1910 — Nov 26, Fire, Asch building/glass factory, Orange & High Streets, Newark NJ– 25
Compiled by Wayne Blanchard; last edit 4-13-2025 for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/
–25 Insurance Engineering. [Editorial]. Vol. XXI, No. 1. Jan 1911, p. 6.
–25 National Fire Protection Association. 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, p. 139.
–25 NFPA. Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association. Vol. 4, No. 3, Jan 1911, 399.
–25 NFPA. “Some Fundamentals of Safeguarding Life From Fire.” Quarterly, 16/2, Oct 1922, 170.
–25 New York Times. “Events That Made the History of 1910…” Jan 1, 1911.
–25 Stein 1962. The Triangle Fire, pp. 26-28.
Narrative Information
Elliott: “In this fire the principal causes of loss of life were: (1) The machines were so located as to cause the employees to travel the maximum distance in order to reach a means of egress; (2) the cloak rooms should have been designed to permit free passage to an outer exit of the building without returning. The cloak rooms were provided with but one door and those who had entered the rooms first were not permitted to leave on account of the pressure of the crowd outside. They were compelled to remain in the cloak rooms at the expense of their lives.” (Elliott. “The Need of State Building Codes.” Safety Engineering, V26, N3, Sep, 1913, 141-144.)
Insurance Engineering, Jan 1911: “The burning of the Glass factory building in High street, Newark, N.J [photo label]. This fire, which was caused by the accidental upsetting of a can of gasoline, cost twenty-five women employed in the top story their lives and sent many others to the hospital. Nobody was to blame. The ‘law’ had been complied with.” (Insurance Engineering. [Editorial]. Vol. XXI, No. 1. Jan 1911, p. 2.)
“According to the finding of a coroner’s jury, twenty-five young women, employed in a factory in Newark, N. J., lost their lives in a fire through “misadventure and accident and not as the result of the criminal act, either of omission or commission, on the part of any individual or individuals, whether as private citizens or public officials.” This finding was based on the fact that the owner of the building had “complied” with an inadequate law. It is also a fact that similar laws respecting the construction of buildings and the safety of life are common in the United States, and that thousands of lives are almost sure to be sacrificed, among all classes, in the same manner, because the men who made our building laws failed ignorantly or willfully, to specify types of construction that will minimize the danger from fire and from collapse. The least that can be done is to amend all laws affecting the construction and equipment of buildings in order to apply the lessons of this awful disaster. It is not pleasant to learn, on the authority of such men as the chief engineers of our fire departments, that there are still many factory buildings, as well as other structures, where large numbers of persons assemble, in which an equal, if not a greater, loss of life could occur as the result of a fire.” (Insurance Engineering. [Editorial]. Vol. XXI, No. 1. Jan 1911, p. 6.)
NFPA, Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, Jan 1911, pp. 399-404: “H-5989. Tenant Manufacturing Building. (Newark, N.J.) Twenty-five girls and women lost their lives in the fire which practically destroyed an old four-story brick and joist constructed building. The main building was four stories high with a blind attic five feet high at peak; adjoining sections were one and three stories high. Main building was fifty by one hundred and thirty-two feet in area; walls were of brick; interior construction wooden girders and beams supported by unprotected cast-iron columns. Floors were double, two inches think, but had been in use since the erection of building and were worn thin. The roof was constructed of composition roofing on boards with wooden boxed cornice. There was practically no finish on inside walls, but about thirty per cent of the ceiling was sheathed with wood or metal. The one superimposed stairway was enclosed in a double board partition with doors arranged to close automatically. There was one elevator partly enclosed in frame partitions with glass windows; this, however was of such inflammable construction that elevator was practically open. There were also numerous small belt holes from floor to floor.
“The building was heated by steam and lighted with electricity and gas. Steam power was derived from a one-story boiler house adjoining the main building. This boiler house was fairly cut off from the first story of main building. There was no watchman and practically no private protection. There was a good supply of fire pails at last inspection, but fire spread so rapidly as to make such protection entirely inadequate.
“Main building was equipped with two unreliable and inadequate fire escapes, one on the front of the building and one on the rear. There was an iron balcony covering two windows on each floor with steps inside of window from floor to window sill. These balconies were connected with straight up and down iron ladders so that only one person could start down at a time and these ladders were further located right in front of windows out of which flames and smoke were pouring when their use was greatly needed. During the start of fire one of these ladders became red hot, a veritable gridiron, the use of which was impossible, while the bottom ladder of the other fire escape failed to work through the sticking of a joint or ladder not being properly hooked on so that it could not be lowered and was practically worthless as a means of egress. In the rear, even had escape been possible, there was only a narrow alley difficult of access at such a crisis.
“The occupancies of building and hands employed were as follows: First floor occupied for the manufacture of paper boxes, employing about thirty people and by a machine shop employing about sixteen people; second floor, manufacturing of paper boxes, employing about fifty people; third floor, assembling incandescent electric lamps, employing about seventeen people, fire starting on this floor; the fourth or top floor was occupied for manufacturing underwear, employing from seventy-three to one hundred and fifteen people. Most of the employees in the building were girls and women, there being only a few men employees in the building outside of the machine shop.
“Fire occurred in this building on Saturday, November 26th, when the structure was practically destroyed, many lives lost and a large number injured. Starting on the third floor in the plant of the incandescent electric lamp factory, it spread to gasoline present and was immediately beyond control.
“There appears to be little doubt that the fire was caused by upsetting a can of gasoline belonging to an apparatus for re-carbonizing the filaments of incandescent lamps. The filament to be re-carbonized was looped and connected with two poles supported in a vulcanized cork or stopper which was placed in the mouth of a small metal can. A small iron pipe connected this can with the can of gasoline on the floor near the workbench, and the opposite side of the can on the table was connected with a vacuum pump. The air was first exhausted from the carbonizer, then the vapor from the gasoline was allowed to enter the carbonizer, and finally an electric current was sent through the filament in the carbonizer.
“How the gasoline ignited the first time is not definitely known. The girl’s shoe may have made a spark by striking a nail in the floor. A small electric motor was running in the room at the time, variously said to have been from twenty to fifty feet from the gasoline.
“The main supply of gasoline for this process was kept in a barrel in the factory yard, and a supply was brought in several times a day in a galloon can. The supply can for the apparatus held about two quarts. This can had just been refilled by the girl in charge. When she saw the burning gasoline spreading over the floor she called for help. To get any sand a trip had to be made up the spiral stairway to floor above. That alone gave the flames ample time to spread. Two pails of sand were thrown on the blaze by an employee. The sand seemed to extinguish the fire, but apparently it only smothered it, for it suddenly flashed up a second time and quickly jumped to the ceiling.
“Work of that description was not of a character to be entrusted to inexperienced girls or to be carried on in such an old tinderbox of a firetrap. To extinguish gasoline flames either chemicals or sand should be employed. Neither were on hand, as surely would have been the case if experts had been employed as these girls were. One was already badly burned and thereby was hardly capable of action even if the sand or chemicals had been lying beside them ready for use.
“A fire station was directly opposite the building. Instead of immediately giving the alarm, the foreman, the girls assisting him, tried to smother the flames with sand. With the rising flames spreading fiercely round them, they found it impossible to do what possibly might have been done a few minutes before when the fire was in the incipient stage. Finding their endeavors vain, a fireman who was standing outside the station was beckoned to, and he, not knowing the true state of the case, ran across with a chemical extinguisher. Too much time, however, had been lost and the flames had gained great headway. The fireman rushed back to the house of engine 4 and turned in an alarm. The first alarm was received at 9:26 a.m., followed by a telephone call at 9:29 for a special truck from fire house across street from the fire. At 9:32 a second alarm was sent in and at 9:43 the third alarm was given. Although a fire engine company was directly opposite and was in its quarters at the time, the fire gained a great hold on the two upper stories before the first line of hose could be stretched. Before any water was thrown, the fire burned is way into the concealed spaces in the joisted floor, and each time it came through the sheathing it is said that there was a flash and a noise like an explosion.
“The flames spread quickly through the building, at once creating a panic. The employees on the ground and second floors escaped without much trouble; some even on the third floor managed to reach the street in safety. With the hundred employees on the fourth floor it was very different. Choking and blinded by the smoke, they groped to find a means of exit. They tried the stairway but were driven back by the suffocating fumes of gasoline and smoke combined and many of the girls were forced to jump from the fourth story windows into the street. Others were overcome by smoke and died in the building. The fire spread so rapidly that the girls could not be prevented from jumping before arrival of the ladder trucks. Some rushed to the one miserable pretense of a fire escape near the end of the building, as some from the lower floors had escaped at that end, but the looped-up fire escape ladder had become too hot to handle and they had to be gotten down by means of a stepladder. At the rear of the building was the narrow, straight-up two-story fire escape, running down past the windows out of which the flames were issuing which had heated the ladder red hot.
“Had the employees only stayed where they were they would have been rescued by the firemen, who by this time were raising the long ladders — work of difficulty at the end of the building, on account of the narrow alley – and were extending the life nets to catch the girls if they jumped.
“The firemen directed all of their effort toward saving the women in the building and the fire was not checked until the building had been completely destroyed, with the exception of portions of the outside brick walls. It is reported that the dangerous condition of the building had been for some time widely known, although it had recently been passed as complying with the New Jersey State laws ay Deputy Factory Inspector.
“The building was built fifty years ago and was thoroughly saturated with oil. The flames spread very rapidly and cut off escape down the stairway from the fourth to the third floor before the employees on the fourth floor were aware of the danger.
“The coroner’s jury which investigated the holocaust, it is stated, was compelled to find that no one was to blame for the great loss of life even with the acknowledged deficiencies in fire escapes, overcrowding of the old fire trap and lack of facilities for escape of employees in case of fire. The allowing of the building, unfit for either factory or residential occupancies, to be occupied for the several hazardous occupancies employing the large number of girls and women – with the most hazardous occupancy on the third floor under the manufactory employing over one hundred women at the time fire occurred – is grossly criminal.
“The superseding of the city ordinance by the action of State Legislature which lowered the standard for protection of life and property and made such a verdict possible is not in accord with progress. Had either the city ordinance or state laws been intelligently enforced, however, the protection given would have eliminated the possibility of such a holocaust.” (National Fire Protection Association. Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association. Vol. 4, No. 3, Jan 1911, p. 399-404.)
NFPA. “Some Fundamentals of Safeguarding Life From Fire.” Quarterly, 16/2, Oct 1922, 170:
“Newark, N. J., November 26, 1910. Factory. Old four-story brick and joist constructed building. Smoke and fumes prevented the use of the stairway. Two fire escapes. One was located right in front of windows, out of which flames and smoke were pouring. At the start of the fire it became red hot and could not be used. On the other fire escape the bottom ladder failed to work through the sticking of a joint or ladder not being properly hooked on, so that it could not be lowered and was practically worthless as a means of egress. Twenty-five women lost their lives.”
Patton: “The Asch Building presents another type of hazard that should be safeguarded as much as possible. In such manufacturing risks, all furniture including tables, racks, chairs, etc., should be of non-inflammable material and large areas should be reduced to the smallest possible minimum by non-inflammable partitions having metal or metal covered doors at communicating openings; each such section to have ready and easy access to smokeproof stair tower. In the event of a flash fire in any one section, employees could be hastily transferred to the next section and if necessary to the smokeproof tower and so to the street. Elevators should never be relied on in case of a fire panic owing to the limited capacity, the liability of the service being interrupted by the fire and the element of human fallibility which enters into their operation….
“We must conclude, therefore, that in order to properly safeguard life and conserve our building construction it is imperative to eliminate from so-called fireproof buildings all inflammable trim and furniture and exercise common sense in their construction; and, furthermore, the installation of smokeproof and fireproof stair towers is imperative. . . .
“The proposed building code prepared by the Advisory Committee of the Board of Aldermen of the City of New York is, in the main, most excellent. It calls for non-inflammable trim in fireproof buildings of over 100 feet in height. This is a very decided movement in the right direction, but we wish it could have gone further and required such trim in all fireproof buildings regardless of height.” (Patton. “Dangers of Wood Trim…Combustible Furniture.” Safety Engineering, 26/4, Oct, 1913, 224-226.)
Stein: “Nine days before the Triangle Fire—on March 16—the New York Call published excerpts from the report of Dr. George M. Price, the [New York Joint Board of Sanitary Control’s] director. Copies of the full report on the investigation had already been sent to the Building, Fire, and Police Departments. In addition, the Board’s secretary, Henry Moskowitz, had sent a long list of shops with hazards to Mayor William J. Gaynor.
“Dr. Price noted that the coat and suit shops were not the worst offenders in the matter of safety. “Yet,” he declared, “our investigation into the conditions in these shops clearly shows that fire prevention facilities are very much below even the most indispensable precautions necessary.” Ninety-nine per cent of the shops were found to be defective in respect to safety: 14 had no fire escapes; 101 had defective drop ladders; 491 had only one exit; 23 had locked doors during the day; 58 had dark hallways; 78 had obstructed approaches to fire escapes; and 1,172, or 94 per cent, had doors opening in instead of out. Only one had ever had a fire drill….
Exactly four months before the Triangle tragedy—on November 25, 1910—fire broke out in an old four-story building at Orange and High Streets in Newark, New Jersey. In minutes, twenty-five factory workers, most of them young women, were dead. Of these six were burned to death, nineteen jumped to death. The disaster just across the Hudson River shocked New York and the next day Chief Croker warned:
“This city may have a fire as deadly as the one in Newark at any time. There are buildings in New York where the danger is every bit as great as in the building destroyed in Newark. A fire in the daytime would be accompanied by a terrible loss of life.”
“Professor Francis W. Aymar of the New York University Law School read Chief Croker’s warning. He immediately wrote a letter to the city Building Department saying that from the windows of his classroom he could see the crowded and dangerous conditions in the Asch building across the yard. His letter was acknowledged and assurance of an investigation was given.
“Following the Newark fire, the Women’s Trade Union League assigned Miss Ida Rauh to study the disaster and draw up a set of conclusions and recommendations. This she did and then, on behalf of the League, Miss Rauh wrote to the January Grand Jury asking to be heard. Her hearing was short, and fruitless. She was practically dismissed by the foreman of the Grand Jury when she had identified herself. He warned her that “unless you have a complaint of criminal negligence on the part of an official, you had better take your stories to the Corporation Counsel and have him prosecute for violations.
“The lesson of the Newark fire was not lost on Alderman Ralph Folks. He introduced a resolution in the Board calling on the Superintendent of the Building Department to investigate and determine if additional legislation were needed to protect the lives of factory workers in New York. Four months before the Triangle fire the resolution was passed.”….[Later]…the Times sought out Alderman Folks and asked him what had come of the investigation he had requested in his resolution. “I don’t know. I never heard of it again, “he replied….” (Stein 1962. The Triangle Fire, pp. 26-28.)
Sources
Elliott, Fred W. “The Need of State Building Codes.” Safety Engineering, Vol. 26, No. 3, September, 1913, pp. 141-144. Accessed 9-22-2017 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=L9YMAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=editions:LCCNsc80000582&lr
Insurance Engineering. Vol. 11, No’s 1-6, Jan-June, 1906. New York: The Insurance Press, 1906. Digitized by Google. Accessed 4-13-2025 at: https://books.google.com/books?id=axHOAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
National Fire Protection Association. Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association. Vol. 4, No’s 1-4, July, Oct 1910, Jan, Apr 1911. Google digitized. Accessed 4-13-2025 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=o2JHAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
National Fire Protection Association. “Some Fundamentals of Safeguarding Life From Fire.” Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2, Oct 1922, p. 170.
New York Times. “Events That Made the History of 1910 – What They Were, Where They Happened and the Chief Actors in Them.” Jan 1, 1911. Accessed 4-13-2025 at:
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F70A10FC385517738DDDA80894D9405B818DF1D3
Patton, A. G. “Dangers of Wood Trim and Combustible Furniture.” Safety Engineering, Vol. 26, No. 4, October, 1913, pp. 224-226. Accessed at: http://books.google.com/books?id=L9YMAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=editions:LCCNsc80000582&lr
Stein, Leon. The Triangle Fire. New York: A. Carroll & Graf, Quicksilver Books, 1962.