1965 — Aug 25, Explosions (26) and Fire, Du Pont Chemical Corp., near Louisville, KY– 12

 

–12  Armistead. “Du Pont’s Louisville Works Explosion.” Fire Journal, V60/N1, Jan 1966, p.37

–12  Barlay, Stephen. Fire: An International Report. Brattleboro: Stephen Greene, 1973, p. 142.

–12  Bruggers. “Hazmat Happenings,” Courier-Journal.com (KY), October 6, 2006.

–12  Khan & Abbasi. “Major Accidents in Process Industries…,” LPPI Journal, Vol. 12, 1999.

–12  Klein, James A. “Two Centuries of Process Safety at DuPont.”

–12  Louisville Courier-Journal. “History of Rubbertown,” October 26, 2003.

–12  Mannan. Lee’s Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Case Histories App. 1, p. 33.

–12  National Fire Protection Association. 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, p. 139.

–12  NFPA. “The Major Fires of 1965.” Fire Journal, Vol. 60, No. 3, May 1966, pp. 52-53.

–12  United Steelworkers. Not Walking the Talk: Dupont’s Untold Safety Failures. 2005, p. 9.

–12  Victoria Advocate, TX. “Safety Training Minimized Losses in…Blast.” 9-26-1965, 7A.

 

Narrative Information

 

Armistead:[1] “Du Pont’s Louisville Works is located southwest of the city on the banks of the Ohio River in the heart of a two-square-mile industrial complex named Rubber- town that is bordered by a rural residential area. It is six miles from the center of downtown Louisville.

 

“Du Pont’s manufacturing process involves the three- step conversion of acetylene gas to monovinylacetylene (MVA), then to chlorobutadiene (CD ), and finally, by polymerization, to neoprene. The first two steps are conducted in manufacturing units of generally open-type construction stretching out in lines as long as 1,800 feet.

 

“A work force of nearly 2,000 operates the plant 24 hours a day, seven days a week. On the morning of Wednesday, August 25, 1965, the normal day crew of 850 people was at work.

 

“At 9:28 am a major explosion shook the plant and the surrounding countryside….

 

“In thirteen minutes, by 9:41 am, a total of ten ex­plosions had occurred. On the basis of observations of the disaster area made by plant supervisors, the con­trol center gave the order to evacuate the plant….

 

“Evacuation had been completed and the first hospital run was on its way by 9:45 am. ….

 

“Explosions from the plant continued. By 11:00 am eight additional explosions had oc­curred, making a total of eighteen. Smoke and flames were billowing from the disaster area of the plant….

 

“At 5:45 pm another large explosion, the last, brought an immediate halt to rescue operations. Nineteen police and volunteer firemen received injuries….

 

“It was not until 2:30 pm Thursday that plant and civil authorities felt assured that the hazards in the plant were fully under control….

 

“Twelve lives were lost in the disaster. Eleven were killed instantly in the first explosion; the twelfth victim died two days later from severe burns. All but one, a subcontractor’s employee, were Du Pont people….

 

“The investigation following the explosion defined the cause as a mechanical failure in a compressor circula­ting gaseous MVA in the reactor system. This highly flammable material has characteristics similar to acety­lene and under certain conditions will decompose with explosive violence. The mechanical failure caused localized heating in metal moving parts to such an extent that the extremely high temperature initiated a decomposition. Instantly, materials in adjoining equip­ment underwent violent decomposition.

 

“The series of subsequent explosions was caused by fragments from the first explosion, flame impingement, and transmission through pipelines….” (Armistead, J. G. “Du Pont’s Louisville Works Explosion.” Fire Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1, Jan 1966, pp. 35-39.)

 

Klein: “In many respects, the modern era of Process Safety Management (PSM) at DuPont began with a serious process incident in Louisville, Kentucky in 1965, which resulted in 12 fatalities, 61 injuries, and a property loss of over $50 million.  Following the incident, corporate management asked each site to review their production facilities and procedures to assess the potential for catastrophic events and to take appropriate preventive measures.  An annual review was also instituted to ensure that process additions or changes did not create new hazards, and in following years, many sites conducted annual, in-depth process hazard reviews to evaluate the process safety of site processes. By 1973, new guidance was issued that detailed suggested hazard review methodologies and frequencies. A corporate guideline for Process Hazards Reviews was issued later in 1978, and a comprehensive, integrated corporate Process Hazards Management (PHM) guideline was issued in 1979.

 

“The PHM guideline, now generally referred to as Process Safety Management (PSM), was intended to help prevent ‘serious, process-related incidents, which might affect plant personnel, off-site communities, the environment, or result in significant property loss or loss of business.’ Its purpose was to:

 

  • Establish a framework to help focus management efforts on this important, serious, and complex subject.
  • Comprehensively describe the principles and essential features of Process Safety Management for use by sites in managing Process Safety.
  • Describe Corporate Business responsibilities and activities.”

 

(Klein, James A. “Two Centuries of Process Safety at DuPont.” Wilmington, DE:  E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company.)

 

Newspapers

 

Aug 25: “Louisville, Ky. (UPI) – Dozens of violent explosions ripped through a Du Pont Chemical Corp. plant five miles from downtown Louisville today.  Authorities evacuated everyone from a two-mile radius in fear a huge tank of vinyl chloride would explode…The explosions sent towering mushroom clouds of black smoke into the air, shattering dozens of windows in buildings and could be heard 10 miles away.  Periodic blasts could be heard for more than two hours.  All available emergency equipment from the city and county was rushed to the scene shortly after the first series of blasts occurred.  But the explosions continued to rock the area and authorities ordered the firemen and police to withdraw…The chemical plant, which employs about 3,000 persons is located in southwest Jefferson County in Louisville’s ‘Rubbertown’ area.” (Great Bend Daily Tribune, KS. “Explosions Rip Chemical Plant At Louisville,” 25 Aug 1965.)

 

Aug 26: “Louisville, Ky. (AP) – The du Pont synthetic rubber plant, battered by explosions and fires, remained sealed off today as the number of missing men climbed to eleven.

 

“Rescue workers were ordered to stay out of the flame-charred wreckage until safety experts gave them an “all-clear” signal.

 

“All families ordered evacuated as a precautionary measure yesterday also were forbidden to return home. Many spent the night at a school which was converted to a refugee center.

 

“Rain and gray skies added to the impression of gloom hanging over the giant installation, turning into a blazing inferno by 26 explosions and fires.

 

“At least 39 men were injured, one critically, during the disaster, the worst industrial accident in Louisville’s history. Du Pont said a bricklayer, employed by a private contractor at the plant, was added to the list of missing when he failed to return home.

 

“National Guardsmen, who had been on duty throughout the night to prevent looting, were replaced early today by Jefferson County police. They permitted some du Pont mechanics, production and operations workers to enter but all others were waved away.

 

“Company officials said the cost of damage will be from $5 million to $10 million. The explosions were centered in the area where monovinylacetylene, a form of acetylene that keeps its explosive qualities, is used in making neoprene.

 

“The Red Cross said it had found housing for about 200 persons who were evacuated from their homes near the complex situated in the city’s west end, near the Ohio River.

 

“There are three tiers of production buildings — valued at well over $100 million — in the du Pont section. The explosions were concentrated in the southwest corner. The complex includes five other large chemical works, an aluminum plant and a generating station for electricity.

 

“Black smoke drifted over downtown Louisville, about five miles away, throughout the day.

 

“The fire started with the first explosion about 9:20 a.m., when officials said, about 850 people

were in the plant.

 

“The injured included 11 volunteer firemen. Eight du Pont employes were hospitalized, two in critical condition.

 

“S. W. Buckel, a maintenance engineer who was about 200 feet from the first explosion, said, ‘I saw smoke flying in the air, a flash – it was about five stories high – and then the building shook like hell. I was looking right at it.’….

 

“Karl Kuehr, a carpenter, said the first blast knocked him down. ‘I tried to get up and then there was another explosion,’ he said. ‘The next thing I knew I was about 1,200 feet away, draped over a drain pipe. Debris was flying over and windows were popping out everywhere.’….

 

“The area was evacuated for fear that a storage tank containing about 300,000 pounds of explosive material also would go off. Gas was burning on a vent atop the tank.

 

“Officials thought the danger of new explosions had passed and, for the first time since mid-morning, moved a large number of firemen and du Pont employes into the plant to fight the main fire and search for bodies. It was then that the final huge blast of the day went off. ‘A piece of machinery in the fire all day evidently just got hot enough to explode,’ an official said.

 

“Shively policeman John Milliner, 31, said, ‘We were underneath it all unpacking bodies from the morning blasts…Then concussion…we started running, but fell flat.’….

 

“All persons were removed from the plant except about 150 security personnel and employes trying to restore power to water pumps to fight the fire.

 

“The storage tanks are more than 300 yards from the main fire and blast area.

 

“Du Pont officials declined to speculate on the cause of the first explosion, but, they said, in a gaseous from the monovinylacetylene could be ignited by any spark, even from a shoe-nail on concrete.

 

“It was the worst industrial accident in the city’s history.” (Charleston Daily Mail, WV. “11 Missing, 39 Hurt in Louisville Blast.” 8-26-1965, pp. 1 and 8.)

 

Aug 27: “Louisville, Ky. (AP) — With the danger of further explosions ended, firemen soaked the rubble on the du Pont plant grounds for six hours early today and prepared to bring in heavy equipment in the hunt for more victims of an industrial disaster.

 

“Nine bodies were recovered from amid the blackened remains of a synthetic rubber facility yesterday and were identified by relatives. Two men remained missing and were believed buried

in the plant.

 

“Col. Eugene Dodson, Louisville’s fire chief, said the bodies were found ‘within a 65-yard area of where we think the main blasts were concentrated’ in the southwest section of the plnt. Twenty-six explosions within nine hours Wednesday spread fire over an area 250 yards long and 75 yards wide.

 

“Elwood J. Crispin, 53, a general foreman, who was burned over all of his body, was in serious condition but ‘more comfortable’ at  Louisville hospital early today. He was one of 12 persons still hospitalized. Twenty-seven others were treated for injuries and have been released from hospitals.

 

“Chief Deputy Coroner William Anderson said the bodies removed yesterday were those of

 

Thomas H. Clore, 36;

Charles F. Clem, 57;

Edmond Dever, 52;

Gaines R. Taylor, 46;

Christopher N. Sinback, 46;

George A. Cracraft, 36, and

Johnny G. Dawson, 26, all of Louisville; and

David H. Thompson, 43, New Albany, Ind., and

John Summers, 55, Jeffersonville, Ind.

 

“Du Pont officials said a research and development team is investigating to determine the cause of the original explosion. The first blast is believed to have been a minor one which bred major explosions heard 20 miles from the scene.

 

“Residents who had been evacuated from within a three-mile radius of the industrial complex known as ‘Rubbertown’ returned to their homes yesterday….

 

“About two-thirds of the du Pont operations remain idled by the explosion.” (Charleston Daily Mail, WV. “Blast Danger Ends at Du Pont Plant; Nine Bodies Found.” 8-27-1965, p. 10.)

 

Aug 28: “Louisville, KY. (AP) — Elwood J. Crispin, who suffered burns over 95 per cent of his body in the Du Pont explosions and fires, died in a Louisville hospital late Friday – just hours after he was believed making progress toward recovery. Crispin, 53, became the 11th confirmed fatality…Ten bodies have been recovered from the rubble — all but one has been identified.” (Salt Lake Tribune, UT. “Blast Toll: 11.” 8-28-1965, p. 6.)

 

Sep 26: “Louisville, Ky. (AP) – ‘Since we’ve been back in the plant, we’ve found no instance where our people failed to do what had to be done to secure the plant and get it shut down.’ Thus, after a month-long investigation, a Du Pont official credits alert use of safety training with helping keep the casualties and damage confined to the immediate area of the first of 26 explosions in a section of the synthetic rubber plant. ‘Basic safety is such a habit with them. Not just the conventional hard-hat and glasses approach – it’s a built-in thing,’ added A. T. Tollefsen, superintendent of employe relations. ‘These people didn’t bolt until they had done the tings they had to do before they could leave the plant in as safe a condition as possible,’ he said.

 

“The explosions Aug. 25 touched off a fire in the section where neoprene is produced through an acetylene process. Of the 850 persons in the plant when the first blast occurred in a large compressor, 12 died and 30 were hurt….

 

“`The actual cause of the first explosion has not yet been determined,’ H. B. Eaton Jr., plant manager, told a Jefferson County (Louisville) coroner’s jury which last week ruled the deaths accidental.

 

“Production has resumed in 75 per cent of the plant. The workforce of about 2,000 is back to normal. No employe lost income as a result of the incident….

 

“Du Pont’s extensive disaster control program is given a full-scale, unannounced test at least one a year for each shift, Tollefsen said. The workers on the job at the time of the explosions had undergone the test about two weeks earlier. ‘The training was effective,’ he added.” (Victoria Advocate, TX. “Safety Training Minimized Losses in Du Pont Plant Blast.” 9-26-1965, 7A.)

 

Sources

 

Armistead, J. G. “Du Pont’s Louisville Works Explosion.” Fire Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1, Jan 1966, pp. 35-39.

 

Barlay, Stephen. Fire: An International Report. Brattleboro, VT: Stephen Greene Press, 1973.

 

Bruggers, James. “Hazmat Happenings, Courier-Journal.com (KY), 10-6-2006.  Accessed at:  http://www.courier-journal.com/blogs/bruggers/2006_10_01_archive.html

 

Charleston Daily Mail, WV. “11 Missing, 39 Hurt in Louisville Blast.” 8-26-1965, pp. 1 and 8. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=45983427&sterm=du+pont+louisville

 

Charleston Daily Mail, WV. “Blast Danger Ends at Du Pont Plant; Nine Bodies Found.” 8-27-1965, p. 10. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=39820736&sterm=du

 

Khan, Faisal I. and S.A. Abbasi. “Major Accidents in Process Industries and an Analysis of Causes and Consequences.” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 12, 1999, pp. 361-378. At: http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:http://202.38.89.99/Loss_prevention/99503.

 

Klein, James A. “Two Centuries of Process Safety at DuPont.” Wilmington, DE:  E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company.  Accessed 4-20-2009 at:  http://cee.che.ufl.edu/AIChE_CEE_Klein_DuPont_Extended.pdf

 

Louisville Courier-Journal, KY. “History of Rubbertown.” 10-26-2003. Accessed at:  http://orig.courier-journal.com/cjextra/2003projects/toxicair/1026/2wir-5-angsttime1026-6467.html

 

Mannan, Sam (Ed.). Lee’s Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: Hazard Identification, Assessment and Control (3rd Ed., 3 Vols.). Burlington, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2005.

 

National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.

 

National Fire Protection Association. “The Major Fires of 1965.” Fire Journal, Vol. 60, No. 3, May 1966, pp. 52-54.

 

Salt Lake Tribune, UT. “Blast Toll: 11.” 8-28-1965, p. 6. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=93560446&sterm=du+pont+louisville

 

United Steelworkers of America and AFL-CIO, CLC. Not Walking the Talk: Dupont’s Untold Safety Failures. September, 2005, 28 pages. Accessed at:  http://www.dupontsafetyrevealed.org/Not%20Walking%20the%20Talk/Walking%20the%20Talk-%20Duponts%20Untold%20Safety%20Failures-%20Final.pdf

 

Victoria Advocate, TX. “Safety Training Minimized Losses in Du Pont Plant Blast.” 9-26-1965, 7A. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=84726031&sterm=du+pont

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] Special Assistant to Director of Manufacture, Elastomers Chemicals Department, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.