1915 — Nov 6, Fire, Diamond Candy Factory, 285-287 N 6th Street, Brooklyn, NY — 12
Compiled by Wayne Blanchard; last edit 4-14-2025 for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/
— 12 Colby. The New International Year Book 1915, p. 219.
— 12 NFPA. “Some Fundamentals of Safeguarding Life From Fire.” Quarterly, 16/2, Oct 1922, p. 170.
— 12 NFPA. “Two Factory Fire Holocausts,” Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, Jan 1916, p. 274.
— 12 New York Times. “Jury Sees Firetrap Door,” Jan 17, 1917.
— 12 New York Times. “Tried in Diamond Factory Fire Case,” Jan 16, 1917.
— 12 Safety Engineering. “Fire-Horrors in Factories,” Vol. 30, No. 5, Nov, 1915, p. 301.
— 12 Safety Engineering. “Diamond Candy Company Fire,” Vol. 30, No. 6, Dec, 1915, p. 406.
— 12 Safety Engineering, Vol. 33, No’s. 1-6, January-June, 1917, p. 212.
— 12 Wickware. The American Year Book: A Record of Events…Progress, 1915. 1916, 802.
Narrative Information
Colby: [During] “…a fire in Brooklyn, N.Y., at the Diamond Candy Company, Nov. 6, 1915…8 employees were suffocated or burned to death, and 4 jumped and were fatally injured, in addition to others injured in other ways.” (Colby. The New International Year Book 1915, p. 219.)
National Fire Protection Association. “Brooklyn, 285-287 North 6th Street, Nov 6, 1915:
“The Fire: The fire originated on the first floor behind the elevator in the stairway enclosure where there were thousands of paper boxes stored. The first alarm was sounded at 1:44 p.m. As the engines responded, the Acting Battalion Chief, realizing the extent of the danger, dropped from his wagon a block away and sent in a second and third alarm. The evidence is conclusive that at least ten minutes elapsed from the discovery of the fire until the first alarm was sounded. The engines arrived, according to the testimony of Capt. Connelly, within three minutes after the call; the hook and ladder within four minutes; when the apparatus arrived ‘there was fire on all the first floor, and fire was coming out of at least one window on the second, and smoke was coming out of every opening in the front part of the building all the way up. There were 40 or 50 people on the fire escapes and the citizens were catching the girls as they dropped off the second floor balcony.’ (p. 271)
….
“Lives Lost: Twelve persons lost their lives; eight by suffocation or burning, and four by jumping from the windows or fire escape. The eight were near or on the fire escapes of the upper floors.” (p. 274.)
….
“The Causes: The causes which chiefly contributed to this disaster may be summarized as follows:
(1) The total inefficiency of one stair enclosure and the entire absence of another;
(2) The bolting of the trap door;
(3) Partial failure of the fire escape, due to overcrowding, lack of protection at openings, and obstruction of balanced stair;
(4) Storing of material in stairway;
(5) The failure to establish fire drills, and as complement thereto a proper interior fire alarm;
(6) The failure to promptly send in the alarm of fire.
Recommendations.
“1. Stairway Enclosures: It is our belief that had the stairways been enclosed throughout with even the lowest grade of partition material permitted by the State Labor Department, the occupants of this building would have escaped in safety. We consider that the type of stairway enclosure which was in progress of erection on the third floor at the time of the fire…was not at all suited to the purpose. It is quite possible that such construction would not have been accepted by the Labor Department, but nevertheless we wish to register a protest against such construction, and the fact that it would not be acceptable should be so clearly understood by all factory owners that they would not even tentatively assume that it would be worth while attempting to ‘put it over.’ Sheet metal is a very poor resistant to heat, and when attacked by fire quickly becomes red hot. In that case it would instantly ignite the dry boards to which it is attached and would quickly fill the passageway with smoke and perhaps flame. We believe that if such low grade construction is permitted, a layer of asbestos board, plaster board or other incombustible, non-conducting material should be placed between the sheet metal and the wood work, or the wooden partitions should be properly covered with metal on both sides.
“2. Fire Escapes: Existing fire escapes, even though they many not be brought up to standard,
should be made less hazardous by the installation of fire windows opposite them and, as the law requires, there should not be any possible obstruction to their operation. The entrance to the fire escape, if possible, should not be made opposite the ladders and landing, but on an extension of the balconies to one side of the path of egress from the floors above, thus allowing the escaping people to avoid fire and smoke which might come through an open exit.
“3. Locked Exit: We condemn most vigorously the practice of locking exits during working hours, and believe the punishment for such crime should be severe. In this particular case, considering the fact that reliable testimony shows that all occupants of the first, second, and third floors escaped, and that the fire did not render the west side of the building untenable for ten to fifteen minutes, it is probable that all the occupants of the upper floors might have escaped if the westerly stairway had been free. We believe that locked exit doors during working hours are inexcusable, as an automatic gong can easily be attached to give notice of the use of an exit. All exit doors should be readily opened without keys from the inside even though necessary to have them locked on the outside.
“4. Skylights: Skylights over shafts extending through roofs should be glazed with plain thin glass which will readily break when attacked by fire, thus affording a vent, and preventing mushrooming of fire on upper floors.
“5. Storage in Stairways: A more efficient method should be devised for preventing ignorant or indifferent people from violating the law by storing material in stairways.
“6. Automatic Sprinklers: We believe that had this building been properly equipped with a system of automatic sprinklers, not only would the loss of life have been prevented, but serious loss of property as well.
“7. Fire Drills and Alarm System: We believe that a properly organized fire drill, together with the necessary fire alarm system would have been effective in reducing if not entirely preventing loss of life, and we feel that a better method than now in use should be devised to secure the inauguration of proper fire drills suitable to varying conditions in factories. Frequent fire drills, using all exits, will tend to reveal inadequate means of egress and keep all exits in working order. They also help to give self-control to occupants and make a tardy alarm less liable.
“8. Laws: We believe that the present laws in this jurisdiction are adequate but that they should be simplified and clarified rather than amplified, and that concurrent authority should be avoided as far as possible.
“9. Criminal Negligence: Indifference and negligence to comply with lawful orders for the safety of occupants is criminal and should be severely and quickly dealt with by law. It is interesting to note that the only orders complied with were those of minor importance which cost little, or those which had the direct effect of lowering the insurance rates on the building and contents.” (National Fire Protection Association. “Two Factory Fire Holocausts.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association. Vol. 9, No. 3, Jan 1916, pp. 275, 277.)
Safety Engineering, Nov 1915: “At least a dozen persons lost their lives on November 6, when the Diamond Candy Factory in North Sixth street, in the Williamsburg district of Brooklyn, was burned. Eight of the victims were girls and four were men. Others may die of their injuries. This fire recalls the Asch Building disaster, when 147 lives were sacrificed. Diamond Candy Factory was an old 4-story brick and wood building with a single outside fire escape and an emergency stairway extending through an opening enclosed by a wooden partition. The absence of fireproofing, the lack of sufficient fire escapes, and the fact that the main stairway led directly past an unused elevator shaft up which the fire ascended as through a flue, are declared to explain the loss of life.
“The candy company occupied the first and second floors where about 70 girls were employed, but, being a half holiday, there were comparatively few persons on these floors. The Essex Shirt Company, employing 60 girls and several men, occupied the third floor. The fourth floor was tenanted by a tailoring company. The Barasch Cloak Company, employing 40 girls, occupied the top floor. When the fire broke out there were about 200 persons in the building, all of them above the second floor.
“In less than three minutes after a wreath of smoke had appeared in the unused elevator shaft, the flames burst out on all the floors. The cry of fire was sounded and an alarm was sent in. The frightened occupants at once made for the stairs, which led from the entrance directly toward the rear of the building in a continuous ascent of four flights. Up the front of the building ran the only fire escape, to which the girls and men rushed, each one fighting for a foothold on the crowded structure. On the first floor the frenzied employees had trouble with the drop-ladder, which they could not get into place. Extension ladders were raised by the firemen, who were unable to ascend them because of the intense heat.
‘In the meantime several girls had leaped to the pavement, crushing out their lives. Hose streams poured tons of water into each story while the ill-fated employees were groping through flames and smoke endeavoring to find an opening. Several hours elapsed before the flames were extinguished and the charred bodies recovered.
“Investigation has developed sufficient facts to show that the disaster was the result of neglect and a disobedience to orders in the enforcement of the factory laws. The State Industrial Commission has suspended the inspector in whose district the fire occurred, also the supervising inspector in charge of Long Island. Their dismissals may follow if the circumstances upon which they were suspended are established as facts. It was held that the negligence of these two officials was responsible for the casualty, as the improvements ordered on the building last January had not been made at the time of the fire.
“Witnesses at the investigation testified that the door leading out of the candy factory was found locked by those endeavoring to escape, and they were held prisoners until the door was broken open. Edward L. Diamond, proprietor of the Candy Company, insisted that he had obeyed every order of the authorities relating to the fireproofing of his factory.
“He admitted that he received the order to fireproof the hallway six weeks ago, but that he had only just begun the work. It developed, also, that several years ago a man who had been injured in the Diamond Candy Factory, got a judgment for $18,000 against Diamond. Diamond then went into bankruptcy, and since then the title of the property and the business have been in the name of his wife.
Fire Marshal Brophy refused to commit himself, but it is understood that he obtained information to show that the fire was of incendiary origin. Both Diamond and his wife, and several others, are being held under heavy bail pending further investigation. James M. Lynch, State Industrial Commissioner, before Coroner Wagner’s inquiry, testified that his department had issued orders for fireproofing of the building, but he did not remember whether any action had been taken. He said further:
“I do not recall any attempt to enforce the orders Ambiguity of the law seems to exempt 5-story buildings from control. The law provides for buildings over or under five stories, but does not specify 5-story buildings. I do not recall any case of non-compliance with our orders being reported to the district attorney. The rule is that if our orders are not complied with when the inspector calls the second time, the matter shall be referred to counsel. We have no system of checking up the reports of inspectors. Between September 28 and November 6, the date the Diamond building burned, our counsel did nothing. After all the investigations of that building something definite and vigorous should have been done. Our employees work seven hours a day. There is no law against working longer except the law of custom. It is not done in any of the State departments. I do not know how many of our orders have not been complied with—whether there were 10,000 or 100,000.”
“….About as sickening as the tragedies themselves a r e the customary attempts of officials to disavow responsibility a n d shift the blame for the calamities. We have the spectacle of city and State governments impotent to protect their factory workers from wholesale slaughter, yet their officials issue voluminous statements designed to exonerate themselves a n d their departments. The laws of New York did not tolerate the fire hazard in the Brooklyn factory, and the State industrial commission, through its inspectors, called the owners to account. But the machinery of the law was too slow.
“There is no doubt that conditions are little short of chaotic. Vital defects should be remedied, for laws that allow a conflict of authority and make it impossible to fix responsibility are travesties on “Safety First.” A law that allows the fire department to make several reports and issue orders against the building without giving it the power to enforce those orders, is worse than no law. A law that gives factory inspection over to a State department, which according to the word of the chief official is incapable adequately to perform such duties, is of no account. There appears to be a sufficiency of New York law, but a lack of enforcement.” (Safety Engineering, “Fire-Horrors in Factories,” Vol. 30, No. 5, Nov, 1915, pp. 301-307.)
NFPA. “Some Fundamentals of Safeguarding Life From Fire.” Quarterly, 16/2, Oct 1922, p. 170:
“Brooklyn, N.Y., November 6, 1915. Factory building. Two stairways and one fire escape. One stairway cut off by fire; other by locked trap door. Fire escape was then the only means of exit, and it had become overcrowded so that several jumped off it. ‘Its balances stair had caught on a door which swung out beyond the walls in the first story, and for some minutes this means of escape was blocked.’ Twelve dead; 38 injured.”
Safety Engineering, Dec 1916: “The building which was the scene of this disastrous fire (November 6, 1915, 1 :44 p. m., 285-287 North Sixth street, Brooklyn) was 5-stories and basement in height with a small 1-story extension at the rear and covered a total ground area of. 5,000 square feet. The walls were of brick….The roof was of composition on joisted construction similar to floors. In the roof was one skylight of wired glass on metal and there was a similar skylight at top of elevator shaft. The finish of walls and ceilings was open except there were metal ceilings on part of the first and third floors. There were a few interior partitions of wood of a minor character.
“The main floor openings consisted of an elevator shaft and two flights of stairs. The elevator was enclosed in a shaft of 12-inch brick with a skylight of wired glass on metal at the top and 2-ply doors covered with single lock-jointed tin, not standard but of fair value, at the openings to floors.
“The easterly stairs, which were regularly used, were enclosed in a wooden shaft from first to fifth with wood doors to loft spaces. From the foot of the stairs on the first floor a partition ran diagonally to the street…Under these stairs there was an open flight from basement to first.
“The westerly stairs were less frequently used. They started on the first floor at a point about 40 feet from the front of the building and extended toward the street to the upper floors, as shown on plan. These stairs were open except for wood traps at the third, fourth and fifth floor levels. These traps had no automatic attachments. The trap at the fourth floor level was shut and fastened from the underside at the time of the fire. The State Industrial Commission had ordered that a fire resistive enclosure be built about these stairs. The only work that had been done in compliance with this order was on the third floor. Here the contractor had built a framework of second-hand lumber with boards spaced 2 or 3 inches apart, and was covering it with galvanized iron nailed on in large sheets (not lock-jointed). This work was to be submitted for approval and if accepted the enclosure was to be extended to all floors.
“The west wall of the building acted as a fire wall between a frame, brick filled 1-story building at the rear, used as a candle factory, a 1-story frame building at the front, formerly used as a garage, and the main building; openings in this wall were protected by wired glass m substandard hollow metal sash and frame windows. A boiler room at the rear of the building was an open story equal in height to the basement and first of the main building and was cut off by a 12-inch brick wall with substandard 2-ply tinclad fire doors at openings to factory.
“Windows in the sides and rear of the main building were of wired glass in substandard hollow metal sash and frames of the upper and lower horizontal pivoted type. The glass had only 7/8 to y, inches bearing in the frames.
OCCUPANCY.
Basement—Diamond Candy Company, 4 confectioner’s furnaces disconnected, cooling tables, cooling candy in molds.
1.—Same tenant, office, stock, 3 steam cooking kettles, 2 marshmallow mixers by power, boiler and engine room.
2.—Same tenant, 2 ball machines with gas heated spinners attached, rubber connection, coating kettle, 2 drop machines, steam vacuum pan, peanut separator and 1 cream mixer by power ; confectioner’s furnace, 6 steam heated batch warmers, steam cooking kettles, 2 steam heated chocolate pans ; elevator machinery ; 35 hands.
3.—Essex Shirt Company, manufacturing shirts, about 90 sewing machines by power, old gas engine not used ; 65 hands.
4.—B. L. U. Tailoring Company, contractor on coats, 24 sewing machines by power, 16 gas irons with blowers ; 37 hands.
5.—A. Baratz, shirt factory, about 75 sewing machines by power, gas engine in reserve; 60 hands.
ORIGIN AND SPREAD.
“Two days preceding the fire 1,000 5-pound pasteboard confectionery boxes and 10,000 pasteboard slips for subdividing these boxes had been received by the Diamond Candy Company and stored on the first story in the stair hall against the elevator wall. The bulk of these materials was still in the hall the day of the fire, also a case of wax paper for wrapping candy novelties and a barrel of condensed milk, these latter being stored against the westerly wall. How the fire started is not known; it did, however, receive its first impetus from the rapid combustion of the stacked candy boxes. The fire was discovered by Harry Koop, Diamond’s shipping clerk, who was in the stock room in back of the office and saw the flames through the sash door into the hall. It was seen about the same time by the driver of a cooper’s wagon who had called for empty glucose barrels, also by the bookkeeper in the office who felt the heat and turning saw the fire burning through the partition. The man on the wagon drove away without turning in an alarm; Koop ran to the frame dwelling adjoining to the eastward to get out his family who lived there; Diamond’s nephew who witnessed the start of the fire from a point on Metropolitan avenue did not turn in an alarm for fear of the police (he was a fugitive from justice); the bookkeeper did not turn in an alarm; other witnesses it would seem were fascinated by the spectacular features of the fire so that it was perhaps ten or fifteen minutes before a policeman turned in an alarm from the corner of Union avenue and Metropolitan avenue, a block away, at 1:44 p. m; three other alarm boxes were pulled almost simultaneously. In the meantime the fire had spread out into the first and second floors and up the stairs to the upper floors with great rapidity.
“There were two flights of stairs in the building (as noted above) and a fire escape on the front, to serve as fire exits. The fire at the start cut off the wood enclosed stairs in which it originated. The westerly stairs were open except for the unfinished enclosure on the third and the non-automatic wood traps on the third, fourth and fifth floors. At the time of the fire the wood trap at the fourth floor level was fastened shut on the underside by a hasp with a bolt with a nut on both ends through the staple. The trap at the third floor was fastened in a similar manner, but a workman who was employed on the stair enclosure removed the bolt and opened this door at the very start of the fire. The fire escape extended in front of the building alongside of unprotected windows; the superior resistance of the wired glass and metal sash at the sides and rear of the building naturally caused the fire to vent itself through these front windows. A glance at the plan will show that although the building was 100 feet deep, all exits were located in the front 40 feet. Certainly none of these exits could be considered reliable, especially in view of the fact that there were 175 persons employed on the upper floors at times.
“On the Saturday afternoon of the fire the Diamond Candy Company’s factory was shut down and there were only 15 employees on the first and second floors ; they and the 65 employees of the Essex Shirt Company on the third, had no difficulty in escaping, the latter by means of the westerly stairs to the second thence through the windows to the roof of the buildings adjoining, or down the fire escape. The fire in the main stairs and the locked trap door on the other stairs at the fourth floor left only the fire escape as a means of exit to the 97 employees of the fourth and fifth floors. Employees worked for fifteen minutes in trying to tear open the fastened trap, but succeeded five persons to squeeze through. In the meantime those who crowded the fire escape were delayed because the counterbalanced ladder intended to reach from the second to the ground was caught by doors on the first story which swung outward. Koop, returned after seeing his family safely out of the frame building adjoining, and closed these doors, allowing the ladder to descend and some employees escaped this way. Flames and dense smoke were, however, pouring out of the doors and windows and many remained huddled on the fire escapes afraid to descend.
HOW THE FIRE WAS FOUGHT.
“When the first fire companies arrived the fire was in complete possession of the first and second floors and smoke was pouring out of all the upper windows, in fact Acting Battalion Chief Edward Conolly, on his way to the fire, realized its magnitude when a block away and sent his driver to turn in a third alarm, which registered at 1:49 p. m. Fire companies entered the first and second floors, but their streams had no effect on the fire and they were forced to retire, subsequently no fire-fighting was done inside of the building. The truck companies assisted by members of the engine companies, devoted their energies to rescuing the employees on the fire escapes by ladders and life nets, saving 37 persons in this way. A fourth alarm was sent in at 2:09 p. m. There were 14 engine companies and four hook and ladder companies at work upon this fire….
LOSS OF LIFE.
“Twelve persons lost their lives in this fire, 8 by suffocation or burning and 4 by jumping to the street. Those burned to death were found near or on the fire escapes on the upper floors. Thirty- eight persons were overcome by smoke or were injured by jumping to the street or into nets. Some missed the nets altogether; in other cases two or three persons would strike a net at once breaking it or making it impossible to hold.” (Safety Engineering. “Diamond Candy Company Fire,” Vol. 30, No. 6, December, 1915.)
Safety Engineering, Dec 1915: New York Board of Fire Underwriters Report on the Recent…Tragedy in Brooklyn Conclusions:
“This fire demonstrated that it is fatal to store combustible stock in stair enclosures; that a building of light joisted construction will burn with such rapidity that the most reliable safeguard to life and property is a standard automatic sprinkler system; that ample and safe exit, are- necessary in a factory building and that such exits should preferably be smokeproof towers or horizontal exits; that all stairways and other floor openings should be enclosed in substantial fireproof construction; that exits should be situated remotely from each other; that fire escapes passing in front of unprotected windows are of little value; that the operation of counterbalanced ladders should at all times be unobstructed; that doors or traps to stairs which might be used as exits in case of fire should not be locked; that it is advisable to equip factory buildings with an efficient fire alarm which will not only warn employees, but call the public fire department; that fire drills should be frequently and faithfully practiced.”
(Quoted in: Safety Engineering. Vol. 30, No. 6, Dec, 1915, p. 402.)
Schene: “The fire-escape was rendered impassable by smoke and flame from adjacent windows and the occupants of this floor jumped to the street below or turned back to meet their death within.”
“How often has the above statement, in one form or another, appeared in newspapers in every, section of the country! Fires involving terrible loss of life occur periodically year after year; the Collinwood school disaster, the Newark factory fire, the Binghamton mill fire, the Triangle Shirt-waist fire, the more recent Brooklyn fires and many others throughout the length and breadth of the land have shocked us momentarily, but only momentarily. We have wept at the funerals of the unfortunate victims, we have cursed those who were responsible, we have read with sympathy the lengthy editorials in the daily papers, and we have settled back with forgetfulness and complacency into the routine of business life. Instead of stopping for a moment to realize our great civic responsibility, we hasten to our work daily in the midst of conditions which at any moment may combine to make us the victims of another catastrophe. The legislators have given scant attention to the passing of laws tending to eliminate this ever present danger, and officials, as a rule, give less attention to rigid enforcement of such inadequate laws as do exist; the owners of buildings have grudgingly complied with these laws in the cheapest possible way; and the rest of us accept these conditions without protest or complaint.” (Schene. “The So-called Fire Escape.” Safety Engineering, Vol. 30, No. 5, Nov, 1915, pp. 334-338.)
Newspapers:
Jan 16, NYT: “Samuel Barkin, President of the Essex Waist Company, which occupied the third floor of the Diamond factory building at 285 North Sixth Street, Brooklyn, where twelve persons lost their lives by fire on Nov. 6, 1915, was placed on trial yesterday, charged with manslaughter…Mrs. Celia Diamond, who owned the building and conducted a candy factory there; her husband, Edward L. Diamond, who acted as her representative, and Samuel Simon, Treasurer of the concern, all indicted with Barkin, were also called for trial, but her counsel requested separate trials. Their cases were deferred. It is the contention of the prosecution that Barkin kept a trapdoor leading from the fourth floor to the third door locked.” (New York Times. “Tried in Diamond Factory Fire Case,” Jan 16, 1917.)
Jan 17, NYT: “The trial of Samuel Barkin of the Essex Waist Company, who is charged with manslaughter in connection with the Diamond factory fire, in which twelve lives were lost on Nov. 6, 1915, was continued yesterday before Justice Isaac M. Kapper, in the Supreme Court in Brooklyn. Assistant District Attorney Everett Caldwell in his opening address said he would prove that Barkin locked the trap door leading from the third to the fourth floor, and thus cut off the escape of the victims.
“Matilda Slotkin, the 20-year-old bookkeeper of the Essex Company, testified that about two weeks before the fire she saw Barkin close the trapdoor, but did not see him bolt it. Captain Isaac Ludgate of Hook and Ladder Company 104 testified that on the day following the fire he found the trapdoor locked with a bolt on the lower side, and he had to use tools to get it open. On the upper side of the door there was a clasp which was easily opened.
“At this point the fatal trapdoor was carried into the courtroom and placed in evidence. It showed where several boards had been ripped from the centre by men imprisoned on the fourth floor. A number of persons escaped through this opening, but it was so small that the fire engulfed the last twelve before they could get through. The trial will be continued today.” (New York Times. “Jury Sees Firetrap Door,” January 17, 1917.)
Sources
Colby, Frank Moore (Ed.). The New International Year Book: A Compendium of the World’s Progress for the Year 1915. NY: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1916. Digitized by Google. At: http://books.google.com/books?id=V1dMAAAAMAAJ&printsec=toc&source=gbs_navlinks_s
National Fire Protection Association. “Some Fundamentals of Safeguarding Life From Fire.” Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2, Oct 1922, p. 170. Accessed 4-14-2025 at: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Quarterly_of_the_National_Fire_Protectio/-MAdAQAAIAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=%E2%80%9CSome+Fundamentals+of+Safeguarding+Life+From+Fire.%E2%80%9D&pg=PA152&printsec=frontcover
National Fire Protection Association. “Two Factory Fire Holocausts,” Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, Jan 1916, p. 274. Accessed 4-14-2025 at: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Quarterly_of_the_National_Fire_Protectio/hL8dAQAAIAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=%E2%80%9CTwo+Factory+Fire+Holocausts,%E2%80%9D&pg=PA265&printsec=frontcover
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New York Times. “Tried in Diamond Factory Fire Case,” 1-16-1917. Accessed 4-14-2025 at: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9D00E6DF173AE433A25755C1A9679C946696D6CF
Safety Engineering. “Diamond Candy Company Fire,” Vol. 30, No. 6, Dec, 1915. NY: Safety Press, Inc., 1915. Accessed 4-14-2025 at: https://books.google.com/books?id=QtcMAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
Safety Engineering, “Fire-Horrors in Factories,” Vol. 30, No. 5, Nov, 1915, p. 301. Accessed 4-14-2025 at: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Safety_Engineering/QtcMAAAAYAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=%E2%80%9CFire-Horrors+in+Factories,%E2%80%9D&pg=RA1-PA301&printsec=frontcover
Safety Engineering, Vol. 33, No’s. 1-6, January-June, 1917. New York: The Safety Press, Inc., 1917. Digitized by Google. Accessed at: http://books.google.com/books?id=hR7OAAAAMAAJ&printsec=toc&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0
Schene, Louis H. “The So-called Fire Escape.” Safety Engineering, Vol. 30, No. 5, Nov, 1915, pp. 334-338. Accessed 4-14-2025 at: https://books.google.com/books?id=QtcMAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
Wickware, Francis G. (Ed.). The American Year Book: A Record of Events and Progress, 1915. New York and London: D. Appleton and Company, 1916. Digitized by Google at: http://books.google.com/books?id=lPgOUea6FK0C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false