1913 — July 22, Fire, Binghamton Clothing Company, Binghamton, NY                      —     35

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard; last edit 4-13-2025 for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

–65  Safety Engineering. “Another Clothing Factory Fire Horror,” Vol. 26, No. 1, July 1913, 13.

–51  Kellogg, The Survey, Vol. XXX, April 1913-Sep 1913..

–50  New York Times. “Former Fire Disasters.”  December 25, 1913.

–35  National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996. 

–35  NFPA. “Some Fundamentals of Safeguarding Life From Fire.” Quarterly, 16/2, Oct 1922, p. 170.

–35  Safety Engineering. “Phases of Fire Prevention Teachers Should Know,” 31/4, 1916, 201.

–35  The Standard. “Careless Smoking as Fire Cause.” Vol. 90, No. 14, 4-8-1922, p. 509.

–31  Safety Engineering. “The Binghamton Fire,” Vol. 26, No. 2, Aug 1913, p. 70.

–31  Simonson, The Daily Star.

Narrative Information

National Fire Protection Assoc., “Some Fundamentals…” Quarterly, 16/2, Oct 1922, p.170:

Binghamton, N.Y. July 22, 1913. Binghamton Clothing Company. Four-story brick building with wood floors; open stairways. One outside iron fire escape. Loss of life confined to fourth floor. Escape by the stairways cut off by the fire. ‘Girls partly down the stairs rushed back to the fourth floor. At they windows they found smoke belching out of the openings below them. Those on the fire escape were enveloped in it. With sickening speed the flames followed, and those who had not jumped to their death were burned in the building or grilled on the fire escape.’ Thirty-five lives lost.”

Safety Engineering, July 1913: “The clothing factory fire in Binghamton, N.Y., July 22, by which 65 persons or more lost their lives and many others were injured, is another illustration, truly awful, of the insecurity of the lives of factory employees….

“In spite of the Asch Building disas­ter in New York City and the lessons which should have been learned from it, the State of New York is now face to face with another catastrophe. State factory investigations, municipal in­vestigations, fire marshal activities, fire prevention work, etc., failed to prevent the Binghamton disaster. Great losses of life will always occur as long as it is possible for fires to gain headway rapidly and spread with almost incred­ible speed.

“Among insurance men and firemen, after the Asch Building fire, the opinion was general that the spread of the fire and the loss of life could have been prevented by an installation of auto­matic sprinklers. 

“Too much attention cannot be paid to fire resistive construction, to the protection of windows and vertical openings, to equipments to detect and extinguish fires, to fire drills to save life and to fire drills to save property. The one purpose of a fire drill to save life is to secure discipline at the mo­ment of peril and to prevent a panic. That fire drills fail, on occasions, the Binghamton case shows.

“Nor are fire escapes to be relied on as, frequently, they are neither planned properly nor constructed properly. When large numbers of operatives are to be conducted to safety, the best type of fire escape is the so-called straight- run or the so-called Philadelphia tower. A division wall which permits em­ployees to gain time by getting on the side of a wall opposite to the fire is often effective.

“But the device known as the auto­matic sprinkler is naturally first thought of, by all who are familiar with the controlling of fires, as affording positive protection in the greatest num­ber of cases. The value of the auto­matic sprinkler lies in the fact that it is on the spot ready to extinguish the fire without any human aid. It saves lives just as it saves property, in one way, and in one way only, namely, by ex­tinguishing the fire. Practical testi­mony to the value of sprinkler systems is afforded by the fact that insurance premiums are often reduced 50 per cent and more when sprinklers are installed.” (Safety Engineering. “Another Clothing Factory Fire Horror,” Vol. 26, No. 1, July, 1913, p. 13.)

Safety Engineering, Aug 1913: “Thirty-one lives is the toll of the fire on July 22 in the Binghamton Clothing Company’s factory in Bingham­ton, New York. The total of the injured is 8. The number in the building at the time of the fire was 102. While the actual number of casualties falls far short of the estimate first reported, it is not less horrible. And the shame of it all is that it could have been prevented so easily. If the sad sacrifice disturbs the smug stolidity of certain kinds of em­ployers and politician-officials then it will not have been in vain. But that is too high a price to pay for knowledge that can be obtained easily in safer and cheaper ways.

FACTORY INSPECTED BY STATE AND CITY OFFICIALS BEFORE FIRE.

“After the fire the local coroner con­ducted an inquest, the first of a series of “probes” and “quizzes” into the sad affair. Some of the testimony taken is startling. The factory had been inspect­ed twice since the first of the year by the city fire marshal who is also the assistant chief of the fire department. At the time of the first inspection he read the law concerning fire drills and fire alarms to the proprietor and recommended the in­stallation of a fire-alarm system, but did not go above the second story of the factory, nor below the first, and did not comment on the need of additional fire appliances. After the fire-alarm system was installed and fire drills practiced the fire marshal visited the factory again and witnessed a fire drill. The building was vacated in two minutes and twenty seconds,

“Last fall a State labor department in­spector examined the factory. At the in­quest he testified that the factory complied with the law and that, under the law, he was not empowered to order improvements except in connection with fire escapes. The fire escapes, he said, complied with the specifications of the present law.

“The chief of the Binghamton fire de­partment testified that he had looked through the factory three years ago and had thought that it was a safe place….

“The building was reported as having been of “approved factory construction,” also “slow-burning construction.” It most decidedly was not. On the con­trary, the construction was “quick-burn­ing” and of the most reprehensible form at that.  The local fire chief testified that he could not account for the rapid spread of the fire. Why not ? There was every reason why a fire should spread rapidly in that building and not a single reason why it should not.

INCEPTION AND PROGRESS OF FIRE.

“The fire started at the bottom of the only stairway that cut through all the floors from basement to roof. The cause of the fire has not been determined. The most intelligent explanation is given by James P. Whiskeman, the New York State Factory Investigating Commis­sion’s advisory engineer. He says: “I am of the opinion that the fire originated in the cellar in the neighborhood of the main stairway and gained considerable headway before it was discovered in the first story underneath the stairway.” The owner of the factory testified before the coroner that he allowed factory waste to accumulate in the basement before it was removed. Fires frequently originate in rubbish.

“When the fire was discovered it was blazing on a shelf in the stair-well, mid­way between the first and second floors. On the shelf were piled bolts of cloth and velvet. Buckets of water had little effect on the fire or the water missed it alto­gether and the flames, leaping up the wooden staircase, flared out in each story—there were not any enclosure walls about the stairway—and, finding ready fuel in the varnished surfaces of the wooden ceiling sheathing and the highly combustible stock and fixtures, soon involved the entire building. It is a matter of seconds, not minutes, for a fire to spread through a building of this sort. So is it any wonder that the bones of thirty-one human beings were found in the ruins after the fire? And there are thousands and thousands of similar buildings in use today.

INSUFFICIENT MEANS OF EXIT.

The factory proper, where the machine work was done, and most of the girl operatives worked, was in the top story of the building. It was located there, the factory owner said, to get the benefit

of the additional light through the roof skylights. The sole means of access to and exit from this story within the build­ing was the stairway at the bottom of which the fire started. Outside was a flimsy fire escape with treads composed of two iron rods, built merely to comply with an inadequate law. The windows, the fire escape crossed, were glazed with thin glass in wooden frames. A State labor department inspector declared at the coroner’s inquest that the loss of life on the fire escape would have been avoid­ed had the windows been glazed with wireglass in Metal frames and sash.

FAILURE OF FIRE DRILL.

After the futile efforts to extinguish the fire the recently installed fire alarm bell system was operated. The person who sounded the alarm was unacquainted with the signals the employees were familiar with and the girls in the top story did not make a move to get out until too late. The stairway was im­passible below the second story. A few got down the fire escape. It was revealed

during the coroner’s inquest that there was but a limited understanding of fire signals in the factory. The signals used in fire drills had been two successive rings of the bells, one to get ready and the next to move out. The alarm given in the fire was one continuous ring. The girls waited for the second bell.

FIRE DEPARTMENT HELPLESS TO SAVE LIFE.

“Soon after the fire was discovered an attempt was made to notify the public fire department by the telephones in the factory office. Before a connection with fire headquarters was secured several precious moments were wasted. Shortly after, the street box on the post-office corner, nearly one block away, was pulled by a passerby who saw the smoke issu­ing from the building.

“The first apparatus to respond was the ladder truck which is housed in the fire department station fronting on Water street. The rear of this station is on Center street opposite the rear of the burned building. The distance the truck had to “roll” to the fire was equal to half a block. But the fire had attained such proportions by the time the truck arrived that it could not get near enough to the building. The firemen were help­less to save the unfortunate girls whom they saw silhouetted in the windows by the flames and engulfed in clouds of smoke on the fire escape. Yet, as the owner of the factory testified at the coroner’s inquest, the fire department ladders were looked upon as the best means of escape! If this factory had been in Philadelphia the fire escape would have been inside a smoke-proof, brick-walled tower. Is life dearer in Philadelphia than elsewhere?

THE FIRE A NEAR-CONFLAGRATION.

“When the department chief reached the box at the post office, he found it operating. As soon as the mechanism stopped he sounded a general alarm, as he had good reason to fear a conflagration.

“Though the burned factory was iso­lated, comparatively, the buildings across Center street suffered more or less severely, particularly the building occu­pied by Simon O’Neill, harness maker, which was gutted. The roof of the Mc­Kalor Drug Company’s building was damaged considerably; fire shutters covered the rear windows but they were not standard and not of much value….

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAWS:  LAWS CANNOT COMPEL REAL INTEREST.

“The fire drill was found wanting. Why? Simply because it had been con­ducted perfunctorily to comply with the law. The interest in it was not real.

“There is an element of psychology in con­nection with the operation of laws that is not thought of much in New York State. Compulsion does not breed real interest and without it the best of schemes, specifications and devices are apt to fail. That element of psychology is thought of in New Jersey. In that State the labor laws are not “enforced” in a compelling manner—a more tactful and more effective method is pursued— the cooperation of manufacturers is sought in making the laws’ specifications effective and their interest is won. Moreover the man who is administrator of the labor laws in New Jersey is not a politician and is more interested in the effective work of his department than in a political future. That is not to say that political officials are not always efficient servants of the people, but in New York what has been accomplished?

INADEQUACY OF LAWS DESIGNED TO ASSURE SAFETY OF FACTORY-WORKERS.

“One of the results of the fearful fire in the Triangle Waist Company’s factory in the Asch Building, Washington Place, New York City, March 25, 1911, was the formation of the New York State Factory Investigating Commission. The commission held many hearings in various cities of the State and acquired tomes of testimony and information. Bills were drafted, then presented to the State legislature and enacted into law. The enactments will become effective as law, October 1, 1913.

“But the new laws will have little effect in factories like that in Binghamton as it was less than “seven stories high,” so both the State Factory Investigating Commission and the State Labor Depart­ment will hold more hearings on the question of fire dangers in factories less than “seven stories high.”

“It is to be hoped that the forthcoming hearings will yield something more in the way of helpful legislature than speci­fications for exits, and elementary fac­tory administration requirements. Also it is to be devoutly wished that the in­vestigators will disregard the height of buildings as a factor in the construction of laws and give careful consideration to automatic fire control; also to the mini­mizing of the combustibility of building construction which will follow if wood-sheathed ceilings, varnished or finished otherwise, are removed. And, in justice to the people of New York State, the in­vestigators should give ear to the testi­mony of engineers who know something about factories, and do more with the information acquired than print it in a bulky report.

WHAT THE FACTORY OWNER ADMITTED.

“But laws do not make good the neglect of employers of labor to realize the sense of personal responsibility. The proprie­tor of the Binghamton factory was a reputable citizen but he had failed to acquire a knowledge of the safe opera­tion of his factory. Here are some of the facts revealed by his testimony at the coroner’s inquest:

• He did not have any knowledge of the factory laws.
• He allowed waste to accumulate in the basement.
• He thought fire buckets better than chemical extinguishers.
• He had not thought of automatic sprinklers nor of other devices of fire control.
• He considered the ladder equipment of the fire department sufficient means of escape.
• He did not know that cotton goods were easily ignited.

WHO IS TO BLAME?

About the only thing the Binghamton Clothing Company is really to blame for, technically, is in allowing factory waste to accumulate in the basement. The company cannot be blamed for the open stairway, the varnished wooden ceiling sheathing, the hollow spaces between the ceiling sheathing and the floor boards and the lack of automatic sprinklers, for these conditions are duplicated in thou­sands of other buildings. What the State is to blame for may be revealed during the forthcoming hearings if the investigators have open minds.

“This fact cannot be denied: If the Binghamton factory had burned at a time when the employees were out of the building the fire would not have attracted more than passing notice. As compared with the usual run of fires the Bingham­ton blaze was not much; the losses on the building and contents do not amount to $60,000. Including the damage to the post office and other buildings nearby the total damage is only a little more than $100,000. No! If the sacrifice of life had not occurred in the Binghamton fac­tory another factory would have had to burn and the lives of other workers, pos­sibly more than in Binghamton, would have had to be sacrificed, before the lethargy of responsible persons became disturbed.

“If factory laws designed for the safety of workers against fire are to be good laws, write into them something more than specifications for means of escape; write into the laws specifications for fire control.

MANUAL OR AUTOMATIC CONTROL OF FIRE.

“Had this fire happened before that in the Asch building the argument would have been that the building construction was to blame. And it was to blame for the rapid spread of the fire in Bingham­ton. But the fireproof construction of the Asch building did not stop the burn­ing of the contents of three entire stories and the loss of 147 lives! It is the burn­ing of the contents of buildings that must be controlled. The control may be manual or automatic.

“If a fire is to be controlled manually, first it must be discovered. The next step is to put it out. If the building is not provided with apparatus to do this, i. e., chemical extinguishers or hand hose, the public fire department is summoned. To do this a fire alarm box must be reached. Naturally all of these suc­cessive steps take time. If the fire is controlled automatically by sprinklers the heat from the fire opens a few sprinklers and—that’s all. The detection, alarm and extinction of the fire, all are accom­plished at one fell swoop.

WHAT AUTOMATIC SPRINKLERS WOULD HAVE SAVED.

“If the ill-fated building had been equipped with automatic sprinklers not a single life would have been lost; the fire would not have progressed beyond incipiency. If a life had been lost, and the building equipped with sprinklers, it would have been the first life lost in the history of sprinkler protection. And the history of this protection covers more than 30,000 fires, some of which have happened in clothing factories!

“But further than the salvation of the 31 lives that were lost, automatic sprink­lers would have saved the factory owner money, much money. An approved sys­tem of automatic sprinklers in that build­ing would have been paid for in five years out of the savings in fire insur­ance premiums, as the premium rate would have been less than 25 per cent. of the rate that was being paid at the time of the fire.

“A two-supply sprinkler system installed in a manner that would warrant the lowest fire insurance rate would not have cost over $2,500. To enumerate every­thing that that investment would have saved probably would take up every inch of space in this number of SAFETY ENGI­NEERING. A few of the items are: Life insurance on the lives of victims; elim­ination of wage-earners ; interment of victims; loss of building; interruption of business; coroner’s inquest; investiga­tions of State authorities and so forth.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS OF THE BINGHAMTON FIRE.

• Process waste was allowed to accumulate in the basement. Self-closing metal oily waste cans were not used to hold oily waste.
• The fire was not promptly discovered.
• The effort to extinguish the fire with buckets of water failed.
• The factory employees were not organized and drilled as a private fire brigade.

• Combustible goods were piled on a shelf in the stairway.

• The stairway at the bottom of which the fire started went from the basement to the top story without enclosure walls.
• Construction of building was “quick-burning,” i. e., board floors on joists of wood.
• The construction was made more quick-burning by the thin wooden ceiling sheath­ing under the joints, and the sheathing was varnished!
• The contents of the building were highly combustible—wooden partitions, wooden tables and other wooden fixtures and a stock of cotton and other inflammable fabrics.
• Windows in surrounding buildings, particularly the post office, were poorly defended, or not at all, against the fire. Wireglass windows would have saved about one-third of total amount lost in the conflagration.
• Inside hose equipments in exposed buildings were used effectively. The roof of the post office was not fire-resistant.
• The factory fire alarm bell system was of an elementary nature, merely installed to comply with the law and the law did not specify much.
• The fire alarm signals could not be given automatically and the person who sounded the alarm was unacquainted with the signal code.
• The fire drill failed because it was organized in a perfunctory manner. Most of the girl-workers were in the top story.
• There was but one stairway in the building from the top story. The fire started at the bottom of this stairway.
• A flimsy fire escape was the only means of descent from the top story.
• The flames bursting through the windows the fire escape passed made it impassible. Wireglass in metal frames in window openings would have saved the lives lost on the fire escape.
• Precious minutes were lost in trying to notify the fire department by telephone. A public fire alarm signal box was not in nor near the building.
• Not a single life would have been lost if the building had been equipped with auto­matic sprinklers!”  (Safety Engineering, “The Binghamton Fire.” V26, No2, Aug 1913,  70-78.)

Safety Engineering, Aug 1913: “The New York State Factory Investi­gating Commission has been advised in a report by its advisory engineer, James P. Whiskeman, who investigated the Binghamton clothing factory fire, to con­sider legislation designed to minimize fire dangers in low factory buildings.  In the report Mr. Whiskeman outlines succinctly and forcibly the circumstances of the Binghamton fire as follows :

The evident and prevalent neglect to exercise simple and ordinary precautionary measures against the outbreak of fire by the removal of readily preventable causes.

The necessity of removing waste materials, cuttings and rubbish from the floors of factory buildings and storing them in fireproof recep­tacles. All factory floors should be thoroughly swept at least twice each day, all waste, etc., kept in fireproof receptacles and removed from the building at least once each day or be baled and stored in fireproof en­closures.

Automatic sprinklers are essential and should be provided in all fac­tory buildings where the nature of the work done and the materials used may readily cause a fire.

The necessity of efficiently organ­ized fire drills and private fire de­partments equipped with auxiliary fire-fighting apparatus. Fire drills in connection with a fire alarm signal system should be conducted at frequent intervals in every fac­tory building, with special regard to the exit facilities, so that if one exit should be cut off, the efficiency of the drill and the opportunity for es­cape may not be lessened.

The necessity for the enclosure of stairways in all factory buildings with fire-resisting doors.

The necessity of proper and suf­ficient exit facilities. All factory buildings of two or more stories in height should be provided with at least two efficient means of exit The utter inadequacy of the so-called outside fire escape has again been tragically demonstrated.

“While the State Industrial Board has authority to require stairways enclosed in all sorts of factory buildings, irrespective of the height, Mr. Whiskeman advises that the following requirement be enacted into law:

All stairways serving as required means of exit in factory buildings two stories or over in height in which more than 25 per­sons are employed on or above the second story, and in which there is no horizontal exit or exterior enclosed fireproof stairway. shall be enclosed by partitions of approved fire resisting material extending continu­ously from the basement.”

(Safety Engineering, “Binghamton Fire Suggests…Legislation,” V26, N2, Aug 1913, 121-122.)

Safety Engineering, 1916: “The Binghamton Clothing Company fire is another illustration of the failure of exits when not reinforced by automa­tic sprinklers. This building was of brick construction, four stories and basement in height. It was provided with one stairway from the basement to the first floor (a second one being blocked), two from the first to the second floor and one from the second to the fourth floor. An outside fire escape of the steep stair type was pro­vided. A fire alarm system comprising bells and buttons centrally located was installed. The fire probably started in the basement at the foot of the refuse chute used for clippings or on a shelf of textiles, which could have been ignited from a cigarette butt or match carelessly discarded. Smoke, drifting up the stairs, was seen by a workman in the cutting department on the second floor, and the foreman immediately pushed the alarm button, holding his finger on this button for perhaps three minutes; and until the smoke was so dense that he had to crawl down the front stairs on his hands and knees in order to reach the open air.

“The fire department was called at the same time and reached the scene before the alarm had ceased to ring. By this time the heat and smoke were so intense that a ladder could not be raised. The girls thought the alarm indicated another fire drill. All of them did not respond immediately and leave the building. Some went to get their street clothing, some their valuables. In several black­ened hands pocketbooks were tightly grasped. One forewoman and one fore­man on the top floor, realizing the seri­ousness of the situation, urged the girls to hurry. Soon the need for this was evident to the most doubting, for smoke rapidly filled the stairs on the second floor and up the last two flights. Escape was cut off. Girls partly down the stairs rushed back to the fourth floor. At the windows they found smoke belching out of the openings below them. Those on the fire escape were enveloped in- it. With sickening speed the flames fol­lowed, and those who had not jumped to their death were burned in the building or grilled on the fire escape. The heroic forewoman and foreman both lost their lives. Of the eighty persons on the top floor, about forty-five escaped down­stairs to the street. All the people on the third, floor and below, except the engineer, who was trapped in the basement, escaped. Of the thirty-five lives lost, thirty-three were women and girls.

“The lesson from this fire…is that reliance should not be placed upon outside iron fire escapes, a type of exit which, though allowed by law, is condemned by the experience of many fires, of which Binghamton, Mel­vin apartment house, etc., are examples.

“Fire drills alone do not insure safety. Instant obedience in fire drills is essen­tial, no delays for clothing, etc., should be tolerated.

“Automatic sprinklers would probably have extinguished the fire at the start and, at least, would have checked it so escape would have been easy.”  (Safety Engineering. “Phases of Fire Prevention Teachers Should Know,” 31/4, 1916, 201.)

Simonson: “Ever since we’ve been young we’ve been instructed to pay attention to fire alarms and practice escape drills at home, school and the workplace. There are times we’ve probably been guilty of not paying attention to the alarms, thinking they were false.  On a steamy July day in 1913, some women on the second, third and fourth floors of the Binghamton Clothing Co., once found at 17 Wall St., were working when the fire alarm went off. They looked at each other, and some shrugged, ignoring it for several minutes, thinking it was just another false alarm.

“How wrong they were that day. Their delay snuffed out their lives, and those of many others.      It was just about an hour after lunch on Tuesday, July 22. There were 111 people at work in the brick, four-story factory that faced the Chenango River, in an area close to today’s Boscov’s Department Store and the Binghamton Regency Hotel.  Most of the workers were women. Time was money to them, as they did piece work on the sewing machines. Having gone through several fire drills recently, they didn’t want to stop work this time.

“Flames had been discovered under a front stairway in the building, formerly a cigar factory. Reed Freeman, the president and owner, with Amber Fuller, a cutter, threw buckets of water on the flames. But rolls of material on the next landing went up like tinder.  The stairways and elevator shafts drew the flames and smoke to the top floors, making the building like a furnace within a few minutes.

“Attempts were made to reach the Central Fire Station using both telephone systems in existence at the time, but the fire company was on another call. A continued drought had kept firefighters busy for days. In the past 24 hours alone, there had been five other calls.  By the time the department got to the clothing factory, every window was a sheet of flames. A hearty breeze that day made things worse, as firefighters had to fight flames that spread to other buildings.

“Many of the women were trapped inside. It was a grisly sight for onlookers on the street as some attempted to escape the building. While most did, at least 31 did not. Those numbers were likely higher, but some of the remains were unidentifiable, and others were never accounted for.

This tragedy had its heroine and hero who saved many, but they died in doing so.  Nellie Connor, a 31-year veteran of the company and a mother figure to the women, remained in the building the whole time, hurrying people out.  Sidney Dimmock, a foreman for 16 years, who was in charge of the fire drills, did as much as could in the rescue, finally being lost in a shroud of smoke.

“Much of the Binghamton community turned out for the funeral and procession a few days later. The streets were lined from the Stone Opera House on Chenango Street, where a mass funeral was held, all the way to the Spring Forest Cemetery, in the city’s First Ward. In all, about 20,000 attended. A large memorial in the cemetery honors the victims today….

Investigations and hearings failed to discover the cause of the fire. The Binghamton Clothing Co. never re-opened.

“This tragedy followed another fire at the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory in New York City that killed 146 garment workers in March 1911. Those two fires contributed to the evolution of modern safety laws for industries throughout the state. The Binghamton fire led a concerned industrialist, George F. Johnson, to install automatic sprinkler systems and other protective devices in his vast array of shoe factories in the area….

“City Historian Mark Simonson’s column appears twice weekly. On Saturdays, his column focuses on the area during the Depression and before. His Monday columns address local history after the Depression. If you have feedback or ideas about the column, write to him at The Daily Star, or e-mail him at simmark@stny.rr.com. His website is www.oneontahistorian.com.”  (Simonson, Mark. “Binghamton Fire Spurred Improved Safety Laws.” Yangtze River Communications, 7-21-2008.)

The Standard:  “At Binghamton, New York, a fire caused by a cigarette resulted in the sacrifice of thirty-five lives.  Many of the victims were literally roasted on the fire escapes.  A special report on the fire sated that when the fire department arrived the fire escapes were choked and windows banked with the forms of women, flames bursting out over and behind them.  It is a striking coincidence that one of the views of the ruins of this factory showed a large cigarette advertisement on a fence in the foreground….

“A record of three hundred and ninety-two factory fires shows that one hundred and seventy-three were caused by careless smokers.” (The Standard. A Weekly Insurance Newspaper. “Careless Smoking as Fire Cause.” Vol. 90, No. 14, 4-8-1922, p. 509.)

Sources

Kellogg, Paul U. (Ed). The Survey (A Journal of Constructive Philanthropy), Vol. XXX, April 1913 – September 1913. New York  Survey Associates, Inc. Digitized by Google. Accessed at: http://books.google.com/books?id=gCkKAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA557&lpg=PA557&dq=Binghamton+fire+July+22&source=web&ots=dW6jO-R8lm&sig=6J4p76mKSr4PRw5ejaPcfcOs7l8&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=5&ct=result#PPP11,M1

National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996. Accessed 2010 at:  http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=1352&itemID=30955&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fire%20statistics/Key%20dates%20in%20fire%20history&cookie%5Ftest=1

National Fire Protection Association. “Some Fundamentals of Safeguarding Life From Fire.” Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2, Oct 1922, p. 170.

New York Times. “Former Fire Disasters. Heavy Toll of Death in Theatres and Other Structures.” 12-25-1913. Accessed 4-13-2025 at:

http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=980DE6DF113FE633A25756C2A9649D946296D6CF

Safety Engineering. Vol. 26, No’s 1-6, July-December, 1913. NY: Safety Press, Inc., 1913. At: http://books.google.com/books?id=L9YMAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=editions:LCCNsc80000582&lr

Safety Engineering. Vol. 31, No’s. 1-6, January-June, 1916. NY: Safety Press, Inc., 1916. At:  http://books.google.com/books?id=mtcMAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=editions:LCCNsc80000582&lr

Safety Engineering. “Binghamton Fire Suggests New Legislation,” Vol. 26, No. 2, Aug 1913, pp. 121-122. Accessed at:  http://books.google.com/books?id=L9YMAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=editions:LCCNsc80000582&lr

Safety Engineering. “Phases of Fire Prevention Teachers Should Know,” Vol. 31, No. 4, 1916, p. 201. Accessed 4-13-2025 at:

https://www.google.com/books/edition/Safety_Engineering/mtcMAAAAYAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=%E2%80%9CPhases+of+Fire+Prevention+Teachers+Should+Know,%E2%80%9D&pg=RA1-PA197&printsec=frontcover

Simonson, Mark. “Binghamton Fire Spurred Improved Safety Laws.” The Daily Star, Oneonta, NY, Yangtze River Communications, 7-21-2008. Accessed 4-13-2025 at: https://www.thedailystar.com/opinion/columns/binghamton-fire-spurred-improved-safety-laws/article_47f4a38a-cdbc-5070-bc5c-babbe9f0e069.html