1985 — Sep 29, Skydiving Crash, Westwind Sports/Parachute Center, Jenkinsburg, GA–17

 — 17  Daily Herald (Chicago). “Plane Crash Kills 14 Skydivers,” Sep 30, 1985, p. 46.

— 17  NTSB. Aircraft Accident/Incident Summary Reports (NTSB/AAR-87/02/SUM). Jun 1987.

 

Narrative Information

 

NTSB: “About 1230 on September 29, 1985, a Cessna 208, N551CC, crashed during an uncontrolled descent. The pilot and 16 parachutists were fatally injured, and the aircraft was destroyed. The airplane was registered to Air Carriers Express Services, Inc., (ACES) and was being flown for sport parachute operations under 14 CFR Part 105 and visual flight rules (VFR). Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The weather was clear, and the temperature at the parachute center was reported to be 780 F. The owner of the airplane, who also was the President of ACES, was one of the parachutists onboard the airplane.

 

“Shortly before the accident, the airplane departed the sod runway of the West Wind Sport Parachute Center at Jenkinsburg, Georgia, with the parachutists for a mass jump from 12,500 feet. Witnesses familiar with the operation of the airplane stated that the takeoff roll was longer than normal, that the airplane speed was slower than normal, and that the climb angle was shallower than normal. The airplane climbed to an estimated altitude of 300 feet, rolled steeply to the left, and spiraled to the ground in a steep nosedown attitude. One witness reported that the propeller rotation visibly slowed just before the banking maneuvers. The airplane impacted nose-down in a pasture about 8/10 of a mile southeast of the parachute center. There was no fire.

 

“….The pilot’s logbook indicated that the pilot had 4,907 flight hours; with 1,121 hours in single-engine aircraft and 306 hours in turboprop aircraft. No entries were noted after August 28, 1985, and no flights in a Cessna 208 were logged. The pilot was hired about a week before the accident to pilot N551CC during parachute operations and 14 CFR Part 135 operations. His father reported that the pilot had flown about 15 hours in N551CC the week before the accident while engaged in sky diving operations in Illinois…..

 

“The postaccident inspection of the wreckage revealed that there was continuity of the flight control cables from the area of the cockpit to the flight control surfaces. The position of the flap actuating jackscrews indicated that the flaps were extended 200 at the time of impact. The approved takeoff range listed in the aircraft flight manual is 0 [degree] to 200 [degrees].  There was no evidence of a flight control failure before the accident.

 

“No fuel was found in the ruptured left-wing fuel tank. Approximately 23 gallons of jet fuel was removed from the right-wing fuel tank. The fuel contained water and an unknown solid foreign matter. The composition of the solid material was not determined, but it had the appearance of brown algae.  The fuel reservoir did not contain any fuel. The reservoir manifold assembly fuel line, which transports pressurized fuel to the engine, was fractured; fuel in the reservoir would have drained out since the wreckage was on its nose. The reservoir interior was coated with intermittent, dark brown to black spots, which had the appearance of algae.

 

“The airplane fuel filter and the engine fuel pump filter were removed and inspected. The airframe filter element was covered with a dark, stringy foreign material. The composition of this material was not determined, but it also had the appearance of algae.  The engine fuel pump paper filter was covered with a similar dark, stringy, foreign material.  Less than a teaspoonful of what appeared to be Jet A fuel flowed from the engine fuel pump filter canister when it was opened.

 

“The Pratt and Whitney PT6A turboprop engine was sent to the manufacturer for a teardown examination.  Damage to the engine was found to be consistent with no-engine rotation at the time of the impact.  About 22 milliliters of a milky fluid was recovered from the engine fuel control.  Laboratory analysis showed it to be 64 percent Jet A fuel and 36 percent water. Contaminants filtered from the fluid were found to be 95 percent iron.  Data from the manufacturer concerning an earlier water/fuel injection test on a PT6A engine indicated that, at take-off condition with ignition off, the engine flamed out and did not recover when approximately .11 U.S. gallon of water was injected over a 5-second period into the fuel supply close to the engine.

 

“On September 26, 1986, 500 gallons of Jet A fuel was delivered to the parachute center by a local distributor. The fuel was pumped into nine 55-gallon drums used to store fuel for N551CC; all of the drums were located outside. The driver of the fuel pumper truck stated that he opened all of the drums, tipped two of them on end to allow any residual contents to drain out, and smelled the remaining drums before filling them. According to the driver, three other drums contained water and sludge and were not used.

 

“After the accident, fuel from the airplane wreckage was placed in an empty drum from the parachute center.  At that time, all drums were observed to be in an upright position with water standing on the tops of the drums.  When the drums were disturbed, air bubbles were seen coming from the filler and vent caps, indicating that water was seeping around the caps into the drums.

 

“Further investigation revealed that the airplane had a history of fuel contamination. On the weekend of September 14, 1985, the airplane reportedly was refueled from 55-gallon drums containing contaminated fuel, while in Xenia, Ohio, to conduct sport parachute operations. Witnesses said that the engine quit on a takeoff roll while the airplane was being piloted by the owner, a certificated pilot.  All of the fuel was supposedly drained from the airplane and replaced with uncontaminated fuel.  The airplane was flown back to Dekalb-Peachtree Airport (PDK) in Chamblee, Georgia, where it was based.

 

“On September 18, 1985, the owner flew the airplane to a nearby repair facility. According to the work order for the airplane, the main fuel screen and fuel pump inlet and outlet screens were cleaned, and the EPA can 2[1] and fuel sump were drained. The mechanic who cleaned the fuel sump filters said that the airframe filter had water droplets, muddy-brown discoloration, and trash particles; that syrup-like black/brown material was drained from the fuel reservoir (header tank); and that about 4 gallons of fuel was drained from the fuel reservoir before the fuel cleared in color. The mechanic stated that he informed the owner of the findings and suggested that the fuel system be purged; the owner replied that he had drained the system.

 

“On September 25, 1985, the chief pilot for ACES flew a training flight to prepare a pilot employed by another air-taxi operator, Midnite Express, Inc., for a 14 CFR Part 135 checkride in N551CC.  The training was being accomplished in anticipation of a charter agreement between ACES and Midnite Express, Inc., whereby the latter would rent N551CC during weekdays for cargo runs on its own routes.  Both pilots said that after the training flight, the airframe fuel filter bypass indicator[2] was displayed.  The bypass indicator was reset and the aircraft was ferried from PDK to the Midnite Express Facility at nearby Fulton County Airport (FTY), to position it for the upcoming checkride.

 

“On the morning of September 27, 1985, the Director of Maintenance for Midnite Express, Inc., checked the airplane fuel.  He said that he found the fuel to be “highly contaminated with what looked like micro (sic), water, dirt and possibly a deteriorating bladder due to its black color.” When the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector arrived at the airplane for the checkride, a mechanic informed him that the aircraft could not be flown due to fuel contamination.  The inspector later stated that he examined four samples of fuel taken from the left wing sump and that he noted that each sample contained solid black/brown colored contamination covering the bottom of the sample jar.  The inspector also noted that the airframe fuel filter bypass indicator was displayed.  He reported that he cancelled the checkride and that after learning from Midnite Express, Inc., personnel that the chief pilot for ACES had been told of the fuel contamination, he returned to his office.  An Aircraft Condition Notice (FAA Form 8620.1,) was not issued.

 

“That afternoon, the Director of Maintenance for Midnite Express, Inc., informed the owner of N551CC by telephone that the fuel was contaminated.  Later that day, the Director of Operations for Midnite Express, Inc., advised the owner by phone of the contamination. The owner reportedly responded by explaining the airplane’s past contamination history, and he described the precautions taken, saying they were sufficient.  The owner arrived at the facility later in the afternoon to fly the aircraft away; he was advised that the airplane should not be flown.  The owner commented that he had checked the fuel and that it was still contaminated, but that he did not feel it was sufficient to ground the aircraft.  The owner departed FTY in the aircraft that evening and returned to its base, DeKalb-Peachtree Airport.

 

“FAA Order 8430.1 (Air Carrier Operations Inspector’s Handbook) states that during a ramp inspection, if an aircraft deficiency is noted, an Aircraft Condition Notice will be issued. Although the FAA inspector’s examination of the airplane involved an initial checkride, once the checkride had been cancelled, the aircraft examination became, for all practical purposes, a ramp

inspection.  Normally, an Aircraft Condition Notice is delivered to the appropriate manager of the carrier or, if that cannot be accomplished, the Aircraft Condition Notice is affixed to the aircraft in a conspicuous location.  The purpose of the notice is to make the carrier aware of a deficiency and warn against flying the aircraft until the deficiency is corrected. The chief of the inspector’s assigned operations unit stated that operations inspectors normally do not carry nor issue Aircraft Condition Notices and that airworthiness inspectors are responsible for issuance of the notices.  An airworthiness inspector was not contacted to inspect the aircraft and/or to take appropriate action to assure that it was not operated before corrections were accomplished.  The Safety Board believes that it is possible the accident may have been prevented if the operations inspector had taken all the options available to prevent the aircraft from being flown until the deficiency was removed.

 

“On September 28, the aircraft was flown to the West Wind Sport Parachute Center in Jenkinsburg where parachute operations were conducted without any reported problems.  One parachutist reported that he saw the owner checking fuel from one of the drums. He said that the owner squirted fuel onto the ground, that the fuel had an amber color at first, “like rust from the bottom of the drum,” and that it became clear after about 4 seconds.  A portable battery-powered pump was used to pump the fuel from the drums.

 

“On September 29, 1985, the aircraft returned to the West Wind Sport Parachute Center from PDK. The aircraft reportedly was refueled from one of the 55-gallon drums at the jump center before any parachute operations.  It was estimated to have departed with 60 gallons of fuel onboard.

 

“A pilot who previously had worked for the owner and had conducted sport parachute operations stated that it was normal procedure to disengage the stall warning circuit breaker during flights with skydivers.  The procedure was used since the sounding of the stall warning horn reportedly startled the skydivers.  The position of the stall warning circuit breaker at the time of the accident could not be determined due to impact damage.  An estimated weight and balance at the time of the accident was calculated using the aircraft weight and balance records, individual weight records, and witness statements.  Individual weights were obtained from records at the parachute center, and an average weight of 26 pounds per person for parachute equipment was added. Witnesses familiar with the seating arrangements in the aircraft during parachute operations provided the probable loading distribution; 15 jumpers were seated three abreast in five rows, and 1 jumper was seated next to the pilot.  All jumpers were seated on the floor of the airplane facing aft and were not wearing seatbelts.  Although 17 passenger seatbelts were installed in the aircraft, the seatbelts were found generally attached to the same attachment ring in a cluster. The aircraft was estimated to be 370 pounds over gross weight and 1 inch forward of C.G. limitations.

 

“In prior parachute operations, the aircraft was routinely flown with 14 to 16 parachutists onboard and sometimes with as many as 18.  Parachutists who rode in the airplane during such operations reported that the airplane generally had no problem handling such loads.  The airplane was certificated for nine passenger seats, in addition to the pilot’s seat.

 

“It is not known if any attempt was made by the parachutists to exit the aircraft before the accident.  A parachutist who jumped from the plane the previous day remarked that parachutists in general are trained to stay in the aircraft if the engine quits below 1,000 feet above the ground. Witnesses to the accident generally agreed that the aircraft ascended no more than 300 to 500 feet above the surrounding terrain.

 

“The investigation of this accident revealed that the airplane had been operated for several weeks with known contamination of the fuel system.  Even though the owner/operator was informed by qualified maintenance personnel on at least two occasions of the need to purge and clean the airplane’s fuel system before further flight, he continued to operate the aircraft.  On at least one occasion, the airplane was flown after contaminated fuel samples were repeatedly obtained.  The aircraft flight manual states that all drain valves should be thoroughly drained until there is no evidence of water or sediment contamination before the flight.

 

“The fueling history of N551CC strongly suggests that water entered the fuel via natural means. The 55-gallon drums used to store the airplane fuel at the parachute center were outdoors, which would allow for normal heating and cooling.  Further, the drums were upright and the filler and vent caps were not tight, which would allow rainwater standing on the drum tops to seep into the drums.  A witness noted “rust” colored fuel dispensed from at least one drum.

 

“The extent of the accident pilot’s knowledge of the airplane’s fuel contamination history is not known.  Witnesses reported that he checked fuel samples drained from the airplane’s wing tanks just before the accident flight, though it is not known whether or not he observed any contamination.

 

“Steep turning maneuvers by the airplane were observed shortly after departure; witness observations of these maneuvers were consistent with an attempt to return to the runway. These maneuvers were preceded by an apparent engine failure caused by fuel contamination, and culminated in a departure from controlled flight and subsequent ground impact in an adverse attitude.  The loss of control, or stall, was probably aggravated by the disabling of the stall warning system.

 

“The investigation revealed that ACES was issued an Air Carrier Operating Certificate for passenger and cargo, day/night, air taxi on-demand operations under visual and instrument flight rules.  Although not a causal factor, the certification of ACES as an air carrier was examined.  No evidence was found in the air carrier records maintained by ACES that any employee had completed the company training required for air taxi operations….The director of operations/chief pilot was a full-time employee for AT&T.  When interviewed, he displayed little knowledge of the operator’s manual, contrary to 14 CFR 135.39.

 

“In accordance with 14 CFR 135.63, an air carrier operator is required to maintain records of a pilot’s aeronautical experience “in sufficient detail to determine the pilot’s qualifications to pilot aircraft in operation under this part….”  No record was found of pilot qualifications for persons named as ACES pilots by the director of operations.

 

“The principal operations inspector assigned to ACES stated that he could not recall if ACES had training records required by 14 CFR 135.323 when the initial base inspection of the operator was conducted.  He also stated that the training records, however, normally would be reviewed when the pilots receive a checkride and that the training records would be examined by the inspector conducting checkrides of the operator’s pilots.  No pilot training records were found during the investigation of the accident.

 

“Title 14 CFR 135.37 requires that one of the management personnel of each certificate holder be designated as a director of maintenance. The principal maintenance inspector for ACES stated that a director of maintenance was not required in this instance since the operator had an agreement with a repair facility to assure that required maintenance would be performed. He provided a letter from the operator which named a repair facility’s inspector as the person responsible for the duties of the director of maintenance. The repair facility inspector said that he did not assume any responsibility for ACES other than to conduct requested maintenance on its airplane and that he was not aware the aircraft was to be inspected and maintained under 14 CFR Part 135.  As a result, the operator had no director of maintenance as required by 14 CFR 135.37.

 

“Title 14 CFR 135.71 requires that operators establish a procedure through which a pilot can determine the airworthiness of the aircraft before flight. The manual for ACES stated that a status board would be kept in the operator’s offices for that purpose. A status board was not found during the investigation and the director of operations/chief pilot said he was not aware that a status board existed. Discrepancies discovered during the accident investigation indicated that  the operator did not meet the requirements of 14 CFR Part 135 for issuance of an Air Carrier Operating Certificate….”  (NTSB/AAR-87/02/SUM, 1987, pp. 9-15.)

 

Newspaper

 

Sep 30: “Jenkinsburg, Ga. – A single-engine plane packed with skydivers preparing for a formation jump stalled shortly after takeoff Sunday and nose-dived onto a rural road, killing all 17 people aboard The plane had been grounded Friday for fuel contamination and it was not known if the problem had been fixed a Federal Aviation Administration spokesman said.  The craft also may have been overloaded for the skydiving run, another FAA official said.

 

“The Cessna 208 Caravan owned by Air Carrier Express Services and leased to the Westwind Sports and Parachute Center, stalled three minutes after takeoff from a private airport 45 miles south of Atlanta and crashed at about 12:15 p m , police said.  An FAA inspector grounded the Cessna Friday after discovering its fuel was contaminated and notifying the plane’s owner FAA spokesman Roger Myers said Sunday night. ‘He (the inspector) said, ‘Hey, you’ve got a fuel contamination problem here — this aircraft should not be flown until it is repaired,’’ Myers said. Another FAA official questioned whether the plane had the capacity to carry the 16 jumpers aboard along with the pilot.  But club spokesman Bill Scott said the aircraft was certified by the FAA to fly 17 people.  Barker said the plane, owned by Air Carrier Express Services of Atlanta, climbed to an altitude of 1,000 feet before witnesses saw it stall.  Parachutists aboard the second plane jumped to the crash spot but found no survivors…” (Daily Herald (Chicago). “Plane Crash Kills 14 Skydivers,” Sep 30, 1985, p. 46.)

 

Sources

 

Daily Herald, Chicago, IL. “Plane Crash Kills 14 Skydivers,” Sep 30, 1985, p. 46. Accessed at:  http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=15886995

 

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident/Incident Summary Reports (NTSB/AAR-87/02/SUM). Washington, DC: NTSB. 6-30-1987, 48 p. Accessed 1-22-2017 at: http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-summaries/AAR87-02S.pdf

[1] “The EPA can is used to collect fuel rejected by the engine during normal shutdown, and it is used to prevent fuel from draining overboard.”  (NTSB/AAR-87/02/SUM, p. 11)

[2] “The bypass indicator indicates that the fuel filter is blocked with foreign material and that fuel is bypassing the filter.”  (NTSB/AAR-87/02/SUM, p. 11)