1959 — Sep 24, Reeve Aleutian Airways fl. #3 approach crash, Great Sitkin Island, AK– 16
–16 AirDisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 09241959.
–16 Baugher. 1942 USAAF Serial Numbers (42-70686 to 42-91973). 5-18-2011 rev.
–16 CAB. AAR. Reeve Aleutian Airways…Great Sitkin Island…Alaska, 24 Sep 1959.
–16 Liefer, G. P. Broken Wings: Tragedy & Disaster in Alaska Civil Aviation. 2003, p. 166.
Narrative Information
Baugher: “Douglas C-54B-1-DC Skymaster….72381…to Twentieth Century Airlines in 1946 as N63396. Bought by Reeve Aleutian Airways Apr 7, 1957. Crashed Great Sitkin Isle while on approach to Adak, Alaska Sep 24, 1959. 16 killed.” (Baugher. 1942 USAAF Serial Numbers (42-70686 to 42-91973). 5-18-2011 rev.)
Civil Aeronautics Board: “Synopsis On September 24, 1959, at approximately 1717 A.S.T. [Alaska Standard Time], a Douglas C-54B-DC, N 63396, operated by Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc., as Flight 3, crashed into the northeast side of Great Sitkin Island killing all 16 persons on board.
“Flight 3 was a scheduled flight between Anchorage and Shemya, with intermediate stops at Cold Bay and Adak, Alaska. A routine takeoff was made at Cold Bay, and all en route radio reporting points were made to the company within two or three minutes of their estimated times. At 1650 A.S.T., the flight reported that it was 100 miles northeast of Adak, at 4,500 feet, on top and in the clear. Flight 3 then estimated it would be over the Adak low frequency range at 1725 A.S.T. The flight was cleared to the Adak low frequency range, to maintain VFR on top, and to call Adak approach control when 30 miles out for landing instructions. At 1715 A.S.T., the flight advised the company it was canceling its IFR flight plan and was proceeding VFR. Two minutes later Flight 3 attempted to communicate with Adak approach control. Upon hearing this message, approach control called the flight but was unsuccessful. It was later determined that the aircraft had crashed on Great Sitkin Island and that there were no survivors.
“This accident occurred as a result of the pilot’s failure to maintain flight in accordance with visual flight rules over hazardous terrain….
“Investigation …Captain Strouse’s medical certificate was not current; his last medical examination, required each six months, had been taken some three years previously. As chief pilot of the company, as well as being a company agent responsible for the maintenance of pilot records, Captain Strouse was in a position where he readily could have falsified his own records. The Board believes that if an FAA inspector had asked for Captain Strouse’s medical certificate to examine it, during the three years it was not current, the lack of its validity would have been discovered….
“Throughout the flight from Cold Bay to the last reporting point all reporting points were reached approximately when estimated. From this fact it must be concluded that Captain Strouse could have easily computed his position at the time he canceled the flight plan and should have known approximately how far he was from the only obstacle of any proportion along the course. Since Great Sitkin Island is 5,740 feet in height, and at the time was obscured from the pilot’s view by converging, cloud layers as well as the orographic formation surrounding the mountain, and since the flight was cruising IFR on top at 4,500 feet, it is obvious that a change of course or altitude had to be made to avoid it. If the captain had elected to continue IFR, under the existing weather conditions, he would have had to change course, climb and maintain VFR on top, or request an amended clearance for an altitude assignment of at least 8,000 feet (the minimum en route altitude). To do this would have taken very little extra time and this should not have been a deciding factor because the airplane was to remain overnight in Adak and no other uses were scheduled for it. Captain Strouse did not elect to take any of the above courses of action, but instead decided to cancel his IFR flight plan and proceed VFR.
“At the time this decision was made, the aircraft was computed to be approximately 35 nautical miles from its destination and about 9 nautical miles from Great Sitkin Island. Due to the lack of precise information, it is not definitely known what the cloud coverage was where the descent was begun; however, it is believed that it was slightly better than that in close proximity to Great Sitkin Island. It is logical to assume that a pilot with this captain’s experience and background would not deliberately descend into a solid cloud condition after stating that he was going to proceed VFR. He must have thought that he could descend to a safe altitude below the clouds in accordance with visual flight rules and proceed in this manner to his destination.
“Conclusion Since the aircraft was apparently in the clouds just prior to impact, the Board concludes that the pilot for reasons unknown, did not continue to maintain visual reference to the extent necessary to navigate successfully through hazardous terrain.
“Since the aircraft was apparently in the clouds just prior to impact, the Board concludes that the pilot for reasons unknown, did not continue to maintain visual reference to the extent necessary to navigate successfully through hazardous terrain.
“It cannot definitely be determined to what degree, if any, the cerebrovascular disease from which the captain suffered contributed to this accident. However, the fact that poor judgment is one of the results of this disease, it is possible that this may have caused him to attempt to proceed visually under conditions in which better judgment would have caused him to be more cautious.
“In any event the Board must conclude that the failure to maintain flight over hazardous terrain, in accordance with visual flight rules, was not compatible with the degree of judgment expected of an airline pilot.
“The company has taken the following corrective action: All approaches into Adak are to be made in accordance with instrument flight rules. Photographic copies of each pilot’s medical certificates are to be made upon the pilot’s receipt of the certificate and placed in the file.” (CAB. AAR. Reeve Aleutian Airways…Great Sitkin Island…Alaska, 24 Sep 1959.)
Sources
AirDisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 09241959. Accessed at: http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=09241959®=N63396&airline=Reeve+Aleutian+Airlines
[This site is no longer up, servers having crashed early 2008.]
Baugher, Joseph F. 1942 USAAF Serial Numbers (42-70686 to 42-91973). 5-18-2011 revision. Accessed 12-16-2011 at: http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1942_4.html
Civil Aeronautics Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc., Great Sitkin Island, Aleutian Chain, Alaska, September 24, 1959. Wash., DC: CAB, Aug 30, 1960, 8 pp. At: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=*P%3A%5CDOT%5Cairplane%20accidents%5Cwebsearch%5C092459.pdf
[Link inoperable when checked 12-30-2017.]
Liefer, G. P. Broken Wings: Tragedy & Disaster in Alaska Civil Aviation. Blaine, WA: Hancock House, 2003.