1956 — Jan 29, Oyster Roast Fire, Arundel Park Hall, Brooklyn, MD — 11
–11 Baltimore Sun. “Arundel Park Fire Hero is Eleventh Victim,” February 5, 1956.
–11 Barlay, Stephen. Fire: An International Report. Brattleboro, VT: Greene Press, 1973, p. 34.
–11 Fire Engineering. “Church Supper Fire-Panic Brings Death to 11, Injures >200,” 1956.
–11 National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, p. 137.
–11 Post Standard (Syracuse, NY). “Eleventh Victim of Fire,” February 5, 1956.
–11 Ross 2008. Arundel Burning. viii.)
–11 Stevens. “Church Oyster Roast Fire Panic.” NFPA Quarterly, V. 49, No. 4, Apr 1956, p. 277.
–11 Thornton. “Human Safety vs. Selfish Planning.” NFPA Quarterly, V53, N2, Oct 1959, p.140.
Narrative Information
Ross: “Imagine yourself in a sea of frantic uncertainty. You are just one whitecap, one body bobbing in waves made up of hundreds of panic-stricken people. You are bound together by only one fearful thought—get out now! But unlike a sea there is no water; there is only the fear as bright orange and red flames laced with dark, deadly, acrid smoke roll unopposed over your head across a massive ceiling.
“Your fear heightens when you find that the closest exit door is locked. Behind you, in front of you, and all around you men, women, and children are pushing, screaming, and knocking one another to the floor. Finally, you are within twenty feet of another exit door, but the sea is no longer moving. The door is jammed with frantic people fighting for fresh air and safety. Heat from the fire is now searing the back of your head, your neck, your shoulders. Your elbows sting as if you have a severe case of sunburn. The aching in the middle of your stomach is telling you that something is dreadfully wrong.
“Breaking glass and the crackling fire intermix with screams and crying. Those are the sounds you hear as the anxious and frightened make a last desperate attempt to climb out the building’s windows. Thick smoke makes your eyes water. In that haze, all you can do is follow the crowd. As you move in what seems like slow motion, your heart is pounding. Then, as if the past thirty seconds haven’t been frightening enough, the lights go out.
“The fire just described occurred a little more than fifty years ago just outside the Baltimore City’s southern boundary in the Brooklyn Park area of northern Anne Arundel County. This tragic and devastating fire occurred at the Arundel Park Hall at approximately 5:05 P.M. on a cold, foggy, drizzly Sunday evening on January 29, 1956. Ten people perished and an eleventh died later from severe burns. Hundreds more were injured. A one-time skating rink, the facility at the time of the fire was best known for its crab feasts, bull and oyster roasts, nightly bingo games, and the many slot machines located throughout the building.” (Ross 2008. Arundel Burning. p. 1)
“A few minutes past five o’clock on the drizzly Sunday evening of January 29, 1956, more than 1,200 men and women were preparing to return home following an oyster roast sponsored by the church many had attended that morning, in Brooklyn, Maryland. When workers spotted smoke drifting downward from the ceiling, no one panicked. World War II veterans and war workers, they were accustomed to dealing with this sort of thing themselves. No one called the fire department.” (Ross 2008. Arundel Burning. Inside cover.)
“ON JANUARY 29, 1956, a raging fire devastated the Arundel Park hall in Brooklyn, Maryland. The fire killed eleven people and injured hundreds more making it the worst public assembly disaster ever to occur in Maryland. The assembly hall, located in northern Anne Arundel County and filled with people, was holding an oyster roast sponsored by Brooklyn’s Saint Rose of Lima Catholic Church. The fire, which quickly spread through the large one-story, concrete-block and wooden structure destroyed lives, shattered families, devastated property, shortened livelihoods, and perpetuated the public’s lack of confidence in elected officials and government bureaucracy.” (Ross 2008. Arundel Burning. viii.)
“Lawrence O’Brien, the oyster roast’s chairman, was stunned. He later said, “Men behaved like beasts. I saw men beating women to get into a door or window. Men and women shrieked, screamed, and cried — I will never forget it”.” (Ross 2008. Arundel Burning. p. 64.)
“The largest exit opening, designed to evacuate 250 people per minute, was located between the milk bar and the huge hall. In order to keep nonpaying customers from coming into the event, the door had been locked on this evening. The door had no panic hardware, no metal bar that when depressed pops and releases the locking bolt.” (Ross 2008. Arundel Burning. pp. 64-65.)
“The hall’s windows were very difficult to climb through. Framed in metal, they ere five feet off the floor and had a large sash near the middle that opened outward. Desperate parents tossed their children through these openings.” ( Ross 2008. Arundel Burning. p. 66.)
“Altogether Baltimore City, Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Howard, and Prince George’s Counties, along with the Friendship Airport Fire Department, sent a total of thirty-four fire engines, two ladder trucks, seven rescue trucks, and fifteen ambulances.” It was later estimated that five thousand spectators also arrived at the scene, many with their vehicles, all of which hampered the responding emergency equipment.” It was a major challenge for police to keep a traffic lane open so that ambulances could move in and out.” ( Ross 2008. Arundel Burning. p. 87.)
“Of the approximately 250 injured, 140 were treated at area hospitals.” ( Ross 2008. p. 99.)
“Nine bodies, all women, were found huddled in the northwest quadrant of the building close to…[an] overhead door… A tenth body, also a woman, was found on the other side of the building, on the floor between the bandstand and the kitchen. ” ( Ross 2008. pp. 103-104.)
“On Saturday, February 4, 1956, almost one week after the fire, one of the heroes of the Arundel Park fire, Andrew Brady, died from severe burns…. Witnesses said: “When the fire broke out, Brady stood on a table exhorting the panic-stricken people around him to stay calm. He remained in the hall helping people out and returned into the inferno [repeatedly], until badly burned on his face, hands, and back. Brady, a true hero, was dragged from the burning building with his uniform on fire after he had helped at least a dozen other persons to safety.” (Ross 2008, p. 113.)
“…no one notified the Brooklyn Fire Department until at least thirteen minutes after fire was first seen in the exterior wooden cornice near the roof of the kitchen. The committee attributed the delay to the fact that Arundel Park employees and others were not seriously concerned with that fire or the second small fire in the kitchen and attempted .to extinguish both themselves. The investigators concluded the obvious: “An immediate call to the fire department might have averted loss of life”.” (Ross 2008, p. 150.)
“Not until 1969 would the Fire Prevention Bureau require Anne Arundel County Public Schools to have the fiberboard ceilings throughout the school system painted with a special fire retardant paint. Unfortunately fiberboard continued to appear in new buildings, and more would die before builders stopped using the combustible material in new construction in the mid-1960s” (Ross 2008, 156-157.)
“Today [2008] all interior finishes including ceiling material must meet strict flame spread requirements as established in the NFPA Life Safety Code.2° Present day ceiling tile, for the most part is non-combustible and will not burn. In addition, today’s codes would have required the hall and the large concealed area in the attic of Arundel Park to be protected by automatic sprinkler systems and draft stops. Draft stops are layers of non-combustible sheetrock installed tight to the top of the ceiling and tight to the underside of the roof. They act as giant fire stops. Draft stops are required to subdivide the area into smaller fire zones to either confine the fire or significantly slow its horizontal movement.” (Ross 2008, p. 157.)
“Fire life safety studies have shown that most people in an assembly, whether in an emergency or not, leave by the same way they entered. Today’s Life Safety Code addresses this practice by requiring exit doors in the main wall of an entrance to be able to safely accommodate 50 percent of the occupants.” What is especially puzzling is that Arundel Park’s north exits originally met that requirement. Yet, at some point after the structure was built and before the fire, the six-foot-wide exit doorway leading from the hall through the cloakroom corridor to the double exit doors was reduced to three feet, negating the benefit. The 50 percent front entrance exit door standard was a requirement under the old building code…. That alteration, along with the locked double doors into the milk bar, severely impeded patrons’ ability to escape and heightened the panic. Overhead doors are not considered exits and are not counted as exits when determining the number of exit doorways needed. They are not considered exits because of the problems revealed during this tragedy—the pushing, which bent the door, and the problems unlatching, raising, and keeping the door open. Because the fire moved so rapidly and created so much toxic smoke, we will never know whether opened overhead doors would have allowed more occupants to escape.” (Ross 2008, p 162.)
“Failure of the [electrical] current supply to the exit signs. The failure of the lighting system, and concurrently the lights for the exit signs, undoubtedly contributed to the panic. Although the building had a gasoline-powered generator in a room adjacent to the rear of the structure, it was not used. Investigators have not learned whether this generator was dedicated to emergencies or intended for other purposes. If it was for emergencies, it is unknown whether it had to be manually started or came on automatically.
“At the time of the fire, the NFPA Building Exits Code required emergency lighting (exit lights) to be wired into an independent source isolated from the general lighting so the current to the illuminated exit signs would not be interrupted in the event the normal lighting service was lost, and if so, it would be backed up by an alternative power source. Unknown too, but doubtful, is whether the illumination cast by the exit lights alone would have reduced the panic that erupted when the main lights went out. NFPA technical secretary Robert Moulton writes, “Unexpected darkness is disturbing anytime, and in time of danger, real or imagined, it is conducive to panic”.” (Ross 2008, pp. 164-165.)
“Congestion of materials in the hall…the folding chairs and tables were a major contributor to the panic and interfered with the swift escape from the building. Fixed seating, which cannot be moved, typically has adequate aisle space and exit access built into the floor arrangement. Folding chairs and tables do not. After being knocked over and thrown about in the confusion, they created a major impediment to the evacuation of the building….” (Ross 2008, 166)
“Lack of fire alarm system and employee training for fire emergencies. Today most buildings the size of Arundel Park are equipped with sprinklers and fire alarm systems. Even Arundel Park’s successor, the newer Arundel Arena now the Bingo World, was eventually equipped with an automatic sprinkler system in 1986. But even with these systems, employees have duties in an emergency. At the time of the Arundel Park fire (and today), the NFPA Building Exits/Life Safety Code emphasized training employees for the duties they should perform in the event of fire. There was no evidence that Arundel Park employees had received such instruction.
“Obviously someone should have called the fire department immediately on the evening of the Arundel Park fire, and the hall’s occupants should have been warned when the fire was discovered in the kitchen ceiling. Someone in authority should have cut off the band and announced over the public address system that everyone was to leave the building, to walk, not run, to the nearest exit and not stop at the cloakroom, etc. The duty to inform audiences of exits before the start of an assembly actually was required (and still is) by the county fire prevention code then in existence, but it was loosely enforced when enforced at all.” (Ross 2008, pp. 167-168.)
“Employees must be trained in incipient fire suppression. Carbon dioxide (CO,) fire extinguishers are not rated for Class A fires. The fire in Arundel Park’s kitchen and hall ceilings, which consisted of ordinary combustible building materials, was a Class A fire. The CO, extinguishers used in the futile attempts to suppress it work well on small flammable liquid, gas, and electrical fires, but when used on Class A fires they only remove the oxygen from the flames for a few moments. They cannot penetrate a deep-seated Class A fire. Even the portable Class A soda and acid extinguishers probably would have failed because of the hot, smoldering fire’s large area.
“Although not required by any codes, Arundel Park did have a standpipe with fire suppression hose and a nozzle. Possibly at the request of its insurance carrier, it was installed after Klasmeier’s inspection of March 1955. The system was mounted near the wall in the area of the bandstand.” The 150 feet of cotton standpipe hose with attached nozzle would have reached the original fire area. One or two trained employees, immediately applying a stream of water supplied by a six-inch main with the maximum pressure into the opened trap door might have created enough steam in the concealed space to greatly slow if not extinguish the fire altogether. But the day after the fire, the forged “steel” control wheel that turns on the pipe valve supplying the hose was missing, so it appears the appliance would not have worked had somebody attempted to use it”.” (Ross 2008, p. 168.)
“Employees should be authorized to pull the fire alarm, evacuate patrons in an orderly manner, and call the fire department. If properly trained, they can try to extinguish the fire. These things were never done at Arundel Park. If they had been, the night might have turned out much differently.” (Ross 2008. p. 170.)
“The application of Anne Arundel County’s building code to the planning, design, and construction of Arundel Park teetered along a fine line between a lawful building and a fire trap…. Unfortunately the building code contained an exception clause that allowed a building the size of Arundel Park to be built without a sprinkler system. The exception or loophole would be found in the section entitled “Fire Limits”….A building of “ordinary construction” exceeding area restrictions might be approved if it was constructed outside the fire limits; if it was approved by the president of the Anne Arundel County board of commissioners, the building official, and the local fire chief; and if it was protected by an automatic sprinkler system for buildings of “combustible occupancy.” Hence the loophole.
“No official records remain to indicate whether the principals agreed or disagreed on applying the exception to Arundel Park. Nothing on record interprets the designation or defines the term “combustible occupancy.” No evidence reveals why the county leadership failed to require Arundel Park to install a sprinkler system. All that is left are eleven dead, scores of injured, and pounds of debris that were cleaned up and hauled to the dump—grim numbers that could have been reversed by enforcing the sprinkler system requirement and not resorting to the loophole.” (Ross 2008 176/178.)
“…the fire inside the building had reached temperatures of 1,860 degrees Fahrenheit, hot enough to melt glass.” (Ross 2008, p. 191.)
“It is hard to imagine that in a span of three minutes so many bad things happened to change the lives of so many good people forever. Three minutes—the time it takes to count to one hundred and eighty. Only three minutes elapsed from the time the fire burst through the huge ceiling until the Brooklyn engine arrived and found the entire interior engulfed in flames.” (Ross 2008, p. 196.)
“Arundel Park was directly responsible for the safety of the twelve hundred people who attended the oyster roast. Its managers should have made certain that patrons evacuated immediately, even when their most junior member learned of the fire. Management should have called the fire department. The exit doors never should have been padlocked shut. The locked doors were in violation of the county fire code and contradicted all common sense. It also strains credulity that the approximately twenty career and volunteer firefighters attending or working the event that evening either did not notice the locked double exit doors between the hall and the milk bar, or, if they did notice, failed to force management to correct the problem.” (Ross 2008, p. 197.)
“If there is one lesson of the many to be learned and remembered here, it is vigilance. Today, with most buildings constructed of non-combustible building materials and protected by automatic sprinkler systems, automatic smoke detection, and fire alarm systems connected to elaborate 911 systems, it would be easy to take fire protection and safety for granted. Yet the countless fire tragedies that have occurred throughout the nation over the past fifty years and the recent destructive fires in buildings protected by automatic sprinkler systems prove that we are not totally safe. It is up to us as citizens to question authorities, and to ask about unsafe conditions and the lack of such things as sprinklers, detectors, and alarms in the buildings we use.” (Ross 2008, p. 195.)
Stevens/NFPA: “‘There is a small fire here at Arundel Park, will you send down a fire truck?’ This was the nature of the telephone message received at 5:08 P.M. Sunday, January 29 at the Brooklyn, Maryland fire station. The alarm was sounded and three trucks dispatched to the amusement hall. When the fire fighters arrived, the found people milling everywhere, some critically burned, some injured and some suffering from shock. A general alarm was sounded immediately. Primary attention was given to the burned and injured, but hose streams were also quickly directed into the building. When the fire was cooled enough for firemen to enter the building, ten badly burned bodies were found together near one end of the building about 20 feet from an exit.[1] One man was critically burned and died in the hospital about a week after the fire. A church sponsored ‘oyster roast’ in rented amusement hall thus ended in tragedy.
“The three major factors responsible for the loss of life were: (1) failure to evacuate the building on detection of fire or to call the fire department immediately;[2] (2) combustible concealed attic;[3] and (3) panic following failure of lights….[4]
“It is estimated that there were 1,050 people present in addition to 50 church workers—a total of approximately 1,100 people, which would indicate very crowded conditions and lack of adequate aisle space as measured by the standards of the Building Exits Code
“It is reported that the exit to the milk bar and the one to the cocktail lounge were locked at the time of the fire….
The Fire
“Although the statements of witnesses vary, it appears that fire was first seen outside under the eaves of the roof near of the fireplace where oysters were being cooked. Men in the area used a garden hose in an attempt to extinguish the flames. A ladder was obtained and the garden hose taken up the ladder in a further attempt to extinguish the fire. But fire spread up the roof, and unknown to the outsiders, apparently spread into the concealed space between the combustible fibre-board ceiling and the roof. Meanwhile people inside the building saw smoke and fire coming from between the ceiling and the wall in the corner of the hall near the kitchen. One man took a carbon dioxide extinguisher… and discharged it briefly at the fire. The flame disappeared momentarily. The owner then summoned an employee to obtain a stepladder and suggested that another employee call the fire department. The alarm was received at fire headquarters at 5:08 p.m.
“Using the stepladder, an employee climbed to a trap door in the ceiling… When he looked into the attic space, fire seemed to involve the whole area. The door was quickly closed and the owner motioned to employees to clear the hall. Same occupants, recognizing the danger, stood up to leave and had started towards exits when a “swoosh” was heard and fire and smoke came through the ceiling in several places simultaneously. Where complacency had existed at few seconds earlier, fear now reigned. All thoughts were directed towards getting out of the building. Undoubtedly confusion was heightened by the general clutter of tables and chairs. Fathers made vain attempts to gather their families before leaving the building. Then the lights went out and panic ensued. Stories of the savageness as well as of the heroism of the occupants were reported in newspaper accounts….” (Stevens, Richard E. “Church Oyster Roast Fire Panic.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 49, No. 4, April 1956, pp. 277-285.
Thornton:[5] “….While the architect by thoughtful design can do many things to make his building safer, he cannot do it all. Often the client is not safety minded and is willing to take chances with other people’s lives. He will not allow more to be done than the code requires. Also, client requirements for certain occupancies are directly opposed to those for life safety. This is what we call selfish planning….” [p. 135] (Thornton, John C. “Human Safety vs. Selfish Planning.” NFPA Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 2, Oct 1959, pp. 135-142.)
Newspaper
Jan 29: “Baltimore, Jan. 29 (AP) — Fire and panic raged through a church party south of here tonight slaying at least 11 of a milling, scrambling crowd of about 1,000 and bringing injury to some 227. Three of the dead were children and seven were women….Dr. Gustav Flaubert, Anne Arundel County’s deputy medical examiner, said one of the children appeared to be about 15 years old, a second was between 8 and 12 and the third in the 8-10 range.
“The Red Cross said 110 persons had been treated and released at eight Baltimore hospitals and another 17 were admitted. Firemen estimated another 100 had been treated at the scene….
“The one story building was 75 x 100 feet in length. It was owned by Roy G. Helm and George Stump, trading as the Arundel Park Corp….
“Firemen were hampered in their search by the rubble caused by the fallen roof, melted and twisted metal chairs and sodden materials. A four-inch carpet of ashes covered the smouldering ruins….” (AP. “11 Killed and 227 Injured in Fire.” The Frederick Post, MD, 1-30-1956, p. 1.)
Sources
Associated Press. “11 Killed and 227 Injured in Fire.” The Frederick Post, MD, 1-30-1956, p. 1. Accessed 10-2-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/frederick-news-post-jan-30-1956-p-1/?tag
Baltimore Sun. “Arundel Park Fire Hero is Eleventh Victim,” 2-5-1956.
Barlay, Stephen. Fire: An International Report. Brattleboro, VT: Stephen Greene Press, 1973.
Fire Engineering. “Church Supper Fire-Panic Brings Death to 11, Injures Over 200,” April, 1956.
National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.
Post Standard, Syracuse, NY. “Eleventh Victim of Fire,” 2-5-1956. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/PdfViewerTags.aspx?img=27386551&firstvisit=true&src=search¤tResult=3
Ross, Joseph B. Jr. Arundel Burning: The Maryland Oyster Roast Fire of 1956. Baltimore, MD: Chesapeake Book Company, 2008.
Stevens, Richard E. “Church Oyster Roast Fire Panic.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 49, No. 4, April 1956, pp. 277-285.
Thornton, John C. “Human Safety vs. Selfish Planning.” NFPA Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 2, Oct 1959, pp. 135-142.
[1] Several pages later (p. 281), it is noted that all ten of the bodies found inside were women, aged 28-82.
[2] Stevens notes on page 285 that “approximately 8 minutes elapsed between the time the fire was first seen and the evacuation began.”
[3] Stevens notes on p. 285 that “The presence of the combustible concealed attic allowed fire to reach major proportions in a short period of time. When fire and smoke came through the ceiling, it did so simultaneously in several places and this fact undoubtedly contributed to the panic and ultimately to the loss of life. An automatic sprinkler system installed in the concealed space could have extinguished the fire in the attic in its incipient stages.”
[4] Stevens notes on p. 285 that it is “probable that the actions of some of the occupants, perhaps best described by one newspaper in a quotation that some ‘men behaved like beasts,’ were influenced by the consumption of enough beer to cause them to act more savage than if they had been sober.” Stevens also notes that the failure of the lighting system including “the lights for the exit signs” was a factor in the panic.
[5] John C. Thornton, Chairman, American Institute of Architects Committee on Human Safety.