington, Delaware, as an alternate airport. Minimum fuel required for this flight was 10,050 pounds. Prior to departure from Washington, additional fuel was added, bringing the actual fuel on board to 11,380 pounds. The additional fuel and the amended dispatch release eliminated the need for refueling which was normally accomplished at Groton.

“The flight departed Washington at 0714 on an IFR flight plan. At 0719, AL 485 cancelled its IFR flight plan with Washington Departure Control and proceeded directly to New London, operating in accordance with Visual Flight Rules (VUR). (NTSB. Allegheny, 1972, 3.)

“Subsequent to obtaining clearance to land on Runway 2 [Tweed-New Haven Airport] an altitude callout, “out of a thousand” was made by the captain. Landing flaps were extended subsequently to 240; final checklist items were completed; and flaps were extended to 400, at the command of the captain. Subsequent altitude callouts, “500 Feet”, “Top Minimums” and “Decision Height” were made by the first officer as the airplane proceeded inbound on its final approach course.

“Airspeed of 105 knots and sink rate of 500 feet per minute were called out by the first officer after he noted that the flight had descended through the prescribed minimum descent altitude 9/ of 380 feet. This callout was -acknowledged by the captain. The captain then instructed the first officer to “keep a sharp eye out here.” This command was likewise acknowledged by the first officer. Approximately 18 seconds later, the first officer again remarked, “You can’t see down through this stuff.” The captain responded that he could see the water and could see straight down; whereupon the first officer exclaimed that he could see the water, also that they were “right over the water,” and not twenty feet off the water. The descent continued unarrested while this conversation was in progress. Approximately 3.5 seconds after the statement, “we’re not twenty feet off the water,” an abrupt tone said, “Hold it,” and immediately thereafter, impact with the house occurred. Sounds of impact could be heard on the cockpit voice recorder tape approximately 1 second later. At 0950, the local controller noticed a fireball and a column of smoke south of the approach end of Runway 2. During deposition proceedings, when questioned regarding the final stage of this approach, the first officer stated that he saw “the building” appearing out of the fog in front of him at that time and that there was still no attempt by the captain to arrest the descent or to pull up.

The aircraft struck the upper portions of three beach cottages at a height of approximately 29 feet m.s.1., and came to rest at a point 270 feet from initial impact. Fire developed immediately upon initial impact.” (NTSB. Allegheny, 1972, 6.)

“….Several witnesses stated that when they first arrived at the accident site, they heard voices of people inside the aircraft and that several violent explosions occurred shortly after impact. The female surviving passenger also recalled seeing seven or eight persons up and moving about the cabin and hearing the sound of a male voice calling ‘Try to get to the back.’

“The first officer was rescued from a position on the ground approximately twenty feet in front of the nose section of the burning fuselage. He had sustained massive burn injuries and serious injuries to both legs. The injuries were so critical that amputation of both legs was required later.” (NTSB. Allegheny, 1972, 18-19.) ….

“The facts developed by the investigation showed that the captain elected to land on Runway 2 with a 5 knot tailwind component. Such action was contrary to company regulations which prohibited any downwind landings at New Haven. The captain was aware of the tailwind component, as evidenced by the CVR transcript and it must be assumed that he was aware of the company directive. Therefore, it was reasonable to believe he had some compelling reason for selecting Runway 2 rather than circle to land on Runway 20. In the final analysis, that reason could have been the desire to save fuel so that refueling at New Haven would not be necessary.” (NTSB. Allegheny, 1972, 27.)….

“The Safety Board is concerned with the apparent delegation of authority for operational control to the Pilot-in-Command without a concomitant system to assess the effectiveness of how that authority is exercised in view of the air carrier operator’s duty to perform the operation with the highest of safety.

“Inherent with delegation is a responsibility to assure that the delegation is effectively fulfilled. In this instance the Captain’s deviation from the regulations governing the operation and the air carrier’s operating certificate was one that the operator could not control at that moment.

“The concept of command authority and its inviolate nature, except in the case of incapacitation, has become a tenet without exception. This has resulted in second-in¬-command pilots reacting differently in circumstances where they should perhaps be more affirmative. Rather than submitting passively to this concept, second-in-command pilots should be encouraged under certain circumstances to assume a duty and responsibility to affirmatively advise the pilot-in-command that the flight is being conducted in a careless or dangerous manner. Such affirmative advice could very well result in the pilot-in command reassessing his procedures….

“The Safety Board, in attempting to analyze fully all possible factors which could have influenced the captain’s decisionmaking reviewed the pay provision of the contract between Allegheny Airlines and the Air Line Pilots Association. This agreement essentially rewards a pilot for operating a flight ahead (faster) of the published scheduled times. It is the opinion of the Board that such provisions may not be the best interest of safety. It also recognized the fact that the prudent and professional pilot would not and should not be influenced by monetary rewards at the cost of compromising safety. However, it is most difficult to relate the monetary aspects to the approach into New Haven.

“A dense fog layer prevailed over the area at the time of the accident. The fog layer was based at the surface with the top of the layer at approximately 400 feet m.s.l. Both the ceiling and visibility were considerably lower over the water. An indefinite ceiling of less than 100 feet existed over the water and over the accident site. The horizontal visibility in the fog layer was restricted to less than 50 feet over the water and 150 to 200 feet over the beach area. Neither icing conditions nor turbulence was a factor.” (NTSB. Allegheny, 1972, 29-30.) ….

“The safety Board has classified this accident as survivable. With the exception of the captain, who sustained fatal injuries upon impact, everyone aboard this flight could have survived if rapid egress from the fire area had been possible or if flame propagation had been retarded.

“Primarily, the problem of rapid egress is most prominent. The stewardess is called upon and relied upon for assistance to the passengers in an emergency. In this case, as in so many other cases, such assistance may not have been possible due to a partially incapacitating injury which was inflicted upon the cabin attendant at impact. It appears likely that the stewardess was physically unable to operate the rear service door. Historically, difficulty has been experienced in the operation of this door, even under nonemergency conditions. It is considered unlikely that a passenger in the smoke-filled darkness of the rear cabin could have read or followed the instructions for opening this door or could have successfully opened this door. This theory can be supported by a survivor’s statement that someone shouted to go to the rear of the airplane and by the fact that 15 of the 28 fatalities were found close to the rear service door. It would be reasonable to suspect that one or more of them had tried to open this door but were not successful.

“Allegheny Airlines, as well as other local service carriers, has been authorized to operate the Convair “580” airplane with one cabin attendant; pursuant to exemption No. 1108B exempting carriers from compliance with FAR 121.391, which requires two cabin attendants for this type of airplane.

“Although cabin attendant seating arrangements and restraining devices presently used might not have prevented injury to a second stewardess, the Board believes that the possibility for a greater number of survivors would have existed had a second cabin attendant been aboard this flight.

“Both surviving passengers and eye witnesses described a series of explosions shortly after impact. Explosions and attendant flame propagation, as described by witnesses, would have made survival impossible subsequent to these explosions.” (NTSB. Allegheny, 1972, 32-33.)

Sources

Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Allegheny Airlines Flight 485, New Haven, CT, 7 Jun 1971. Accessed 8/1/2009 at: http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19710607-0

Kimura, Chris Y. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Edition, 1946-1993, Volume 1: Jet and Turboprop Aircrafts. Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Risk Assessment and Nuclear Engineering Group. 4-11-1994.

National Fire Protection Association. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1971,” Fire Journal, Vol. 66, No. 3, May 1972, pp. 63-65.

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Allison Prop Jet Convair 340/440, N5832, New Haven, Connecticut, June 7, 1971 (SA-427; File No. 1-0006; NTSB-AAR-72-20). Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted June 1, 1972, 71 pages. Accessed at: http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR72-20.pdf