1921 — Aug 27-Sep 3, Battle of Blair Mt., miners vs. operators, Logan County, WV –16->50

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard; last edit 4-27-2025 for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

–300-500  Coal operator Walter Thurmond, Kenyon Committee, in Blizzard and Harris, 2010.[1]

—  60-130  Wikipedia. “Battle of Blair Mountain.” 7-5-2012 modification.^[2]

—     ~110  Lewis, Ronald L. Black Coal Miners in America. 1987, p. 162.^[3] [Based on speculation.]

–>20->50  Kilkearny, Desmond. “The Battle of Blair Mountain.” Chaparral. (no date).)

–<20->50  Shogan, Robert. The Battle of Blair Mountain. Basic Books, 2004, p. 208.^[4]

—  16->50  Blanchard estimate.^[5]

—       >36  Pringle. “Coal Firms to Strip-Mine…Battlefield?” National Geographic, 6-2-2010.^[6]

—         16  American Postal Worker Magazine. “The Battle of Blair Mountain.” Jul/Aug 2010.

—         16  Laurie. “The [US] Army…Case of…[WV] Coal Mine Wars, 1920-1921.” 1991, 1-24.

—       >16  West Vir. State Archives. West Virginia’s Mine Wars. WV Div. Culture & History.

—         10  Lee, Howard. Bloodletting in Appalachia. Morgantown: WV Univ., 1969, 101.^[7]

—         >7  Blizzard, W. C. (Wess Harris, Ed.). When Miners March. 2010.

                  —  2  Sharples, Aug 27. Blizzard, W. C. When Miners March. 2010.

                  —  3  Operators men, Blair Mt.  Blizzard, W. C. When Miners March. 2010.

                  —>3  Miners at Blair Mt.  Blizzard, W. C. When Miners March. 2010.

Narrative Information

Blizzard. When Miners March: “….Certain features of the West Virginia battle, which are typical, are as follows: Huge combines of capital move from exploited to unexploited territory. Coal operators of one section war among themselves, then combine to fight coal operators of another section, then all together make a common front against the coal miners’ Union. The coal miner attempts to build himself an organization so that he can have something to say about his own life – and is beaten, jailed, starved and shot.

“It sounds like war, and it is. The only time this battle ceases, oddly enough, is when the United States Government is at war. Then a halt of sorts is called and it becomes a violation of the law for the coal miner to engage in any sort of industrial battle to improve his conditions, no matter how serious the provocation. Pledged not to strike, the miner sees his plight worsen because of increased prices, while the coal operator wallows in super profits and bathes in the blood- money which flows into his coffers during every foreign war….

“The mine owner in West Virginia had several advantages over his Central Competitive Field rivals. He had “high” coal, seams of six feet or over, highly adaptable to mechanized mining, and free from impurities. The coal was soft, high grade, and easily mined. Production cost was a fraction of that of his rivals. His men were not unionized, so he could pay what he pleased, pay attention to safety as he pleased, maintain living conditions as he pleased. His labor overhead was low. For instance, as late as 1912 he was paying his men less than 25 cents a ton. At this time the C.C.F. was paying 90 cents. In addition the “company town” plan was stronger in West Virginia than elsewhere. The company owned the store, the houses, the recreation, if any, the blacksmith – everything. And each thing it owned was made to show a profit. No wonder West Virginia operators could undersell the C.C.F. in their own backyard!….

“Federal injunctions, the first to be used in the West Virginia coal struggle (as far as can be determined), fell like snowflakes. They temporarily, then “perpetually” enjoined from organization and agitation….

“The coal diggers fought the injunctions with what was to become in West Virginia the most potent organizational weapon of the miners: the mass march. Union men would congregate at one point in a ragged “army” and go on a march through unorganized fields, speaking and organizing as they went. As men joined the Union the army grew larger, morale grew higher, and nonunion mines shut down….

“The West Virginia coal miner, despite his proud state motto, was just about as free as a serf in Czarist Russia….

“….the miners, after the Aug. 1, 1921 killing of Sid Hatfield, were incensed past all alleviation by usual methods. Reports were circulated, later proved false, that UMW representatives A.D. Levender and Charley Wordman had also been killed in Mingo County. The miners began to reach for their rifles, as they could see no possibility of help from any official source. But an armed uprising is a serious matter and evidence points to the fact that a decision was made to appeal once more to Governor Morgan. There apparently was formed by the miners what was called a “Constitutional League,” headed by UMW officials and other interested citizens, with the avowed purpose of ending martial law in Mingo County and thus reinstituting the West Virginia and United States Constitutions. Word was passed to all local unions, including those in Mingo, that a great mass meeting was to be held on the capitol grounds at Charleston on Sunday, August 7. At this meeting the Governor would once more be asked to intercede on behalf of the miners.

“The response to the call for the mass meeting was impressive. A great crowd of miners thronged the capitol grounds, where a series of speakers reviewed the long list of grievances which had led to the present situation. Frank Keeney and Fred Mooney spoke, as did a number of lesser District 17 officials. Frank Ingham, the Negro who had been beaten and left for dead in McDowell County, retold his bloody story to an angry and attentive audience. Mother Jones added her own special brand of speaking to the swelling tide of accusing voices.

“Beautiful Sally Chambers, young widow of Ed Chambers, described how her husband and Sid Hatfield were murdered before her eyes just a week before, and how she had pluckily struck C.E. Lively with her umbrella. And many were the anonymous miners who rose to give their own stories of brutal coal company oppression. Thus regaled with tales of their own woes – and that they were very real and outlandish woes no reader can doubt – the anger of the miners reached fever pitch. They submitted to the Governor a series of resolutions wherein were reiterated the demands submitted to the coal operators of Mingo by C.F. Keeney on July 11, 1921. One might think, from the violent opposition of the operators, that the miners were asking for the immediate delivery of the coal industry into UMW hands.

“For this reason the miners’ demands are set forth, just as they were presented on August 7, 1921. Resolved:

1 –That the coal operators involved agree that all employees return to work without discrimination against any employee belonging to a labor Union as provided in state law.

2 –That establishment of an eight-hour day as applied to all classes of labor in and around the mines as provided in contract in contractual relations between employer and employee.

3 –That miners get the semi-monthly payday.

4 –That the employees have the right to trade where he (sic) pleases and without molestation and duress.

5 –That employees shall have the right to elect checkweighmen, as provided in the mining laws; and that two thousand pounds shall constitute a ton as provided in the weights and measures law.

6 –Where the coal is not weighed over a standard scale, and the miner is paid by the car or by measure, the weight of each car shall be stamped thereon in plain numerals as provided by law.

7 –There shall be appointed a joint commission consisting of three representatives from each side for the purpose of adjusting wages of all workmen and miners working in and around the mines; to determine the mining rates, yardage, etc., and to endeavor to reach an equitable basis whereby parties in interest can meet any competition: to adopt rules and methods for the adjustment of any disputes which may arise between parties to this agreement.

To avoid any failure to agree, a Board of Arbitration consisting of three members shall be created, one to be chosen by the operators, one by the employees, and these two to select the third man who shall be a non-resident of the state.

Whenever the commission of six members shall fail to agree, the Board of Arbitration shall sit with the commission and decide the question in dispute which decision shall be final and binding on the contracting parties. The findings of the commission shall date from the time work is resumed, and shall continue until April 1, 1922.

….

“The miners on the lawn of the statehouse presented their resolutions to Governor Morgan, asking that he request a meeting of operators and miners on the above terms, and if either refused to agree to call a special session of the Legislator to carry out campaign promises that the mine guard system would be abolished by law.

“Governor Morgan answered the miners by letter on Aug. 17, 1921. Though the letter was quite polite, and took up the miners’ demands point by point, it nevertheless said quite plainly; “Go to Hell!” If this seems to put the matter bluntly, we shall illustrate.

“As regarded the request that strikers be not discriminated against, Morgan replied that he had no “authority to say to the coal operators of Mingo County or any other county, whom they shall employ in their coal mines….” This was quite true. The coal operators had seen to it that there was no legal coercion possible insofar as they were concerned, for they made the laws of West Virginia. And they also saw to it that Governor Morgan DID have the authority to invoke martial law in order that strikers might be beaten and starved into submission. The attempt to dictate to the coal companies, Morgan said, would be “unjustifiable usurpation of authority by the executive.”

“The same Governor wrote this who also wrote the proclamation under which men were arrested for reading the United Mine Worker’s Journal, and five Union men peaceably sitting together were thrown into jail for unlawful assembly!

“As to the eight-hour day, Morgan said that this was already in effect in Mingo County, so there was no point in discussing the matter. The obvious answer was that the men worked eight hours if the company felt like letting them work eight hours, and then only because of outside Union pressure.

“Governor Morgan very well knew this. He did not mention it. Governor Morgan solemnly stated that he had “been advised” that there was no company pressure in Mingo County for men to trade in the company stores, and that twice-a-month paydays were general rule. Governor Morgan does not name his advisers, but they were certainly not strikers.

“Checkweighmen, Morgan noted, were called for in state law, and a coal company should be prosecuted for violation of the law. He therefore urged that the matter be taken up with the courts of Mingo County. This was written with Morgan’s absolute knowledge that the Mingo Courts were in the hands of the coal operators, who are not noted for masochistic tendencies.

“As to the proposal that a joint commission of operators and miners be established in order to begin negotiations, and the appointment of a board of arbitration if this method failed, Governor Morgan pointed out that this would involve recognition of the UMW by the operators, and that the Mingo coal owners had said they would have nothing to do with this union.

“For Morgan, this ended the matter, for he pointed out that “the operator has a constitutional right to not recognize the Union if he so likes.” The Governor then went on to cite the infamous U.S. Supreme Court Decision in the Hitchman Case in 1917. This case originated in West Virginia, and was finally decided when the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the “yellow-dog contract.” In part, the decision was as follows: “An employer is acting within his lawful rights in making non-membership in a Union a condition of employment, and no explanation or justification for such a course is needed.”….

“`The proposal of the UMW that a special session of the Legislature be called in order to implement Republican campaign promises to end the mineguard system is not an issue in the strike in Mingo County, as I am advised by the county official that its deputy sheriffs are paid out of the county treasury.’

“The reader will recall elsewhere in the history testimony of a Mingo County coal operator that the guards or deputies were really hired by the coal companies, with the understanding with the county court that it would pay the operators back when the county had the money.

“This was the flimsiest kind of evasion. The coal operators in Mingo were the county court and vice versa, so that in effect the operators would have been paying themselves back if they had really gone through with this announced scheme. There is no evidence that they ever did….

“His absolute refusal to act on any of the suggestions submitted by the miners on August 7 surely makes him in great measure responsible for the events which followed his complete exposure as a coal company governor.

“The events which followed, we repeat, are in part to be attributed to Morgan’s deafness to the plight of the miners of nonunion West Virginia. But he can not, of course, be held wholly responsible. The miners had throughout their history in West Virginia been victims of exploitation, cruelty, bad working conditions, miserable pay, and murderous treatment if they dared to protest. This they knew. And they were well aware of the role which many governors before Morgan had played in aiding the coal companies to dominate their lives. They had seen their employers grasp control of all governing bodies in West Virginia, from the statehouse to the county court….

“It seems quite apparent that the miners decided that they could rely only upon themselves. Morgan’s refusal of aid was dated August 17, 1921. By August 19 every Union miner in Kanawha, Boone and other counties had been informed of his reply. They grimly decided to reply to Morgan – in their own way. On August 20 the miners, armed with rifles, began to congregate at the mouth of Lens Creek, a point about 12 miles from Charleston. They arrived by the hundreds. It began to be evident that the miners traditional form of struggle in West Virginia, practiced since 1897, was about to be used again. This was the mass march of workers from coal camp to coal camp. But this time the atmosphere was grimmer….

“Just why the coal diggers chose Lens Creek as a congregating spot will be obvious when a glance is taken at a map of the area, and the purpose of the assembled group is made clear. Lens Creek is the beginning of a sort of natural pass through the hills from Kanawha County into neighboring Boone, which was also strong UMW territory. Boone County borders Logan County, and through Logan it is a comparatively short march into Mingo. At this date a modern highway, U.S. Route No. 119, has been built, and is one of the more convenient methods of getting to the towns of Logan and Williamson when traveling from the Charleston area. There was no hard surfaced road in 1921, but this route was nevertheless a convenient and logical choice for men who wished to march first to Logan, and then “on to Mingo.”….

“By the last week in August some 8,000 miners were at Lens Creek, most of them armed….

“During late August the miners drove toward Marmet in wagons, in old Fords and Reo Speed Wagons; some came on foot, others on the family horse or mule. If they had guns they brought them, if not they came without, evidently believing that they would be supplied by arms from coal company caches. By August 23, the whole valley below Marmet was teeming with armed miners and their varied vehicles. Their District 17 leaders and others, including Mother Jones, were obviously in contact with the miners, and made frequent speeches. At this point the story becomes even cloudier and more contradictory than is usual at a time of social crisis….

[On August 24] “…the armed miners left their encampment near Marmet in great numbers, pouring up Lens Creek and over the hills toward Boone County. Through the town of Racine they traveled, up Drawdy and Rock Creek into Danville and Madison. A few reports aver that they were sometimes accompanied by miners’ wives and daughters wearing nurses’ caps with the letters “U.M.W. of A.” sewn neatly to the brims. The “uniform” of the angry miners, for those who observed such regulations, were blue denim overalls and red handkerchiefs around the neck, in accordance with their traditions….the miners had a sort of military organization for the march, with sentries posted, patrols organized, and passwords for the identification of enemies and friends….

“Miners were supposed to have commandeered freight cars which bore numbers of men and such titles as “Blue Steel Special” and “Smith & Wesson Special.” The general movement of the miners was toward Blair Mountain, a high ridge over near the town of Logan, where centered the demesne of Sheriff Don Chafin. A fiction writer might well use Blair Mountain in some symbolic manner, as it was the dividing line between the Union forces and the nonunion fields. A small portion of Logan County on one side of Blair Mountain was unionized. On the other side, to the south, was a howling wilderness, so far as Union men were concerned.

“This concerted march of thousands of armed miners, needless to say, was brought to the attention of the state and federal governments. Governor Morgan, through Major Tom Davis, dispatched Capt. James R. Brockus from martial-law-ruled Mingo County to the aid of Don Chafin. With him Brockus took 71 regular state police and about 15 of the “volunteers” before mentioned in this history. This turned out to be an important action, historically, as we shall show later, but these police did not arrive in Logan until about 6 a.m. on the morning of August 27. The Federal Government had meanwhile intervened.

“This was at the request of Governor Morgan, who evidently had men reporting to him who were in close touch with the situation. Gen. Harry H. Bandholtz of the United States Army arrived in Charleston at 3:05 a.m., August 26th, and proceeded to the temporary “pasteboard” capitol which had been erected to replace the stone building destroyed by fire on Jan. 3, 1921. Here he met Governor Morgan and they summoned Keeney, Mooney, and UMW Attorney Harold Houston. The sleepy-eyed Union officials found Morgan and Bandholtz in a room crowded with policemen, state officials of varied ranks, and the military staff of Bandholtz. They were ordered to proceed at once to turn back the marching miners. District 17 President Keeney explained that he might well get shot if he attempted such a thing without something to show that the United States Government had given him orders. Keeney asked General Bandholtz for a letter, signed by the General, ordering him to turn back the marchers. Bandholtz at first refused, but later consented to this arrangement, according to Keeney himself…

“Keeney and Mooney then took off toward Boone County, where most of the miners had by this time congregated, in order to talk with the marchers. The Union leaders telephoned later in the day (August 26) telling General Bandholtz that they were having success in inducing the men to withdraw. On August 27 General Bandholtz, with two other military officials, got in an automobile at Charleston at 11:15 a.m. with William Blizzard, then President of UMW Sub-district No. 2, and followed in the path of the marching miners over a “very difficult road” to the Boone County town of Racine. In view of later events, part of the courtroom testimony of Bandholtz should be given verbatim:

1. Why did you make that trip that morning, General?

1. To satisfy myself that the miners were returning as reported. In addition to that, I had sent Major Thompson further up the river for a like purpose.

1. Did you satisfy yourself that they were returning home?

1. I did.

1. Did you receive any report from Major Thompson on that occasion, as to what he found?

1. I did – confirmatory of my own.”

“After satisfying himself, as he relates above, that the march of the miners had ended, General Bandholtz returned to Charleston and took the 6:40 train back to Washington, D.C. This was on the 27th day of August, 1921. It is clear that the General was correct in his estimate – the miners were returning to their homes, although none too willingly. But a very little match can cause a mighty conflagration in such an explosive situation.

“And on the same night that General Bandholtz and his retinue left West Virginia the coal operators through Don Chafin and a contingent of state police which Governor Morgan and Major Tom Davis had sent from Mingo to Logan County, furnished that match. This was the Sharples incident.

“There is reason to infer, both from this action near Sharples, Logan County, and the seeming fact that some of the operators in the Union fields aided the marchers with arms and food and encouragement, that in the Armed March the coal operators saw an excellent club with which to break the back of the United Mine Workers of America; with the coal operators superior firepower, if not numerical superiority, and the backing of the United States and West Virginia governments, they had nothing to lose by provoking the armed miners into revolt. They had, in fact, much to gain, for with the Government of West Virginia their docile tool they would not themselves be subject to prosecution in the courts. And they stood an excellent chance of obtaining severe legal penalties against the UMW.

“But this would not have been easy if the miners had merely returned peacefully to their homes after having been warned by representatives of the Federal Government. So, if the inference is correct, something had to be done by the coal operators to again rouse the miners to hot-blooded anger; an incident had to be manufactured which would again set the miner on the march. Such an incident was manufactured, if the theory of this writer coincides with the facts.

“It will be recalled that Mingo County was still under martial law, with Major Tom Davis, a veteran of such labor-quelling measures, in charge. About 2:30 a.m., Aug. 27, Davis ordered State Police Captain James R. Brockus, of Lick Creek fame, to proceed to the aid of Don Chafin in Logan County. Brockus, with about 85 or 86 other regular state police and “volunteers” did as he was told. The Captain did not go into Logan just to help Chafin in a general way, but for a specific purpose. This was to lead a group of men across Blair Mountain and serve warrants on Union coal miners. This Brockus proceeded to do, augmenting his armed force by adding a number of Chafin’s deputies thereto.

“Let us look at this move more closely. Major Davis ordered Brockus to Logan on orders from Governor Morgan. This request to Governor Morgan for men to serve warrants could have come only from Don Chafin. Chafin of course knew exactly what was going on as regarded the armed march of the miners. And Governor Morgan knew that the miners were returning home, and that General Bandholtz was going back to Washington that same day. Just why did Morgan rouse police in Mingo County out of bed at 2:30 a.m. in order to be able to serve warrants in Logan County that same day? ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT DON CHAFIN HAD THE WARRANTS IN HIS POSSESSION FOR SOME DAYS PRIOR TO AUG. 27?

“Why, in other words, did the warrants have to be served by state police in such a hurry? It seems apparent that Morgan wished to cause an “incident” which would encourage the miners to resume their march on Logan County, thereby forcing the armed intervention of the Federal Government, and giving the coal operators more opportunities to file charges of murder, insurrection, and even treason against the miners and their leaders. If he waited until all the miners had gone home, it might be too late. The iron was, on the night of the 27th day of August, 1921, still hot, and Governor Morgan struck with haste.

“Brockus left Mingo County with his armed force about six o’clock on the morning of the 27th and met Don Chafin, who gave the Captain warrants for the arrest of 30 or 40 miners who lived on Little Coal River in Union territory. Brockus picked up some deputies from Chafin, swelling his forces to about 130 men, and they crossed Blair Mountain about dusk in regular military formation. That is, there was an advance guard of 15 men and two guides about 200 yards in advance of the main body of police. Just on the other side of Blair Mountain they were met by five Union men who challenged them but surrendered without resistance. These men were arrested, evidently without warrants, and placed at the head of the column. This was a thoughtful measure, for the miners were advised to tell anyone who challenged not to fire, and it was also a protection or shield for the police. This same process was repeated several times, with the number of prisoner-shields increasing, until Brockus and his force reached the town of Sharples, where they found another detachment of five miners. Brockus of course maintains that these men fired upon his group of 130 men after he had asked what they were doing there at that time of night. (It could not have been later than eight o’clock.) Whoever fired first, two of the miners were killed and the other three fell, wounded. Shooting then became general, according to Brockus, with miners firing from houses in Sharples and the police shooting back.

“However it was, it is a fact that not one of the 130 police and deputies was scratched, while houses in Sharples were pierced by bullets and the challenging patrol of miners lay dead and wounded. News of this shooting at Sharples, done by what had all the appearances of an advance guard of a much larger force, spread through the coal camps of Boone and Kanawha counties. “Don Chafin’s thugs are invading the Union fields, and they have already murdered our men!” was the alarm that struck the ears of the Union miners.

“Miners returning home from their intended march to Logan simply turned on their heels, and with angry faces declared that once again they had been doubled-crossed. No leader could have stopped the movement then, not with the tongue of Demosthenes. The Armed March began again.

“That Governor Morgan had ample intelligence reports from the vicinity of Sharples is indicated by his evident close relationship with William M. Wiley, the Vice-President of the Boone County Coal Corporation, and also an operator at Sharples….

“Wiley was at Sharples on Saturday night, August 27 – when Captain Brockus and his men descended on the town. He admits to the Kenyon Committee that he had been informed by telephone that the police were coming, but he says he didn’t believe it. Be that as it may, he certainly told none of his miners. And he confirms the fact that it was not till after this shooting that the miners poured into Sharples from every direction, more or less taking control of the railroad above Sproal, where Little Coal River goes over toward Logan, and the Big Coal River valley extends to Whitesville, and leads through a railroad tunnel into Cabin Creek, Paint Creek and other fields….

“Further confirmation that the specific instigation of the latter and more serious part of the Armed March must be placed at the door of the coal operators is found in the report of the investigating Kenyon Committee. “The cause of this turning back was without doubt the ill-timed service by Captain Brockus, of the state constabulary, acting under the direction and with some of the deputies of Sheriff Chafin. When the marching miners had begun definitely to turn back towards their homes, Sheriff Chafin undertook to serve warrants upon 42 men at Sharples who had held up and disarmed members of the state constabulary on August 12, fifteen days previous. The sheriff, according to his own testimony, had had those warrants for several days, but the time chosen to serve them was after night and with an armed force of about 130 men. Sharples was in the heart of the troubled area and in Union territory. Just at the time the miners had been dissuaded from their first march and had begun returning to their homes and reports had come out of this territory that the trouble was over, the descent upon this town at night to serve these warrants could hardly have had any other effect than to start afresh the threatened trouble.”….

“As the news spread of the Sharples raid the miners began their march all over again, a fact of which the authorities of Logan County were immediately made aware from a dozen sources. From the nonunion side Don Chafin and his men, possibly 2,000 in all, including deputies, state police and anyone else who could be pressed into service, marched toward Blair Mountain. From the Union side the miners, some with machine guns captured from coal company stores (again, why did these peaceful industrialists maintain such arsenals?), also directed their steps over rutted roads and grassy mountain paths toward the same destination. On August 28, according to the same William M. Wiley before quoted, “The Logan Operators’ Association passed a ringing resolution, which was telegraphed to the Charleston Chamber of Commerce, who had a meeting, and a committee from the Governor (was sent –Ed.) to Washington to explain to General Bandholtz just exactly what the situation was and to put up to the federal authorities the dire necessity for troops.” This “ringing resolution” and action bears out and still furthers our theory as to the origin and reasons behind the Sharples incident. As we have said, Don Chafin was notified from many sources that the miners had turned back after the Sharples raid, and were proceeding toward Logan County….

“As has been related, after the Sharples incident of August 27 the miners resumed their march toward Logan, Don Chafin was warned that this was the case, and the two opposing forces began to line up on opposite sides of the Coal River-Guyandotte River water- sheds. It was deadly serious business and both sides were well-armed, but organization in both “armies” was somewhat helter-skelter, as is shown by the fact that no one to this day seems to know, even within some thousands, just how many men were involved.

“Governor Morgan sent W.E. Eubanks to Logan County to take charge a day or so after he had been informed that the miners were still on the move. Eubanks was a traveling salesman, a member of the West Virginia Legislature, and a colonel in the National Guard. When asked how many men he commanded at this time Eubanks replied that “It was estimated at from 2,500 to 4,000.” Neither did he know the size of the force opposing him, saying that it was supposed to be from 5,000 to 8,000 strong, but he didn’t know exactly.

“The confusion on both sides of Blair Mountain must have been enormous. The Union men and their sympathizers poured in and around Clothier and Sharples, using every type of transportation, just as they had in the initial part of the march. Men not accustomed to military ritual, and excited anyway, gave some highly original variations on “I Come Creeping” when replying to a challenge. But so long as the idea was about right they were permitted to pass. On the south side of Blair Mountain the antiunion forces set themselves up with nurses and doctors and commissaries and flung out a battle line between 15 and 18 miles in length.

“One observer described the action of the next few days when he said that each group went up its respective side of the mountain and both shot at the top. A great deal of shooting went on, that is certain.

“The operators had a number of machine guns, and the miners had captured at least one themselves, with a miner operating it who had been a gunner in World War I. Eubanks, the traveling salesman colonel, judged that his side fired between 500,000 and 600,000 shots and he supposed the miners “wasted as much as we did.” Eubanks had a weapon the miners did not possess, however. This was the airplane. The coal operators hired aviators W.F. Denim, Earl Halloran and R.S. Haynes to “observe” for them. At least Denim and Halloran claimed that they did nothing but observe. Haynes, however, admitted that he dropped two types of bombs on the miners, one explosive and the other designed to cause nausea and vomiting….

“Aside from the general barrage, each side sent out patrols. The three men that operators admit were killed on their side (and in this case there is no reason to doubt their estimate) met their deaths as a result of patrol action. How many coal miners were killed will never be known, as the miners through their years of struggle did not permit the opposition to learn of their casualties if they could prevent it, and the same policy evidently was followed at Blair Mountain. It appears, however, that they had far more men killed and wounded than the coal operators. The brutality of the Logan deputies has been pointed out, and it was again shown in some of the fighting at Blair Mountain. For instance, one miner killed, a Negro, was shot 11 times. Is it not clearly evident that this butchery sprang from pure sadism, with racist overtones, but it is not difficult to believe….

“There was a great deal of shooting done around Blair Mountain, that is certain, to cause so little loss of life. The reason for this seems to be that the miners made no real concerted push toward Logan in an attempt to crack the enemy lines during the days of active battle from Aug. 31 through the first two or three days of September. Had they done so there would have been heavy loss of life on both sides….

“John Gore, an assistant of Don Chafin’s, was killed, along with two other deputies named Cafago and Muncy. When asked for the correct password by a Union patrol they answered instead “amen.” A battle ensued in which they were killed.

“How many were really killed and wounded in the Armed March, as we have said, will never be known. Coal operator Walter Thurmond told the Kenyon Committee that he had heard estimates of from 300 to 500. As the chairman of the committee pointed out, this was quite an elastic estimate. All estimates as to detail of the Armed March must remain elastic. It was that kind of battle….

“It was admitted by the state forces that they had dropped explosive bombs on the miners from airplanes, and it seemed that one of these bombs had failed to explode. Fred Mooney, Sec.-Treas. of District 17, in the middle of the courtroom removed this dud from a suitcase and handed it to Charnock. The latter was directed by defense counsel to take it apart to see what was in it. The whole courtroom, including jury and judge, was tense. For the bomb was an ugly looking homemade contraption, as an eyewitness describes it: “It consisted of an iron pipe about six inches thick and two feet long, with caps screwed on each end and a foot-long detonator sticking out of one of the caps.” Charnock obediently began to twist the ends of the bomb, until one of them loosened and came off. The Adjutant General poured out the contents of the bomb on the floor for the benefit of the jury. 

“When Adjutant-General J.H. Charnock tilted the pipe-like bomb which the state had dropped on the miners, out rolled the following: One ratchet wheel from some kind of machine. Seven bolts, 15 nuts, an indeterminate number of screws, nails and minor pieces. Several pieces of metal that looked like souvenirs from the Baltimore fire. What looked like the hindquarter of a flivver,^[8] although it was afterward denied that any such thing was a bomb. The vicious nature of this bomb, which the State of West Virginia had thought necessary to drop on its coal miners, made a perceptible impression upon the jury. Compared with it, and the knowledge that it had been dropped from a state-hired airplane, the clacking of rifle bolts seemed rather mild….” (Blizzard, William C. (Edited by Wess Harris).  When Miners March. Independent Publishers Group. 2010.)

Kilkearny, Desmond. “The Battle of Blair Mountain”: “….On May 19, Governor Morgan proclaimed martial law declaring West Virginia to be in “a state of war, insurrection, and riot.”

“Mingo County authorities created a vigilance committee made up of the “better citizens of Mingo County,” men of business, men of property, to reinforce the state police and the newly constituted national Guard as well as a newly recruited volunteer army known as the State Militia, which lacked proper uniforms but wore white armbands to distinguish themselves from the union men with the red bandanas. Most miners had taken to wearing blue bib overalls and tying around their necks a red bandana which soon became the hallmark of the insurgent army, leading both friends and foes to refer to them as “rednecks.”

“While a shipment of Thompson submachine guns arrived in Mingo County for the State Police, union miners were being arrested for carrying union literature, for speaking against martial law, and for carrying arms.  Held without bail or hearing, they overflowed the Mingo County jail and were sent to prisons in adjoining counties.  A military commission ruled on offenses ranging from larceny, adultery and disorderly conduct to disobeying sentries and perjury.  A makeshift prison was erected in a freight terminal to house “criminals,” among whom was Mother Jones.

“The Harding Administration not only sent troops but set up a base for air operations under the command of Brigadier General Billy Mitchell.

“Small battles or skirmishes, local group encounters, intermittent sniping, marches and counter marches, kidnappings and ransoms, marked the progress of the union forces as they made their way through southern West Virginia toward the town of Logan, which they hoped to envelop in a gigantic pincer movement.  A major problem with the plan was the imposing presence of Blair Mountain, an easily defended high ground consisting of twin peaks which looked down on a pass leading into Logan.

“During the ensuing conflict, thousands of rounds were fired by both sides using all kinds of small arms including machine guns. The precise death toll was never established, but estimates range from fewer than twenty to more than fifty.  Both miners and defenders were well armed and had plenty of ammunition which they fired freely.  The roar of the guns became a steady pounding in the ears of the men on both sides: you could hear it for miles along the river.

“Eventually, the federal troops arrived.  The miners were optimistic, believing that their grievances would be vindicated.  Governor Morgan and his allies, the coal mine operators, expected that the arrival of the troops would end their troubles with the union.  The governor was right; the officer class was more than sympathetic to the owner’s interests with which they identified and saw the miners simply as mutineers.

“Although clearly disappointed with the turn of events, the miners were not of a mind to war against the federal government and its military which proved to be unsympathetic to their interests.  The army of workers, some ten thousand strong, simply quit the battle and went home.  Once the war was over, the federal government opted out.

“Federal prosecution would have been redundant since the State of West Virginia was coming down on the union rebels with all its might and authority.  Led by a vengeful governor Morgan, determined to punish the rebel leaders by choosing to charge them with the most serious crimes of murder and treason, which it turned out were easier to bring than to make stick, the focus shifted to the courts.  No one could deny that the insurgents had committed violent acts and rejected lawful authority, but the claim that they were trying to make war against the state distorted reality.

“The aftermath of the “war” included a number of trials for treason conducted by biased judges and corrupt prosecutors; however, the crime of treason was hard to prove, and nearly all of the defendants were exonerated, but one lowly insurgent, Walter Allen—a minor figure in the rebel army—was convicted of the charge even though nothing more damaging than that he had been seen “with the armed forces” in Logan County and “had been carrying a gun”  was presented. Out on bail while awaiting an appeal, Allen simply disappeared and was never seen again.  The state dropped the treason charges against the other twenty men.

“While most of the arrested miners were acquitted or had the charges against them dropped, the rebellion proved to be a disaster.  The miners didn’t lose the war, they lost the peace, and the financial injuries suffered under the state’s legal system proved to be devastating to the labor movement.  The numerous legal battles essentially emptied the union coffers.  As Shogan describes it: “A political wind was blowing with gale force against the miners in West Virginia and against organized labor throughout the country.”

“In West Virginia union membership tumbled from 50,000 to a few hundred.  Nationally, the United Mine Workers membership declined from 600,000 to fewer than 100,000.  From 1920 to 1923 the American Federation of Labor lost two million workers or nearly 25 percent of its total membership.  And the courts seemed ready to issue strike-breaking injunctions almost for the asking….” (Kilkearny, Desmond. “The Battle of Blair Mountain.” Chaparral. (no date).)

Laurie. The United States Army…The Case of the West Virginia Coal Mine Wars, 1920-1921: “….On July 14, 1921 the Senate’s Committee on Education and Labor, chaired by Iowa Republican Senator William Kenyon, began a three-month investigation of the recurring crises in West Virginia’s coal mining industry. Interviewing scores of witnesses, including Sid Hatfield, union officials Fred Mooney and Frank Keeney, and Captain James Brockus, the Kenyon Committee’s hearings aired innumerable abuses by the operators and kindled short-lived hopes among the miners for immediate reforms. In its October 1921 report, the committee condemned, among many other things, the practice in Logan County of paying the sheriff and his deputies from funds contributed by the coal operators instead of exclusively from the public treasury, but no immediate reforms were forthcoming.^[9]

“While in Washington testifying before the Kenyon Committee, Sid Hatfield learned that he and thirty-five miners had been indicted by a West Virginia grand jury for their alleged role in an attack on a non-union mining camp the previous summer. Although Hatfield suspected the charges were trumped-up by the state at the urging of the Felts family, still seeking vengeance for Hatfield’s role in the Matewan Massacre, he returned to West Virginia to stand trial. On the steps of the McDowell County Courthouse in Welch on August 1, 1921, the gunmen of the Baldwin-Felts Agency avenged the deaths of Albert and Lee Felts and their colleagues by shooting to death the unarmed Sid Hatfield and an associate, Ed Chambers, as the two men and their wives prepared to enter the court building. The death of the popular chief of police enraged grief-stricken union miners and their sympathizers throughout southern West Virginia.^[10]

“Capitalizing on the miners’ outrage, Frank Keeney, UMW District 17 president, organized a rally in Charleston and called for a march against the coal operators. On August 7, one thousand miners presented Governor Morgan with a resolution calling for an end to martial law in Mingo County. By that date, nearly one hundred and thirty miners had been arrested and held without charges. When the governor refused to rescind state-imposed martial law, Keeney called upon the miners to assemble on August 20 at Marmet, just south of Charleston. From that location, along the banks of Lens Creek in Kanawha County, Keeney hoped to march thousands of miners sixty-five miles to Logan County, and from there to Mingo. Keeney’s objectives remain uncertain, but evidence supports the idea that he hoped a gun battle would ensue eliminating thirty-four year old Sheriff Don Chafin and enough mine company guards and private detectives to open the area for union organizers.  If that failed, at least the march and ensuing violence would force federal intervention which the miners considered preferable to bossism or state enforced martial law.^[11]

“On August 20, 1921, nearly five thousand miners, armed with rifles and an old machine gun with three thousand rounds of ammunition, assembled at Marmet.  Their commander, “General” Bill Blizzard, a twenty-eight year old man of proven leadership in District 17, formed the men into a column and began the march toward Logan. Along the way new recruits swelled the column until it reached fifteen to twenty thousand men. Informed of “Blizzard’s Army,” Secretary of War Weeks directed General Read, on August 23, to place the Nineteenth Infantry in readiness, and sent Major Thompson to Charleston to investigate.  Realizing that two years of cumulative “insurrectionary fury” were about to explode in the coalfields, Governor Morgan, on August 25, asked President Warren Harding for one thousand troops and military aircraft. According to Morgan “the miners had been `inflamed and infuriated by speeches of radical officers and leaders’.” Learning that Morgan had taken what appeared to the president as only slow and halting steps to organize a National Guard, Harding withheld aid pending reports from his military advisors. Initial reports from Major Thompson minimized the need for federal troops, but in face of continued requests for help, Secretary of War Weeks determined further information was needed.^[12]

“On August 25, Secretary Weeks, with the approval of President Harding, sent Brigadier General Henry H. Bandholtz, Commander of the Military District of Washington and former Provost Marshal for the American Expeditionary Force in France, to investigate the West Virginia situation. The fifty-six year old general carried with him a mandate to determine whether the use of federal troops was necessary or the mere threat to use federal military force would suffice in restoring order. When his train arrived in Charleston in the early morning hours of August 26, 1921, Bandholtz immediately conferred with Thompson, Morgan, Keeney and Mooney. Armed with the authority of the White House and the War Department, Bandholtz wasted little time in exerting pressure.^[13]

“General Bandholtz informed Governor Morgan, and later the two union leaders, that he was indifferent to the merits of the dispute between miners and coal operators, but was concerned only with the president’s directive to restore law and order without delay and preferably without bloodshed.  During his meeting with Bandholtz, Morgan claimed that the southern counties were at the mercy of an army of rabble, and insisted that army intervention alone would prevent loss of life and destruction of property. Convinced that the miners were in the wrong, Bandholtz warned Keeney and Mooney that he considered them personally responsible for the march and any problems caused by the miners, as well as any consequences that might ensue if the army stepped in. Bandholtz stated: “These are your people. I am going to give you a chance to save them, and if you cannot turn them back, we are going to snuff them out like that (snapping his finger under Frank Keeney’s nose). This will never do, there are several million unemployed in this country now and this thing might assume proportions that would be difficult to handle.”^[14]

“For his part, Keeney conceded that Blizzard’s army might get violent if it met resistance, but promised that the marchers would disperse if guaranteed federal protection against reprisals by Sheriff Chafin and the operators’ guards. After Keeney and Mooney agreed to disband the miners, General Bandholtz gave them a handwritten ultimatum to convince skeptics that he meant business. Confident the marchers would yield, Bandholtz nonetheless requested permission from Secretary of War Weeks to continue preparations for the deployment of troops equipped with tear gas dispensed from mortars.^[15]

“Major General James G. Harbord, Deputy Chief of Staff, wired Bandholtz complimenting him for his “great skill” in handling matters. Harbord further directed Bandholtz to have Governor Morgan rewrite the formal request for military aid, originally submitted on August 25, to include both a statement that the governor would try to convene the state legislature and a list of measures that he would use to reassert state authority against the insurgents. This would place Morgan in compliance with RS 5297. Harbord, however, referred specifically to what he called West Virginia’s egregious failure to accept money available to the states for the establishment of a National Guard, inferring this would hinder federal efforts.^[16]

“Even while negotiating with Governor Morgan, General Harbord proceeded with preparations to intervene. On August 26, he sent Bandholtz to prepare for infantry operations and instructed Major General Charles T. Menoher, Chief of the Air Service, to examine Kanawha Field, outside Charleston, to determine its suitability for use in either reconnaissance or tactical air support operations.  Later in the day, commander of the First Provisional Air Brigade, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, personally led a flight of three olive-drab DeHavilland Bombers (DH-4B) from Bolling Field in the District of Columbia to execute Harbord’s orders concerning Kanawha Field. Upon landing, Mitchell, never one to mince words about airpower, commented to the press that the Army Air Service, by itself, could end the civil disturbance by dropping canisters of tear gas upon the miners. If that failed he recommended the use of artillery by the ground forces to bring the crisis to a speedy conclusion.^[17]

“Fortunately, Billy Mitchell lost the opportunity to demonstrate what tear gas or artillery could do to mountaineers, miners, and immigrants armed with hunting rifles. As soon as Keeney and Mooney read Bandholtz’s note and addressed the crowd, the miners decided to call off the march. The two men impressed the group with the seriousness of the current situation and appealed to their loyalty and patriotism.  If the march continued, it was stated, it would be done against the direct orders of the President of the United States. The miners would then be facing the entire might of the federal government and the United States Army. For the first time many miners realized that their march was interpreted by federal authorities as a rebellion against the West Virginia and federal governments and not as a justified and righteous struggle against what miners perceived as greedy coal operators, corrupt sheriffs, or ruthless Baldwin-Felts “thugs.” As the marchers began to disperse, Keeney and Mooney hurriedly made arrangements with local railroads on August 27 to return the miners to their homes.^[18]

“Upon learning of these events, General Bandholtz, accompanied by Major Thompson and Bill Blizzard among others, visited the positions previously occupied by the miners. Satisfied that the emergency was over, the general wired the War Department that while all alerted units could stand down, they should remain prepared for future use. Bandholtz had no confidence in the ability of Governor Morgan and the legislature to maintain order, stating, “the State had made only a feeble attempt to check the growth of the insurgent movement or to keep reasonable touch with its progress.” That same day Bandholtz boarded a train for Washington, while General Mitchell flew back to Bolling Field. Despite the outward appearance of calm, actions by state authorities almost immediately stirred further unrest.^[19]

“At midnight, August 27, 1921, in an ill-advised move to arrest leaders of the miners’ march and union miners involved in a recent fracas with state police, a posse of from seventy to one hundred deputies and state police, led by Sheriff Don Chafin and Captain James Brockus, went to the small mining community of Sharples north of Blair Mountain, near the Boone County line. In a confrontation with miners that resulted in a gunfight, at least two miners were killed and two others were wounded.  From positions on adjacent hillsides, miners fired at the police forces who quickly withdrew.

“Within forty-eight hours, five thousand miners streamed back into the area to defend their homes against what they perceived as a new and unwarranted attack by those in league with the coal operators. Miners who were awaiting trains to return to their homes from the aborted march on Logan County now refused to board, and resumed their march. Chafin and Brockus, in an effort to contain and combat the new uprising, raised a volunteer force of approximately three thousand anti-union, anti-miner “militiamen,” and took up positions near the summit of nearby Blair Mountain.  With the miners deployed along a ten-mile front at the base of the mountain, determined to wipe out all impediments to their march, Governor Morgan on August 29 renewed his application for federal troops, citing an insurrection fanned by the influx of “Bolshevist” outsiders from Indiana, Ohio, and Illinois. The next day Morgan appended to his request a statement that the legislature could not be convened in time to avert bloodshed.^[20]

“The ineptitude and insensitivity displayed by West Virginia officials during the raid at Sharples convinced President Harding and his principal advisors that Governor Morgan and county officials were obviously too much a part of the problem to share in its solution. On August 30, Harding issued a proclamation under RS 5300 as the first step toward federal intervention to protect West Virginia from domestic violence. The proclamation called for both the miners and the Logan County force to disperse by noon on September 1, 1921. It was the first such presidential proclamation regarding a civil disorder issued since the American entry into World War I four and one-half years before. The proclamation finally and formally put to rest the wartime policy of direct access in action as well as thought.^[21]

“Accompanied by Chief of Staff Colonel Stanley H. Ford and Judge Advocate Colonel Walter A. Bethel, General Bandholtz returned to Charleston on August 30. Secretary of War Weeks had ordered Bandholtz to investigate compliance with the proclamation and provide guidance for the army in the event neither side dispersed. Neither side immediately complied. With the broad mission of suppressing domestic violence, dispersing lawbreakers, and maintaining order, Weeks gave Bandholtz some leeway as to tactics and the degree of force to be employed by stating that “necessity is the measure of your authority.” Bandholtz’s instructions translated into qualified martial law — a modified form of martial law in which his troops would support civil authorities in executing state laws. Secretary Weeks wrote Governor Morgan on August 31, 1921, “I very earnestly hope that it may not become necessary to employ federal troops. If they are used it will be to restore peace and order in the most effective and prompt way. The problem will be regarded by the military authorities purely as a tactical one.”^[22]

“Support for civil authorities was contingent upon the ability of local and state forces to suppress violence and restore order efficaciously. If Bandholtz determined that civil officials were ineffective, or even negligent by releasing prisoners whom they knew would contribute to new disorder, the general was to detain the prisoners in his custody “as long as necessity exists.” In cases where the military refused to turn prisoners over to civil officials, Bandholtz was to detain those prisoners as ordinary military prisoners under the provisions of the Court Martial Manual. In each case, however, Weeks required the general to forward a full report of the circumstances.^[23]

“By September 1, private airplanes had dropped copies of Harding’s proclamation on the belligerents. Each side, now totaling an estimated ten to twenty thousand men, refused to comply: the Logan County force was unwilling to relinquish the commanding heights of Blair Mountain, and the miners feared that their withdrawal would precipitate new raids by Sheriff Chafin and Captain Brockus. Arriving in Charleston at 11:30 a.m., General Bandholtz carried with him a second proclamation that reflected the belated realization of President Harding and Secretary of War Weeks that the 1866 decision in Ex Parte Milligan after the Civil War prohibited “martial law . . . where the courts are open and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction.”^[24]

“On September 1-2, intermittent skirmishing took place as the miners probed the positions of the defending force. Not content with rifle and machine gun fire to repulse the miners, the coal company operators associated with the Logan County force at one point arranged for commercial aircraft to drop homemade bombs filled with nails and metal fragments upon the miners. The bombs missed their targets or failed to explode. This incident gave rise to a short-lived rumor that the army had bombed the miners. A member of General Bandholtz’s staff, Captain J. W. Wilson, compared the Battle of Blair Mountain — with its considerable expenditure of ammunition interrupted by frequent breaks for coffee, lunch, liquor or rest — to comic opera. Wilson observed neither ground taken nor casualties suffered. On September 3, the miners repeatedly attempted to overrun the militiamen, but without success, due largely to their lack of organization, leadership, and a common tactical goal.^[25]

“As the miners prepared their assaults up Blair Mountain, General Harbord ordered four units, previously selected for the task, to West Virginia. Eleven officers and 201 enlisted men of the Nineteenth Infantry and 15 officers and 224 enlisted men of the Tenth Infantry Regiments came by rail from Camp Sherman and Columbus Barracks, Ohio. The first troops of the Nineteenth Infantry arrived in West Virginia on September 2. From Camp Knox, Kentucky, General Bandholtz ordered 36 officers and 384 men of the Fortieth Infantry Regiment to West Virginia, while further orders prompted the dispatch of 47 officers and 158 men of the Twenty-sixth Infantry Regiment from Camp Dix, New Jersey. In addition to the above forces, all of which arrived on September 3, a detachment of Chemical Warfare troops equipped with tear gas were dispatched from Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland. All told, General Bandholtz commanded a federal military force of 2,106 troops. To supplement this federal force Governor Morgan directed on September 3 that all “state and county officers . . . deputies, assistants, and other subordinates” cooperate with and obey General Bandholtz and his subordinates.^[26]

“While orders went out to the infantry regiments, General Harbord directed the Chief of the Army’s Air Service, General Charles T. Menoher, to have General Mitchell send twenty-one aircraft of the Eighty-eighth Aero Squadron, commanded by Major Davenport Johnson, to Kanawha Field.  In light of General Mitchell’s reputation as a zealous booster of air power and his proclivity to “steal the show,” the War Department ordered him to relinquish command of the squadron to Bandholtz and by no means accompany that unit to West Virginia.^[27]

“On September 1, DeHavilland DH-4B bombers, each equipped with front- and rear-mounted machine guns and carrying tear gas and fragmentation bombs, began the three hundred and twenty mile flight from Langley Field to Charleston. After spending the night at Roanoke, Virginia, the planes crossed over the Appalachians and by late afternoon, eleven had landed at Kanawha Field. Of the twenty-one planes requested, only seventeen were in proper condition and managed to take off from Langley Field. Two planes experienced mechanical difficulties at Roanoke and one crashed there on take-off. Another bomber experienced engine difficulty over West Virginia and crash-landed near Beckley, while two others became lost in dense fog and ended up landing in Mooresburg, Tennessee. Four additional aircraft, twin-engine “box-like Martin bombers,” from Aberdeen, Maryland, were also ordered to Kanawha Field but only three survived the flight. The total number of army aircraft in West Virginia by September 2 stood at fourteen. The bombers and their crews became an instant hit with the local population who had never seen so many military aircraft at one time in one place. Although neither the DeHavillands or Martins ever used their armament, they performed several reconnaissance missions and enjoyed the unique distinction of being the first air unit to participate in an American civil disturbance. Mitchell subsequently boasted how the “`Mingo War’ provided an excellent example of the potentialities of air power, that can go wherever there is air, no matter whether they be over water or land.”^[28]

“With no more than two thousand troops and fourteen bombers to overawe the civilian combatants of both sides, General Bandholtz deployed on September 3, 1921. From the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company building in Charleston, Bandholtz divided the area around Blair Mountain into three operational zones and deployed his command in a classic pincer movement around the two civilian forces. The first group of regulars, under the command of Colonel C. A. Martin and Major Charles T. Smart, Nineteenth Infantry, were ordered to advance southeast by rail along the Coal River from St. Albans to Madison, Danville, Sharples, Jeffrey, and finally Blair, to the rear of the miners’ army at the base of the mountain. 

“The Fortieth Infantry, in a second column under the command of Colonel G. A. Shuttleworth, would move on Logan, positioning themselves behind Blair Mountain opposite the miners and behind the army raised by Sheriff Chafin.  The remaining federal troops, regulars of the Twenty-sixth Infantry, would reinforce the remaining units of the Nineteenth Infantry at Madison, with additional companies positioning themselves along the Kanawha River at Marmet, Paint Creek, Lens Creek, and Montgomery. As the first two columns began their double envelopment of the Blair Mountain battle area, General Bandholtz ordered a cease-fire to go into effect at 4 p.m. In compliance with Governor Morgan’s order to obey Bandholtz, the sheriff’s deputies and the volunteers of the Logan force immediately disbanded. The miners, reassured then that they would not be attacked, and unwilling to resist so many regulars and the power of the national government, surrendered to the federal troops or simply went home.

“Although casualty figures were not kept by either side, best estimates put the death toll during the Battle of Blair Mountain at sixteen with all but four of the dead being miners. None of the casualties were inflicted by federal forces.^[29]

“Between September 4-8, 1921, federal troops disarmed and sent home without incident nearly fifty-four hundred miners. Having dramatically restored peace and order, virtually without firing a shot and without army-induced bloodshed, General Bandholtz refused Governor Morgan’s subsequent request for military posses to help civil authorities arrest miners wanted for violations of state laws.  The maintenance of long-term order in West Virginia and the arrest of suspects, in Bandholtz’s mind, was not an army job once calm was initially restored. Military intelligence agents investigated union headquarters and meeting halls for evidence linking the marchers to a radical conspiracy. The agents found almost no radical literature, in spite of coal operator claims, and determined that a mere 10 percent of the miners were foreigners, “poor ignorant creatures who will believe anything that they are told.” One intelligence officer stated in his report, “I cannot find that any organization except the UMW operating in this field openly. . . . A small amount of I. W. W. and Bolshevist literature has been taken from departing miners.” Although trouble was expected by the army prior to its arrival in West Virginia, during the entire deployment no violent incidents by miners against federal troops were reported.^[30]

“For the next three months, withdrawals of army troops proceeded piecemeal and in the face of strong political opposition. General Bandholtz first recommended a partial withdrawal of regulars on September 7.  The next day Secretary Weeks ordered the return of the Twenty-sixth Infantry to Camp Dix, the Eighty-eighth Aero Squadron to Langley Field, and the Chemical Warfare Detachment to Edgewood Arsenal. Countering the withdrawal, Republican Senator Howard Sutherland pressed Weeks to retain a federal force near Charleston as a deterrent to future mining disorders.”^[31]  (Laurie, Clayton D. The United States Army and the Return to Normalcy in Labor Dispute Interventions: The Case of the West Virginia Coal Mine Wars, 1920-1921 (Vol. 50 (1991), pp. 1-24,” in West Virginia History.)

Lewis. Black Coal Miners in America: Race, Class, and Community Conflict 1780-1980:

“The second march on Logan was precipitated by the assassination of Sid Hatfield on August 1, 1921, and it would lead to far more dramatic consequences than the first.  For the miners, his murder at the hands of company gunmen, and their unseemly quick release, constituted irrefutable evidence that the companies had destroyed the last vestige of legitimate authority.  The miners had long since abandoned the political system as a means of protecting their rights because of its complete domination by the coal interests.  There was little left for them to do but fight.

“Between August 20 and 23, 1921, thousands of armed miners once again converged near Marmet.  Estimates of how many blacks joined the second march to ‘free Logan’ vary considerably.  The director of the West Virginia Bureau of Negro Welfare claimed that ‘less than 200 Negroes took part in the march, while on the other hand more than 500 Negroes in Mercer, McDowell, Mingo and Logan Counties volunteered their service to go to the battle line nad repel the invaders.’  But it is likely that the bureau was attempting to defuse the issue to prevent a wedge from entering between the employers and black miners, or the bureau itself, which faithfully followed the Booker T. Washington line on industrial relations.  Reporter Heber Blankenhorn probably was more accurate when he estimated that one-quarter of the eight thousand men of the eight thousand men who gathered at Marmet were blacks.

“After several days the miners slowly began to move toward Logan, their ranks swelling with each mile until they numbered between fifteen and twenty thousand.  Many joined the marchers temporarily to ‘get in a lick’ against the ‘gun-thug system’ before retiring to the safety of their homes.  The march was better organized than might be expected from the diversity of its makeup.  There were doctors, nurses, and hospital facilities for the miners’ army, and about two thousand of the marchers were World War I veterans who set patrols, drilled, and used passwords as a precaution against infiltration by company spies.

“Trenches were dug at Blair Mountain, the high ridge which formed the western border of Logan County, and the last physical barrier obstructing the marchers’ approach.  Here too Chafin deployed hundreds of his gunmen, as well as others whom he either bribed r pressed into service at the point of a revolver….

“The battle raged for more than a week.  The miners were more numerous by at least ten to one, but the Logan gunmen were better equipped, better trained, and had a more centralized command structure.  The guards also had machine gun nests on high ground, operator money, a limitless supply of ammunition, and small aircraft for dropping hand bombs.  More importantly, the federal government was on their side.  By September 1, 1921, the marchers controlled half of the long ridge, but they would never liberate Logan, for President Warren G. Harding dispatched twenty-five hundred federal troops to the scene to interdict the marchers.  Disappointed, the men slowly dispersed and returned to their homes.  They could fight the operators’ gunmen, but the miners were patriots, and they refused to bear arms against the federal government.

“The number of people who died in the battle for Blair Mountain has never been authenticated.  Neither side in the conflict ever revealed the number of deaths or casualties, and of course, no one was charged with tabulating battlefield statistics.  A reporter for the Baltimore Evening Sun estimated that one hundred Chafin men and ten miners lost their lives.  His estimate was based on the word of eyewitnesses, one of them a black miner who claimed that he had observed truckloads of dead….”  (Lewis, Ronald L. Black Coal Miners in America: Race, Class, and Community Conflict 1780-1980.  Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987, pp. 161-162.)

Pringle, “Coal Firms to Strip-Mine Historic Battlefield?” National Geographic, 6-2-2010: “On a sultry August morning in 1921, some 15,000 coal miners converged at the foot of the steep, brambly slopes of West Virginia’s Blair Mountain. On a high ridge above, coal industry forces, private detectives, and state police officers peered out from fortified positions, training Thompson submachine guns and high-powered rifles on the men below.

“After years of violent confrontations with mine operators in West Virginia coalfields, the miners were marching to Mingo County, West Virginia, to free miners imprisoned by state authorities and unionize workers who lived in dire poverty in company towns. But the 1,952-foot-tall (595-meter-tall) Blair Mountain stood in the marchers’ path. So the miners—armed with machine guns and other weapons, and wearing red bandannas around their necks—started up the slopes.

“The ensuing battle, the second largest civil insurrection in U.S. history, lasted about five days and claimed dozens of lives. And while the miners eventually decided to lay down their arms when federal troops arrived, the battle of Blair Mountain focused national attention on the oppressive company towns of West Virginia and dangerous mines, resulting in part from lagging state safety regulations….”  (Pringle, Heather. “Coal Firms to Strip-Mine Historic Battlefield?” National Geographic, 6-2-2010.)

West Virginia State Archives: “On July 1 [1920], UMWA miners went on strike in the region. By this time, over 90 percent of Mingo County’s miners had joined the union. Over the next thirteen months, a virtual war existed in the county. Non-union mines were dynamited, miners’ tent colonies were attacked, and there were numerous deaths on both sides of the cause. During this period, governors Cornwell and Ephraim F. Morgan declared martial law on three occasions.

“In late summer 1921, a series of events destroyed the UMWA’s^[32] tenuous hold in southern West Virginia. On August 1, Sid Hatfield, who had been acquitted of his actions in the “Matewan Massacre,” was to stand trial for a shooting at the Mohawk coal camp in McDowell County. As he and a fellow defendant, Ed Chambers, walked up the steps of the McDowell County Courthouse in Welch, shots rang out. Hatfield and Chambers were murdered by Baldwin-Felts detectives.

“As a result of the Matewan Massacre, Hatfield had become a hero to many of the miners. On August 7, a crowd varyingly estimated from 700 to 5,000 gathered on the capitol grounds in Charleston to protest the killing. Among others, UMWA’s leaders Frank Keeney and Bill Blizzard urged the miners to fight. Over the next two weeks, Keeney travelled around the state, calling for a march on Logan. On August 20, miners began assembling at Marmet. Mother Jones, sensing the inevitable failure of the mission, tried to discourage the miners. At one point, she held up a telegram, supposedly from President Warren G. Harding, in which he offered to end the mine guard system and help the miners if they did not march.  Keeney told the miners he had checked with the White House and the telegram was a fake. To this day, it is uncertain who was lying.

“On August 24, the march began as approximately 5,000 men crossed Lens Creek Mountain. The miners wore red bandanas, which earned them the nickname, “red necks.” In Logan County, Don Chafin mobilized an army of deputies, mine guards, store clerks, and state police. Meanwhile, after a request by Governor Morgan for federal troops, President Harding dispatched World War I hero Henry Bandholtz to Charleston to survey the situation. On the 26th, Bandholtz and the governor met with Keeney and Mooney and explained that if the march continued, the miners and UMWA leaders could be charged with treason. That afternoon, Keeney met a majority of the miners at a ballfield in Madison and instructed them to turn back. As a result, some of the miners ended their march.  However, two factors led many to continue. First, special trains promised by Keeney to transport the miners back to Kanawha County were late in arriving. Second, the state police raided a group of miners at Sharples on the night of the 27th, killing two. In response, many miners began marching toward Sharples, just across the Logan County line.

“The town of Logan was protected by a natural barrier, Blair Mountain, located south of Sharples. Chafin’s forces, now under the command of Colonel William Eubank of the National Guard, took positions on the crest of Blair Mountain as the miners assembled in the town of Blair, near the bottom of the mountain. On the 28th, the marchers took their first prisoners, four Logan County deputies and the son of another deputy. On the evening of the 30th, Baptist minister James E. Wilburn organized a small armed company to support the miners.  On the 31st, Wilburn’s men shot and killed three of Chafin’s deputies, including John Gore, the father of one of the men captured previously.  During the skirmish, a deputy killed one of Wilburn’s followers, Eli Kemp. Over the next three days, there was intense fighting as Eubank’s troops brought in planes to drop bombs.

“On September 1, President Harding finally sent federal troops from Fort Thomas, Kentucky. War hero Billy Mitchell led an air squadron from Langley Field near Washington, D.C. The squadron set up headquarters in a vacant field in the present Kanawha City section of Charleston. Several planes did not make it, crashing in such distant places as Nicholas County, Raleigh County, and southwestern Virginia, and military air power played no important part in the battle.

“On the 3rd, the first federal troops arrived at Jeffrey, Sharples, Blair, and Logan. Confronted with the possibility of fighting against U.S. troops, most of the miners surrendered. Some of the miners on Blair Mountain continued fighting until the 4th, at which time virtually all surrendered or returned to their homes. During the fighting, at least twelve miners and four men from Chafin’s army were killed.

“Those who surrendered were placed on trains and sent home. However, those perceived as leaders were to be held accountable for the actions of all the miners. Special grand juries handed down 1,217 indictments, including 325 for murder and 24 for treason against the state. The only treason conviction was against Walter Allen, who skipped bail and was never captured. The most prominent treason trial was that of Bill Blizzard, considered by authorities to be the “general” of the miners’ army. In a change of venue, Blizzard’s trial was held in the Jefferson County Courthouse in Charles Town, the same building in which John Brown had been convicted of treason in 1859. After several trials in different locations, all charges against Blizzard were dropped. Keeney and Mooney were also acquitted of murder charges. James E. Wilburn and his son were convicted of murdering the Logan County deputies. Both were pardoned by Governor Howard Gore after serving only three years of their eleven-year sentences.

“The defeat of the miners at Blair Mountain temporarily ended the UMWA’s organizing efforts in the southern coalfields.  By 1924, UMWA membership in the state had dropped by about one-half of its total in 1921.  Both Keeney and Mooney were forced out of the union, while Blizzard remained a strong force in District 17 until being ousted in the 1950s.  In 1933, the National Industrial Recovery Act protected the rights of unions and allowed for the rapid organization of the southern coalfields.

“Blair Mountain stands as a powerful symbol for workers to this day. The miners who participated vowed never to discuss the details of the march to protect themselves from the authorities. For many years, the story of the march was communicated by word of mouth as an inspiration to union activists. It serves as a vivid reminder of the deadly violence so often associated with labor-management disputes. The mine wars also demonstrate the inability of the state and federal governments to defuse the situations short of armed intervention.”  (West Virginia State Archives. West Virginia’s Mine Wars. West Virginia Division of Culture and History.)

Wikipedia: “The Battle of Blair Mountain was one of the largest civil uprisings in United States history and the largest armed rebellion since the American Civil War.^[33]….The battle ended after approximately one million rounds were fired.^[34]

“….Up to 30 deaths were reported by Chafin’s side^[35] and 50-100 on the union miners’ side, with many hundreds more injured….” (Wikipedia. “Battle of Blair Mountain.” 7-5-2012 modification.)

Sources

American Postal Worker Magazine. “The Battle of Blair Mountain.” Jul/Aug 2010. Accessed 7-31-2012 at: http://www.apwu.org/laborhistory/10-4_blairmountain/10-4_blairmountain.htm

Blizzard, William C. (Edited by Wess Harris).  When Miners March. Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010. Partially Google digitized at: http://books.google.com/books?id=b5-RE_XdH_IC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

Kilkearny, Desmond.  “The Battle of Blair Mountain.” Chaparral. (no date). Accessed 7-31-2012 at: http://www.glendale.edu/chaparral/apr05/blair.htm

Laurie, Clayton Davis and Ronald H. Cole. The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877-1945 (Army Historical Series).  Chapter 13. “The West Virginia Coal Mine Wars and the Return to Normalcy, 1919-1921, pp. 303-324. Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army. 1997.

Lee, Howard B. Bloodletting in Appalachia: The Story of West Virginia’s Four Major Mine Wars and Other Thrilling Incidents of Its Coal fields. Morgantown: West Virginia Univ., 1969.

Lewis, Ronald L. Black Coal Miners in America: Race, Class, and Community Conflict 1780-1980.  Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987. Partially Google digitized at: http://books.google.com/books?id=6fV-BMYCjLMC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

Pringle, Heather. “Coal Firms to Strip-Mine Historic Battlefield?” National Geographic, 6-2-2010. Accessed 7-13-2012 at: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/05/100520-science-environment-blair-mountain-coal-massey-energy-nation/

Shogan, Robert. The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America’s Largest Labor Uprising.  Basic Books, 2004.

West Virginia State Archives. West Virginia’s Mine Wars. West Virginia Division of Culture and History. Accessed 7-30-2012 at: http://www.wvculture.org/history/minewars.html

Wikipedia. “Battle of Blair Mountain.” 7-5-2012 modification. Accessed at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Blair_Mountain

[1] We do not use in tally – appears to be pure speculation. Note only to demonstrate wide range of speculation.

[2] No source is cited. Not consistent with most of sources cited. Thus we do not use.

[3] Lewis writes that “The number of people who died in the battle for Blair Mountain has never been authenticated.  Neither side in the conflict ever revealed the number of deaths or casualties, and of course, no one was charged with tabulating battlefield statistics. A reporter for the Baltimore Evening Sun estimated that one hundred Chafin men and ten miners lost their lives. His estimate was based on the word of eyewitnesses…”

[4] Shogan writes: “Once the shooting stopped, the search for casualties began. Mindful of stories that scores had been killed, their bodies still lying in the woods, Colonel Martin sent a company of troops with miners and guides and stretcher bearers to search the area but found no corpses. Reporters covering the battle were told that miners ‘carried their dead and wounded away with them.’ But no one ever proved or disproved this contention…precise death toll  never established, but estimates range from fewer than twenty to more than fifty. In any case this was a much lower figure than was feared would be produced by the size of the forces involved. Chafin had been informed at one point that the miners’ army numbered 9,000; his own forces he put at about 2,500. Other estimates were even higher.  The official Army history of the Federal role in domestic disorders put the total on both sides between 10,000 to 20,000.

[5] It seems clear that at least sixteen were killed. The high fatality estimate is difficult. There is only speculation based on eyewitness guesstimates, such as reported by Lewis.  It is clear that thousands of men fought on a broad and shifting front for approximately a week using rifles, machine guns and even bombs. We are, we think, conservatively using the estimate used by Kilkearny and Shogan at over 50, recognizing that Pringle’s estimate at over 36 fatalities could be even more conservatively used.

[6] My number based on the statement that “dozens of lives” were “claimed.”

[7] This refers to the report of one Baldwin-Felts mine guard, Hughey Lucas, who told Lee that “he counted ten dead ‘Red Necks’ in his sector.  Lee notes that “Neither side made any announcement of their casualties…”

[8] Small old car.

[9] Cites: Jordan, “The Mingo War,” 110; also Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, 92, 191 and Lunt, Law and Order, 99; Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 48-50.

[10] Cites:  Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 51-53; Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, 96-98; Lunt, Law and Order, 125.

[11] Cites: Rich, President and Civil Disorder, 161; Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, 96; Lunt, Law and Order, 125.

[12] Cites:  Senate, West Virginia Coalfields, 681; RG 407, AGO 370.6 (Mingo County, West Virginia), Memo, Jervey, Army Chief of Staff, Operations Division, Office of the Chief of Staff, to Adj. Gen., USA, 23 Aug 1921, and Tel., Harris, War Department, to Commanding General, Fifth Corps Area, 25 Aug 1921, NARA; Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, 98-99; David Corbin, Life, Work, and Rebellion in the Coalfields: The Southern West Virginia Miners, 1880-1920 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1981), 195, 218-19; Rich, President and Civil Disorder, 162; Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 64-65. Legislation recreating the West Virginia National Guard took effect on 27 July 1921, and the first National Guard unit, Company I, 150th Infantry, was activated on 21 August. By late October, eleven state militia companies would be in existence. John H. Carnock was named adjutant; see Cole, “Martial Law,” 139-40.

[13] Cites: Senate, West Virginia Coalfields, 1032; Rich, President and Civil Disorder, 162; Mauer Mauer and Calvin F. Senning, “Billy Mitchell, the Air Service, and the Mingo War,” West Virginia History 30(October 1968): 342.

[14] Cites: Lunt, Law and Order, 126; Rich, President and Civil Disorder, 162.

[15] Cites: Cabell Philips, “The West Virginia Mine War,” American Heritage 25(August 1974): 90; Senate, West Virginia Coalfields, 1033.

[16] Cites: RG 407, AGO 370.6 (Mingo, West Virginia), Tel., Harbord to Bandholtz, c/o Morgan, West Virginia, 26 Aug 1921, NARA.

[17] Cites: Mauer and Senning, “Billy Mitchell, Mingo War,” 339, 342-43; Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 87-88.

[18] Cites:  Mauer and Senning, “Billy Mitchell, Mingo War,” 343; Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 66-68.

[19] Cites: Senate, West Virginia Coalfields, 1033; Rich, President and Civil Disorder, 163; Mauer, “Billy Mitchell, Mingo War,” 343; Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 92-93.

[20] Cites: Philips, “West Virginia Mine War,” 91; Senate, West Virginia Coalfields, 682, 1034; Lunt, Law and Order, 130-31; Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, 99-100; Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 94-96; RG 407, AGO 370.6 (Mingo County), Tel., W. R. Thurman, Logan County, to Wells Goodykoontz, House of Representatives, 31 Aug 1921, and Morgan to Secretary of War, 30 Aug 1921, NARA.

[21] Cites: Rich, President and Civil Disorder, 163; Lunt, Law and Order, 131, 140; RG 407, AGO 370.6 (Mingo County), Proclamation by the President to the Citizens of West Virginia, 30 Aug 1921, NARA; United States, War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1921 (Washington: GPO, 1921), 204.

[22] Cites: RG 407, AGO 370.6 (Mingo County), Letter, Weeks to Morgan, 31 Aug 1921, NARA; Senate, West Virginia Coalfields, 1033; Rich, President and Civil Disorder, 163-64; Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 101-02; Dowell, Military Aid to the Civil Power, 200, “Letter of Instruction, Secretary War to Bandholtz, circa 30 Aug. 1921.”

[23] Cites: Dowell, Military Aid, 200.

[24] Cites: RG 407, AGO 370.6 (Mingo County), Tels., Morgan to Harding, 31 Aug 1921, and Wm. Petry to Harding, 31 Aug 1921, NARA; Rich, President and Civil Disorder, 164-66; Lunt, Law and Order, 132; Senate, West Virginia Coalfields, 134.

[25] Cites: Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, 100-01; Lunt, Law and Order, 137.

[26] Cites: RG 407, AGO 370.6 (Mingo County), Annual Report, Fifth Corps Area, 1922, NARA; Mauer and Senning, “Billy Mitchell, Mingo War,” 348; “Federal Troops in West Virginia,” Army and Navy Journal 59(3 Sept 1921): 12; Lunt, Law and Order, 138; Rich, President and Civil Disorder, 165; Senate, West Virginia Coalfields, 1032; Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 121; Report of the Sec. of War, 1921, 204-05.

[27] Cites: RG 407, AGO 370.6 (Mingo County), Radiogram, Menoher to Commanding Officer, 1st Provisional Air Brigade, Langley Field, VA, 1 Sept 1921, NARA; Mauer and Senning, “Billy Mitchell, Mingo War,” 339, 344-46; Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 127.

[28] Cites: RG 407, AGO 370.6 (Mingo County), Tels., Adj. Gen., USA, to the Chief of the Air Service, 9 Sept 1921, Menoher to Adj. Gen., USA, 12 Sept 1921, and Mitchell to Adj. Gen., USA, 17 Sept, NARA; Mauer and Senning, “Billy Mitchell, Mingo War,” 349-50; Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 125-28. The return flight of the Martin Bombers was marred by tragedy; see Richard A. Andre, “Bomber Number 5,” Wonderful West Virginia 48(1984): 21-23.

[29] Cites: Rich, President and Civil Disorder, 165-67; Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, 101; Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 129-31, 134, 140; Lunt, Law and Order, 138; Mauer and Senning, “Billy Mitchell, Mingo War:” 348; Senate, West Virginia Coalfields, 1034-35.

[30] Cites: RG 407, AGO 370.6 (Mingo County), Bandholtz to William, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, 4 Sept 1921, NARA; Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 141; Lunt, Law and Order, 138-41.

[31] Cites: RG 407, AGO 370.6 (Mingo County), Letters, Sutherland to Weeks, 10 Sept 1921, and Weeks to Sutherland, 12 Sept 1921, NARA; Rich, President and Civil Disorder, 166; Senate, West Virginia Coalfields, 1034; Mauer and Senning, “Billy Mitchell, Mingo War,” 350.

[32] United Mine Workers of America.

[33] Cites: Chuck Kinder, Last Mountain Dancer: Hard-Earned Lessons in Love, Loss, and Honky-Tonk, Da Capo Press, 2005, page 149.

[34] Cites: Ayers, Rothrock and King 2007.

[35] Anti-union Logan County Sheriff Don Chafin.